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Genealogical debunking arguments aim to show that, given their provenance, none of our 
moral beliefs are justified, at least assuming moral realism. In particular, they claim that this is so 
because the best, complete explanation of why we hold the moral beliefs we do neither presupposes 
nor entails their truth. I dispute this explanatory claim, suggesting instead that, in at least some cases, 
the best explanation of our beliefs must appeal to our capacity to acquire moral knowledge through 
reflection. To defend this suggestion, I respond to three different rejoinders debunkers might offer. 
One of these contends that the proposed explanation is redundant: if we want to explain why 
someone judges some action wrong, all we need to know is the character of their moral sensibilities. 
Two other rejoinders appeal to general skeptical challenges. According to the first, if realism is true, 
the evidence available to us in reflection necessarily underdetermines the truth of our ethical beliefs. 
Like the so-called Benacerraf-Field challenge to mathematical platonism from which it derives, the 
second challenge involves two distinct charges: first, that knowledge requires there be a causal or 
explanatory connection between our beliefs and the facts that realism precludes, and second, that 
realists cannot explain our reliability in ethics. Making novel use of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks 
about following rules, I argue that that each of the first two rejoinders rests on a confused view 
about the ways we are liable to go wrong in ethical reflection. In response to the third rejoinder, I 
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argue that while the no-accident condition on knowledge is indeed best understood in explanatory 
terms, realism does not preclude the possibility that our beliefs might satisfy this condition on 
knowledge; in addition, I explain how realists can explain our reliability in ethics. In all of these 
cases, moreover, I suggest that the responses I outline are open only to proponents of a deflationary 
form of realism that, following Amie Thomasson, I call “simple realism,” conceding to debunkers 
that their arguments are likely unanswerable by proponents of more inflationary or so-called 
“robust” forms of realism. 
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 In particular, I want to thank Dean Moyar and Richard Bett, both for providing invaluable 
verbal and written feedback and for supporting me in many other ways throughout the process; the 
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But then with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the 
convictions of man’s mind, which has been developed from the mind 
of the lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy. Would any 
one trust in the convictions of a monkey’s mind, if there are any 
convictions in such a mind? 
 
-Darwin to W. Graham, July 3rd, 18811 
 
 
 Though he does express the thought in an unusually colorful way, Darwin was neither the 
first nor the last to think facts about their provenance give us reason to be suspicious of our beliefs. 
Nietzsche’s claims in On the Genealogy of Morality that Christian moral beliefs originated in ressentiment 
are meant to undermine those beliefs, just as Freud’s claim in The Future of an Illusion that religious 
beliefs are a form of wish fulfillment are meant to undermine them. Similarly, Marx’s claim in The 
German Ideology that “the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas” is meant to 
                                                 
1 Darwin correspondence project number 13230, quoted at Fraser, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the 
Reliability of Moral Cognition,” p. 457. 
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debunk prevailing moral, political, and economic ideas by suggesting that they reflect, not moral, 
political, and economic reality, but the class interests of the bourgeoisie.2 More recently, several 
philosophers, most prominently Sharon Street and Richard Joyce, have followed in Darwin’s 
footsteps, suggesting that their evolutionary origins should lead us to doubt our moral beliefs or to 
regard them as unjustified.3   
 In all of these cases, the impetus is an observation about the source of our beliefs or about 
the influences that shape or explain why we hold the beliefs we do. Notice, though, that the mere 
fact that our beliefs have a history or are shaped in all sorts of ways does not by itself entail that they 
are untrustworthy, unjustified, or in some other way epistemically suspect. Far from it; in fact, 
information about the sources of or influences on our beliefs can often vindicate or justify them. 
Suppose, for instance, that a friend tells me the twin prime conjecture is false. Though I am not 
familiar with the details, I am under the impression that twin prime conjecture is an unproven 
mathematical theorem, and since I have no reason to think my non-mathematician friend knows 
anything more about the conjecture than I do, I might wonder whether she has good reason to 
believe as she does. However, were she to explain that earlier in the day she had read an article in 
The Washington Post in which a prominent mathematician claimed to have disproven the conjecture, I 
would not only cease to be suspicious but would come to regard my friend’s belief as justified and 
likely true. In other cases, of course, information about the provenance of some belief does serve to 
undermine it. This would be so if my friend had instead answered that he decided the conjecture was 
false by flipping a coin. 
                                                 
2 On Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, see Brian Leiter, “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud.” The quotation from The German Ideology comes from part I, section B of that work, in the sub-section entitled 
“Ruling Class and Ruling Ideas.”  
3 See Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value” and Joyce, The Evolution of Morality. Other 
evolutionary debunking arguments include, inter alia, Michael Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, ch. 6; Gilbert Harman, 
Thinking How to Live, ch. 13; Kitcher, The Ethical Project, part II; Braddock, “Debunking Arguments from Insensitivity”; 
Locke, “Darwinian Normative Skepticism”; Justin Horn, “Evolution and the Epistemological Challenge to Moral 
Realism”; and Matt Lutz, “What Makes Evolution a Defeater.” 
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What accounts for the difference between these cases is the nature of the belief sources cited 
in each. In the first case, where information about the provenance of my friend’s belief serves to 
exculpate and justify it, she forms her belief about the twin prime conjecture after coming across 
expert testimony on the subject. In the second, by contrast, she forms her belief by flipping a coin. 
These two influences on my friend’s belief differ with respect to their relationship to its truth: 
whereas the testimony of mathematicians is generally a reliable guide to truth in mathematics, the 
result of a coin flip has nothing whatsoever to do with the truth of the twin prime conjecture. We 
can call salutary those influences on the content of our beliefs that, like the first, push us toward the 
truth; by contrast, those that influence the content of our beliefs in ways that have nothing to do 
with their truth—influences like that of a coin flip—are irrelevant.4 Plausibly, that a belief is explained 
by salutary influences gives us reason to think it justified or likely to be true; by contrast, when we 
have reason to think it a product of irrelevant influences, we ought to regard it as unjustified or likely 
false. Similarly, if we learn that all of someone’s beliefs of some sort are subject to one or the other 
type of influence, we should take them to be reliable or unreliable about that sort of thing, 
respectively. If my friend were to reveal that she forms all of her mathematical beliefs by flipping 
coins, for instance, I should think twice before asking her for help calculating the tip. 
Recall now Darwin’s “horrid doubt.” Its source, it would seem, was the perfectly sensible 
view that evolution is an irrelevant influence on the content of our beliefs. If that’s right, Darwin 
wonders, how can we take ourselves we are reliable about anything? Similarly, Nietzsche takes it that 
ressentiment is an irrelevant influence on the content of Christians’ moral beliefs, just as Freud and 
Marx take it that beliefs that have their origin in wish fulfillment or the class interests of the 
bourgeoisie are just as likely to be true as not. 
Though my remarks in the chapters to follow do have some bearing on these other 
                                                 
4 I take this latter term from Katia Vavova; see her “Irrelevant Influences.” 
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arguments, they will not be my focus here. Rather, my topic is the so-called evolutionary debunking 
arguments that have recently garnered a good deal of attention in the literature. Different 
evolutionary debunking arguments differ in their details, but all of them begin with the observation 
that our moral beliefs are to a significant extent shaped by the apparently irrelevant influence of 
natural selection and attempt to leverage that observation to cast doubt on the epistemic credentials 
of our moral beliefs. Some maintain that these influences explain why we hold the moral beliefs we 
do and conclude, on that basis, that none of our moral beliefs are justified. Others note that, since 
they push us toward whichever judgments they do whatever the truth may be, the cumulative effect 
of these influences is more likely than not to distort our moral vision, so to speak—to shape us such 
that judgments that are not in fact true strike us plausible or even obviously correct. As a result, they 
conclude, we are almost certainly wildly unreliable about moral matters.  
  In what follows, I distinguish several different evolutionary debunking arguments, arguing 
that, ultimately, none are compelling. Along the way I develop a novel, broadly Wittgensteinian view 
about what we might call the limits of moral discourse—that is, about the kind of moral questions 
we can intelligibly raise and the kinds of moral claims we can intelligibly make. Drawing on this 
conception, I suggest that two of the three most compelling versions of the debunking challenge 
depend on the possibility of asking questions and making claims that in fact cannot be made 
intelligible. In response to the third version of the debunking challenge I take up, I side with a 
handful of philosophers and set myself against much recent work in epistemology by arguing that 
the no-accident condition on knowledge is best understood in explanatory terms and defend a novel, 
teleological proposal as to how moral beliefs can satisfy that condition. Finally, I flesh out this 
suggestion by explaining how we can acquire moral knowledge through reflection even if moral facts 
are objective or mind-independent.  
 I begin in chapter one by setting out the debunking challenge in detail and explaining why 
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only three of the five evolutionary debunking arguments I distinguish are plausible enough to merit 
extensive discussion. I go on, in chapter two, to develop a rejoinder to the first two of these, in the 
drawing process drawing on Wittgenstein’s famous remarks on rule-following. In my third chapter I 
address the third of the three evolutionary debunking arguments I think worthy of consideration, 
and finally, in chapter four, I take up and respond to a variety of objections to my response to 
debunkers.  
 As I hope will become clear, my discussion here amounts to a defense of the possibility of 
critical ethical reflection and, thereby, of genuine epistemic agency. Evolutionary and other irrelevant 
influences on our ethical beliefs notwithstanding, I argue, it is possible to acquire knowledge of 
objective ethical facts through reflection and, consequently, to distinguish salutary from irrelevant 
influences on our moral thinking. We accordingly need not be the epistemic equivalents of a boat 
whose captain has absconded, buffeted about by forces utterly beyond our control and landing 
wherever the wind and the tides push us.5 Instead we can take the helm, thinking carefully about 
whether or not to indulge our various inclinations with a view to ensuring that our beliefs match the 
facts. And, with enough hard work a bit of luck, we may even manage it. 
  
                                                 
5 Since its use by Street at “Darwinian Dilemma,” p. 121, this image has made frequent appearances in the literature on 













The primary task of this this first chapter is to introduce the debunking challenge to which 
the next three develop a response. I begin in §1.1 by laying out the first of the three main versions of 
that challenge that have received significant amounts of attention in the literature; then, in §1.2, I 
further develop this first argument by considering the ways its proponents might respond to an 
obvious objection. In §1.3, I introduce the second and third types of debunking argument that have 
been discussed in the literature, explaining why I do not plan to engage with them in much detail. 
Next, in §1.4, I say a bit about how the challenge might be generalized beyond the moral domain. 
Finally, in §1.5, I turn my attention to the notion of objectivity and briefly sketch out the 
deflationary form of realism I will be concerned to defend against debunkers. As a whole, the 
chapter serves not just to introduce and clarify the problem to which I mean to respond but also 
motivate my particular framing of it. 
 
1.1. Debunking Argument 1: Explaining Beliefs 
The most compelling and probably best-known version of the debunking challenge attempts to 
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leverage some sort of explanatory claim about our moral thinking to show that all of our moral 
judgments are, in one way or another, in bad shape. In the following passage from Joyce’s The 
Evolution of Morality, for example, the explanatory claim appears to be focused on why we form the 
moral beliefs we do, and the conclusion is that none of our moral judgments are justified and that 
we should accordingly suspend judgment as to their truth: 
We have an empirically well-confirmed theory about where our moral judgments come 
from…. This theory doesn’t state or imply that they are true, it doesn’t have as a background 
assumption that they are true, and, importantly, their truth is not surreptitiously buried in the 
theory by virtue of any form of moral naturalism. This amounts to the discovery that our 
moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, which 
forces the recognition that we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these 
beliefs. They could be true, but we have no reason for thinking so. Thus we should, initially, 
cultivate an open mind in order to go and find some other more reliable grounds for either 
believing or disbelieving moral propositions.1 
 
Joyce’s is the best-known version, but many people have made or discussed similar arguments, 
among them Allan Gibbard, Philip Kitcher, Matthew Braddock, Dustin Locke, and most recently, 
Matt Lutz.2 
 Similarities notwithstanding, different iterations of this argument differ in a variety of ways. 
Thus, on some variants, the explanatory claim is simply that we can explain why we form the moral 
judgments we do without presupposing their truth or making any reference to moral facts, while on 
others it is that we can provide a complete explanation of this sort or that the best complete 
explanation of why we form the moral beliefs we do is like this. Moreover, in some cases, the 
explanandum is, not why we form the particular moral beliefs we do, but why our moral sensibilities 
are as they are, or in other words, why certain moral propositions strike us as plausible while others 
                                                 
1 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, p. 211. 
2 See Harman, Thinking How to Live, ch. 13; Kitcher, The Ethical Project, part II; Braddock, “Debunking Arguments from 
Insensitivity”; Locke, “Darwinian Normative Skepticism”; and Lutz, “What Makes Evolution a Defeater.” Locke 




do not.3 And while all go on to suggest it follows that our moral judgments are in some way bad off, 
different iterations differ as to the exact respect in which this is supposed to be the case. Thus, some 
conclude that we ought to suspend judgment about the truth of or withhold belief from all moral 
propositions, some that none of our moral beliefs are justified, and still others that all of them are 
defeated.4 Finally, while some versions of the argument suggest that the explanatory claim directly 
entails the debunking conclusion, others maintain that it does so only by way of its implications for 
some allegedly epistemically significant modal connection between our beliefs and the facts. In that 
case, the argument would go something like this: 
1. The best complete explanation of why we make the ethical judgments we do does not 
presuppose their truth.  
2. If the best complete explanation of why we make the ethical judgments we do does not 
presuppose their truth, the belief-forming processes that lead us to make those judgments 
are highly insensitive; i.e., they would lead us to form the same beliefs even if those beliefs 
were false.  
3. So the belief-forming processes that lead us to make those judgments are highly insensitive. 
(1, 2) 
4. But if those processes are insensitive, they are unreliable.  
5. So all of our belief-forming processes are unreliable. (3, 4)  
6. If we know that the processes whereby we form our beliefs are unreliable, we are not 
justified in continuing to hold those beliefs. 
7. So we are not justified in holding any ethical beliefs. (5, 6)5 
 
Clearly, possibilities abound. 
Fortunately for would-be anti-debunkers like myself, it is possible to extract from all of this 
variety a single argument that, without distortion, accurately represents the thought behind all of 
these different versions. To explain how, I’ll take the various axes along which the argument can 
vary one by one. 
                                                 
3 In his “What Makes Evolution a Defeater,” pp. 1110-1111, Matt Lutz endorses the latter formulation, but most other 
formulations seem to go with the former. 
4 For the first, see Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, ch. 6 and Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses”; for the 
second, see Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, ch. 6  and Korman, “Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics”; 
for the last, see Locke, “Darwinian Normative Skepticism” and Lutz, “What Makes Evolution a Defeater.” 
5 This is a simplified version of the argument outlined by Matthew Braddock in his “Debunking Arguments from 
Insensitivity.” As Braddock effectively shows, the step from (3)-(5) would need to be quite a bit more complicated than 
this argument suggests; for details, see “Debunking Arguments,” §4, esp. pp. 101-102. For my purposes, though, these 
complications would just be a distraction. 
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We can start with the possibility just mooted, that the explanatory claim may only entail the 
debunking conclusion by way of its modal implications. In a series of recent papers, Dan Korman, 
Dustin Locke, and Matt Lutz have argued that this modal detour is unnecessary.6 For, they argue, 
while some potential modal connections between our beliefs and the facts might well be 
epistemically significant, evidence that there is no explanatory connection between our beliefs and 
the facts—that is, evidence that it is the case neither that our beliefs explain the facts nor that the 
facts explain our beliefs—is by itself defeating. That is to say, if we learn that we are forming beliefs 
about some domain, D, in a way that has nothing to do with the D-facts, that discovery is sufficient 
all on its own to render our D-beliefs unjustified. I think these philosophers are right about this, and 
so, going forward, I will not worry about any intervening modal steps some might wish to introduce 
into the argument. 
This conclusion suggests a way of reconciling another disagreement among debunkers, about 
what the relevant explanandum is. If Korman, Locke, and Lutz are right, the crucial thing for 
debunkers to provide is evidence that there is no explanatory connection between our moral beliefs 
and the facts. What sort of evidence would suffice for that purpose? Plausibly, precisely the sort 
debunkers have provided, namely evidence that we can explain why we form the moral beliefs we do 
in ways that do not presuppose or entail the truth of our beliefs. This might seem like bad news for 
those debunkers who have thought the relevant explanandum was instead our moral sensibilities; in 
fact, though, these various versions are not so far apart, since explanations of these latter types 
straightforwardly entail explanations of why we form the particular moral beliefs we do. Thus, an 
explanation of our moral sensibilities—of why certain beliefs strike us true and others false—rather 
straightforwardly entails an explanation of why we form the judgements we do. Moreover, it is only 
because this is so that explanations of our moral sensibilities might provide evidence that there is no 
                                                 
6 See Korman, “Debunking Arguments”; Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses”; and Lutz, “What Makes 
Evolution a Defeater.” 
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explanatory connection between our beliefs and the facts. I accordingly conclude that this version of 
the debunking argument is best understood as resting on a claim about what explains why we form 
the moral beliefs we do. 
What about that explanation though? Does it matter if it is complete, or the best complete 
explanation available, or is it enough for the debunkers’ purposes that we can provide explanations 
of our moral beliefs that neither entail nor presuppose their truth? I think the debunker has to claim 
that it is the best complete explanation of our beliefs that is like this. It would not do for it to be the 
case only that some explanations of our beliefs neither entail nor presuppose their truth, for in that 
case anti-debunkers might simply note that some other explanation does and ask why we should 
prefer the debunker’s favored explanation over this other one (more on what an explanation of this 
sort might look like in the next section). Similarly if the debunker were to claim that there is a 
complete explanation of our moral beliefs of the relevant sort. Here again, the anti-debunker might 
simply note that there is a competing, equally complete explanation of our beliefs that does entail 
their truth and invite the debunker to offer some reason why we should prefer her non-fact-
involving explanation over this other one. In short, debunkers must claim, not only that there are 
explanations of our moral beliefs that neither presuppose nor entail their truth or even that these 
explanations are complete. In addition, they must maintain that some such explanation of our moral 
beliefs is the best complete explanation available. More likely than not, most debunkers realize this, 
and formulations that suggest otherwise are just misleading shorthand. 
This brings us, finally, to the conclusion. Recall the options I mentioned earlier: debunkers 
might argue that we ought to suspend judgment about the truth of or withhold belief from all moral 
propositions, that none of our moral beliefs are justified, or that all of our beliefs are defeated. 
Which is it? In a way, I think, all of them. For, notice, these three conclusions are intimately related 
to one another: if our moral beliefs are defeated, none of them are justified, and we ought to 
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suspend judgment about the truth of or withhold belief from all moral propositions. For this reason, 
I doubt that these differences in formulation signal any substantive disagreements between 
debunkers.  
These considerations suggest a way of understanding this first style of debunking argument 
that should be acceptable to everyone involved. Following Korman and Locke, let us say that, for 
any proposition P that is about a domain D, 
The belief that P is e-connected iff it is explained by or explains some facts in D, 
 
Then we might put the argument like this: 
 
1. If S believes that her belief that P is not e-connected, then S’s belief that P is not justified, 
and S is rationally committed to withholding belief that P.7 
2. Realists are committed to denying that our moral beliefs explain the moral facts. 
3. Realists might therefore affirm that our moral beliefs are e-connected only by affirming that 
those facts explain our beliefs 
4. However, there is compelling evidence that that is not the case. In particular, the best, 
complete explanation of why we form the moral beliefs we do—namely, a broadly 
Darwinian one—neither presupposes nor entails their truth. 
5. Realists, then, are committed to denying that our moral beliefs are e-connected. 
6. Assuming realism, none of our moral beliefs are justified, and, for every moral proposition 
P, we are rationally committed to withholding belief that P. 
 
There is an important question as to how exactly we should understand “realism,” and I will discuss 
it at length in a moment (§1.5). For now, I’ll just try to clarify a couple of the less straightforward 
premises. 
Premise (1). The intuitive idea here is straightforward: if you learn that you are forming beliefs 
about some subject matter in ways or for reasons that have nothing to do with facts about that 
subject matter, your beliefs are thereby undermined, leaving you with no rational basis on which to 
maintain them. This is what gives Joyce’s well-known belief pill example its bite. Were I to learn that 
I only believe Napoleon lost at Waterloo because, some time ago, someone slipped me a pill that 
caused me to form that belief, I should suspend judgment about how Napoleon fared at Waterloo, 
                                                 
7 This is a slightly modified version of the relevant claim in Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses,” §8; cf. 
Korman, “Debunking Arguments,” §8. 
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at least until I have taken the antidote and can return to the question with fresh eyes.8 Similarly for 
realizing that the verdicts of the magic 8-ball have no explanatory connection to facts about whether 
or not my crush likes me. Alas, I’ll have to take another tack.9 
Some might worry here that this first premise is going to have implausible implications 
regarding certain kinds of beliefs, such as those formed by induction. For instance, I believe that the 
sun will rise tomorrow because it has done so every day since I was born and, by all accounts, every 
day before I was born as well. Yet my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow does not explain the fact 
that it will, nor—barring backward causation—does that fact explain my belief. Yet surely I ought 
not for that reason to withhold belief as to whether or not the sun will rise tomorrow! 
This would indeed be a decisive objection to the following, stronger claim: 
If S believes that her belief that P neither explains nor is explained by the fact that P, then S 
is thereby rationally committed to withholding belief that P. 
 
But it does not count at all against premise (1) of this first debunking argument, which is 
considerably weaker. Unlike this stronger claim, premise (1) holds, not that we must withhold belief 
that P if we learn that our belief that P neither explains nor is explained by the corresponding P-fact, 
but that we must do so if we learn that our belief that P neither explains nor is explained by any facts 
in the domain, D, that P is about. Given that my belief that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on 
and so explained by sunrise-facts—namely, facts about whether or not they have occurred in the 
past—premise (1) does not in fact entail that I am rationally committed to withholding belief as to 
what the sun will do tomorrow morning.10 
Premise (2). On any plausible conception of the realism/anti-realism distinction, the 
suggestion that our beliefs or, for that matter, any other psychological facts explain moral facts is 
                                                 
8 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, pp. 179ff. I’ve modified the example slightly. In Joyce’s own example, the pill causes you 
to form beliefs about Napoleon at random rather than to form this specific belief because Joyce is interested in thinking 
about what explains our tendency to form beliefs of some sort rather than about why we form particular beliefs. As I’ve 
indicated, however, I doubt this difference makes a difference. 
9 I take this latter example from Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses,” §2. 
10 Cf. Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses,” §9. 
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antithetical to realism. Consider, for example, the view that, for any x, x is good only if, and because, 
I believe that x is good. This is a paradigmatic subjectivist (and so anti-realist) view. Any attempt by 
realists to resist the conclusion that we are rationally committed to withholding from all moral 
beliefs by endorsing views of this sort would therefore amount to an admission that they cannot do 
so without abandoning their position. 
Premise (4). As I’ve noted, a variety of explanations are possible here, but for the purposes of 
illustration it will suffice to mention just one, Joyce’s in The Evolution of Morality. Joyce thinks the 
best, complete explanation of our tendency to make the moral judgments we do is evolutionary. 
Roughly speaking, the idea is that helping behavior evolved because it tended to promote 
reproductive fitness. Similarly, we developed the tendency to talk and think in terms of categorical 
moral concepts like obligation and prohibition because talking and thinking in those terms tended to 
bolster our motivation to engage in helping behavior and so to make us more reliable cooperators 
than we would be were we motivated purely by self-interest or sympathy. Given the individual and 
group fitness benefits resulting from reliable co-operation, natural selection favored the 
psychological dispositions and mechanisms that give rise to a tendency to form judgments 
employing categorical moral concepts given normal environmental cues.11 Notably, this explanation 
nowhere presupposes the truth of any ethical claims. 
Importantly, this premise might be true even if this particular evolutionary hypothesis turns 
out to be false. For as I noted above, our moral beliefs appear subject to a variety of what in the 
introduction I called irrelevant influences, including but by no means limited to evolutionary ones. 
So long as the best, complete explanation of our making the moral judgments we do draws only on 
irrelevant influences, premise (4) is true. 
                                                 
11 See Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, chs. 1-4. Philip Kitcher develops a similar account in The Ethical Project, part I. 
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However, a caveat of sorts is in order. As Joyce himself is happy to admit,12 there is a certain 
sort of ethical naturalist who can grant that Joyce’s or some relevantly similar explanation of our 
moral beliefs is correct yet deny that this explanation can help debunkers make their case. For, 
according to this very specific sort of naturalist, the evolutionary and other facts that explain our 
beliefs are themselves identical to the moral facts those beliefs are about. If that’s right, then not only 
does the debunkers’ preferred explanation of our moral beliefs entail their truth, it also gives us no 
reason to doubt our moral beliefs are e-connected. Strictly speaking, then, this argument poses a 
challenge, not to realists in general, but to all realists except for this one, very specific type of 
naturalist. As it happens, however, most philosophers who have written about debunking arguments 
have found this particular form of naturalism implausible (myself included).13 
 
1.2. Refining the Challenge 
Such, then, are the essentials of what is in my view the most compelling evolutionary debunking 
argument. My aim in this section is to develop the argument a bit further so as to bring out exactly 
where the real action is. I’ll begin in §1.3.1 by articulating, very briefly, the response I will develop in 
the remaining chapters. Then, in §§1.3.2-4, I articulate what I think are the three best rejoinders 
available to debunkers.   
 
1.2.1. A Preliminary Response to Debunkers 
Premise (4) of the debunking argument holds that the best complete explanation of why we make 
the ethical judgments we do neither presupposes nor entails their truth. Yet, as some readers may 
have already noticed, there is an alternative explanation for why at least some people hold the ethical 
                                                 
12 Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, ch. 6. 
13 Though see Copp, “Darwinian Skepticism about Moral Realism” and Lott, “Must Realists Be Skeptics? An 
Aristotelian Reply to a Darwinian Dilemma.” 
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beliefs they do that, one might think, is at least sometimes better than that defended by debunkers. 
According to this alternative explanation, we form the beliefs we do, not simply because they follow 
from whatever beliefs we started with or because of the influences on our thinking of natural 
selection, our upbringing, or whatever other irrelevant influences, but because, having reflected on 
the relevant issues, we have come to realize that these rather than any other beliefs we could form 
are true. Moreover, unlike the debunkers’ favored explanation, this explanation is manifestly not 
neutral with respect to the truth of our beliefs. 
Obviously this explanation is off the table for false beliefs and for true beliefs whose truth is 
a matter of luck. But for those whose beliefs are true and the truth of whose beliefs is a result, not of 
some happy accident but of hard reflective work, this alternative is not just available and complete 
but arguably much better than the debunkers’ explanations. For whereas the debunkers’ 
explanations paint us as hapless victims of our biology or our backgrounds, stuck with whatever 
beliefs the influences to which we find ourselves subject incline us to form and with no ability to 
take charge of our own epistemic lives, this alternative explanation acknowledges rather than denies 
our potential for exercising meaningful epistemic agency. Indeed, compared to this alternative, it 
would be understandable were people who pride themselves on seeking out and taking into account 
challenges to their views to take offense at the debunkers’ favored explanations. After all, debunkers 
would deny such people what they take to be a central aspect of their epistemic character. Sure, they 
might say, some explanation along the lines of that favored by debunkers is appropriate for some 
other people, or even for some of their own beliefs, but when this is so, that is a mark of a 
regrettable shortcoming, not an ineluctable fact of epistemic life.14 
                                                 
14 This kind of response has received surprisingly little attention in the literature. Street briefly discusses this response at 
“Darwinian Dilemma,” §5, where she argues it’s hopeless (more about that below in §1.2.3). So far as I have been able to 
tell, the only proponent of something close to this response is William Fitzpatrick; see “Why There is No Darwinian 
Dilemma for Ethical Realism” and “Debunking Evolutionary Debunking of Ethical Realism.” For a similar response, 
see Mogensen, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments and the Proximate/Ultimate Distinction” and “Do Evolutionary 
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Now, debunkers will not be at all satisfied with this response. Why not? In the remainder of 
this section, I’ll explain three different objections they might raise. I’ll take my time with these 
rejoinders, since it is the task of the remaining three chapters to respond to them. 
 
1.2.2. Rejoinder 1: Taking Issue with the Proffered Explanation 
The first rejoinder debunkers might plump for is inspired by the work of Gilbert Harman, who 
famously invites us to consider a case in which you see a group of children pour gasoline on a cat 
and ignite it and immediately judge their action wrong. Harman suggests that moral facts are 
“completely irrelevant” to the explanation of your making this judgment;15 rather, Harman says, if 
we want to explain why you judge their action wrong, “[a]ll we need assume is that you have certain 
more or less well articulated moral principles that are reflected in the judgments you make, based on 
your moral sensibility.”16 The point, in effect, is that the explanation of the content of our ethical 
beliefs I have suggested for realists is inferior to that suggested by Harman because the former is 
redundant. Of course, Harman could allow, reflection does have a role to play in explaining why we 
form the judgments we do; it’s just that we can make room for reflection to play that role without 
presupposing the truth of the judgments whose formation we mean to explain. 
One response would note that Harman’s argument threatens to prove too much. For as 
Brad Majors notes, 
The properties of non-basic sciences such as geology, biology, and psychology are put into 
as much jeopardy, if the argument is sound, as are moral properties. Take any explanandum 
that might appear to admit of a psychological explanation, say Darcy’s reaching for a glass of 
wine. One might seek to explain this action by making reference to Darcy’s desire for wine, 
together with his belief that the glass before him contains wine. This is as paradigmatic an 
example of common-sense psychological explanation as one could hope to find. Yet notice 
that it seems possible to explain the behavior without making reference to psychological 
                                                                                                                                                             
Debunking Arguments Rest on a Mistake about Evolutionary Explanations?” For a discussion of the differences 
between the two, see Fitzpatrick, “Misidentifying the Evolutionary Debunkers’ Error: Reply to Mogensen.” 




properties or states. For example, there will without question be a neurophysiological 
explanation for why Darcy’s hand moved as it did. Similar points could be made for 
explanations in any of the other non-basic sciences.17  
 
If Harman wants to claim that the redundancy of the relevant alternatives suffices to establish the 
superiority of an explanation, he would seem committed to saying that these lower-level 
explanations are always better than their higher-level counterparts. But in that case, he appears 
committed to embracing the absurd conclusion that the properties studied by the non-basic sciences 
never play any explanatory role.18  
Whatever this objection’s merits, I want to focus on a different problem with Harman’s 
argument. As Nicholas Sturgeon noticed in the mid-1980s, there is room for doubt as to the 
completeness of the explanation Harman favors.19 “For it is natural,” Sturgeon notes, “to think that 
if a particular assumption is completely irrelevant to the explanation of a certain fact, then the fact 
would have obtained, and we could have explained it just as well, even if the assumption had been 
false.”20 (This is known as the counterfactual test for explanatory relevance.) If that’s right, then if 
we want to know whether or not the truth of our beliefs is relevant to or part of the explanation of 
our having them, we need to ask whether we would have the beliefs we do even if they were false—
we need to ask, for example, whether or not we would believe the children who set the cat on fire 
acted wrongly even if they hadn’t.  
Harman of course thinks the question is straightforward. As Sturgeon observed, however, it 
is anything but: 
To answer the question, I take it, we must consider a situation in which what the children are 
doing is not wrong, but which is otherwise as much like the actual situation as possible, and 
then decide what your reaction would be in that situation. But since what makes their action 
wrong, what its wrongness consists in, is presumably something like its being an act of 
                                                 
17 Majors, “Moral Explanation,” pp. 4-5. 
18 For further discussion, see Majors, “Moral Explanation,” §2. 
19 See Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations.” For subsequent discussion, see Harman, “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts”; 
Sturgeon, “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts”; Blackburn, “Just Causes”; Sturgeon, “Contents and 
Causes”; and Blackburn, “Reply to Sturgeon.” For a helpful overview of this literature, see Majors, “Moral Explanation.” 
20 Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” p. 245. 
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gratuitous cruelty (or, perhaps we should add, of intense cruelty, and to a helpless victim), to 
imagine them not doing something wrong we are going to have to imagine their action 
different in this respect. More cautiously and more generally, if what they are actually doing 
is wrong, and if moral properties are, as many writers have held, supervenient on natural 
ones, then in order to imagine them not doing something wrong we are going to have to 
suppose their action different from the actual one in some of its natural features as well. So 
our question becomes: Even if the children had been doing something else, something just 
different enough not to be wrong, would you have taken them even so to be doing 
something wrong?21 
  
With the question so understood, Sturgeon goes on to say, it doesn’t necessarily follow that 
Harman’s answer is wrong. What does follow, however, is that in order to construct a case in which 
Harman’s answer is right, we have to imagine an individual with a pretty strange psychological 
profile: 
For suppose you are like this. You hate children. What you especially hate, moreover, is the 
sight of children enjoying themselves; so much so that whenever you see children having 
fun, you immediately assume they are up to no good. The more they seem to be enjoying 
themselves, furthermore, the readier you are to fasten on any pretext for thinking them 
engaged in real wickedness. Then it is true that even if the children had been engaged in 
some robust but innocent fun, you would have thought they were doing something wrong; 
and Harman is perhaps right about you that the actual wrongness of the action you see is 
irrelevant to your thinking it wrong. This is because your reaction is due to a feature of the 
action that coincides only very accidentally with the ones that make it wrong. But, of course, 
and fortunately, many people aren’t like this (nor does Harman argue that they are). It isn’t 
true of them that, in general, if the children had been doing something similar, although 
different enough not to be wrong, they would still have thought the children were doing 
something wrong. And it isn’t true, either, therefore, that the wrongness of the action is 
irrelevant to the explanation of why they think it wrong.22 
 
The important point here is that, as with all counterfactuals, the way to assess those relevant here is 
to look at the closest possible world in which the antecedent is true and ask whether the consequent 
is as well. And as Sturgeon points out, when we do this, it’s far from obvious that things are going to 
work out in Harman’s or, more relevantly for our purposes, the debunkers’ favor. 
Here debunkers are liable to protest that this response misunderstands their and Harman’s 
good point. The point, they will say, is not that we would believe the children in the example were 
                                                 
21 Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” pp. 246-247. 
22 Ibid., pp. 247-248. 
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doing something wrong even if they had done something else that, though in some ways similar, is 
not wrong. The point was instead that we would believe it was wrong of them to light a cat on fire 
even if that very thing—i.e., lighting a cat on fire for fun—were not wrong. In other words, Harman 
and the debunkers mean to say that if we vary the moral facts but hold the non-moral facts constant, 
we will form all the same beliefs.23 
One response much discussed in the literature is to note that so understood, the relevant 
counterfactuals come out false on a standard semantics, at least given that moral facts supervene on 
non-moral facts.24 To say that moral facts supervene on non-moral facts is just to say that, for every 
moral fact M, there is some set of non-moral facts N1…Nn such that, necessarily, if N1…Nn obtains, 
then M does as well. If, then, we are to understand Harman as claiming that, if the moral facts were 
different but all the non-moral facts on which they supervene just as they are, we would still take all 
the same moral facts to obtain, the counterfactual on which his argument depends has a necessarily 
false antecedent. On a standard semantics, however, a counterfactual A → B is true so long as all the 
nearest possible A-worlds are B-worlds. Since there are no possible A-worlds if A is necessarily false, 
there are in that case no A-worlds that fail to be B-worlds, and Harman’s counterfactual comes out 
false. 
Still, this is hardly the end of the matter. Debunkers might deny the supervenience of the 
moral on the non-moral or—more plausibly—dispute the standard semantics for counterfactuals 
(which, after all, is controversial, and for good reason).25 Rather than discuss these possibilities, 
however, I want to flag a deeper difficulty with this first rejoinder, one that doesn’t depend on any 
contentious claims about the semantics of counterfactuals. By emphasizing the necessity of the 
                                                 
23 Sturgeon takes up this same objection at “Moral Explanations,” pp. 248ff., though he answers it differently than I do. 
24 For discussion of this response, see, inter alia, Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses,” §6 and Justin 
Clarke-Doane, “Debunking and Dispensability,” §2.2 and “Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality,” 
§4. 
25 For reasons to think the standard semantics for counterfactuals is problematic, see Nolan, “Impossible Worlds,” §2.2. 
For discussion of these two responses, see again Clarke-Doane, “Debunking and Dispensability,” §2. 
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supervenience relation, this objection to Harman’s argument helps to bring out just how hard it is to 
make out the scenario Harman means to invite us to envision—what, for example, a world in which 
it is not wrong to set cats on fire for fun is supposed to be like. But I worry that even this line of 
thought concedes too much to Harman and debunkers. For in my view, it is not just difficult but 
impossible to envision any such scenario, for I doubt that we can even so much as make sense of 
Harman and the debunkers’ suggestion here. At this early juncture, I expect this suggestion may 
strike readers as over-the-top. But since it is the burden of chapter 2 to make good on this and 
related claims, I won’t press the point now. For now, the important thing to note is just that, if I am 
right, proponents of this Harman-inspired defense of debunking arguments cannot evade Sturgeon’s 
good point in the way Harman tries to. 
Before moving on to the second objection debunkers might press against the response to 
their arguments canvassed in §1.2.1, I want to note a potential concern about the Sturgeon-style 
response to debunkers I’ve just been exploring. It might be thought that debunkers have another 
way out here. In particular, they might note that passage of the counterfactual test is not always 
sufficient to demonstrate causal or explanatory relevance. Consider, for instance, the length of a 
pole’s shadow. If the pole were a different length, or if the sun were at a different angle, the shadow 
would be a different length, yet the dimensions of the pole and position of the sun do not jointly 
cause the shadow to be as long as it is. Rather, the shadow’s length supervenes on the length of the 
pole together with the position of the sun. Similarly in cases where two things have a common 
cause. Suppose I fire a pistol at a watermelon and it blows up. If there hadn’t been a bang, the 
watermelon would not have exploded, but the bang doesn’t cause the watermelon to explode or 
explain why it does; rather, the bang and the explosion of the watermelon are both caused by the 
burning of the powder, which forces the bullet from the barrel.26 In light of these kinds of cases, 
                                                 
26 For discussion, see Majors, “Moral Explanation,” §4, from which I take the first of these examples. 
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debunkers might reasonably ask what reason we have to think the counterfactual test can help us to 
establish causal-explanatory relevance in the present case. 
I doubt this is a problem for Sturgeon-style responses to debunkers, however. Plainly, our 
moral beliefs do not supervene on the moral facts, so the concern about the pole-shadow case is not 
applicable here. As we will see later in chapter 3 when I briefly discuss so-called third-factor 
responses, by contrast, several philosophers have argued that the moral facts and our moral beliefs 
have a common cause,27 so this possibility is not so easily ruled out. Nevertheless, this possibility can 
be of no help to debunkers. For suppose it obtains. In that case, sure, the counterfactual test is 
inappropriate, and a Sturgeon-style response cannot show that debunkers’ premise (4) is mistaken. 
Unfortunately for debunkers, however, in that case our moral beliefs turn out to be e-connected to 
moral facts after all, contrary to premise (5). If, then, debunkers want to rescue their premise (4) 
from Sturgeon’s attack, they had better find another way to do it. 
 
1.2.3. Rejoinder 2: Underdetermination-based Skepticism 
Another, very different kind of rejoinder depends on a more general skeptical challenge for realists, 
one according to which realism precludes ethical knowledge. This is how Sharon Street elaborates 
the argument in her “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value.” In the relevant passage, 
Street is addressing a slightly different debunking argument, one I will discuss below in §1.3.2. 
There, the suggestion at issue is that realists might avoid the conclusion that we are probably 
unreliable in ethics by appealing to the potentially corrective influence of reflection on the content 
of our beliefs: “according to the objection,” Street says, “just as a compass and a little steering can 
                                                 
27 This sort of view has been advanced or defended in Nozick, Philosophical Explanations, pp. 342-348; Huemer, Ethical 
Intuitionism, pp. 218-219; Schafer, “Evolution and Normative Skepticism”; Enoch, “The Epistemological Challenge to 
Metanormative Realism,” §§3-5 and Taking Morality Seriously, §7.4; Wielenberg, “On the Evolutionary Debunking of 
Morality,” §§4-8, Robust Ethics, ch. 4, and “Ethics and Evolutionary Theory,” §3; Brosnan, “Do the Evolutionary Origins 




correct for the influence of the wind and tides on the course of one’s boat, so rational reflection can 
correct for the influence of selective pressures on our values.”28 Still, it’s not hard to see the 
relevance to the version of the argument we have been looking at; in our case, the relevant claim is 
that our capacity to acquire ethical knowledge through reflection is part of what explains why we 
have the beliefs we do. Either way, realists are in trouble if their view precludes the possibility that 
we might acquire ethical knowledge through reflection. 
Street thinks it does. She notes that  
the objection gains its plausibility by suggesting that rational reflection provides some means 
of standing apart from our evaluative judgements, sorting through them, and gradually 
separating out the true ones from the false as if with the aid of some uncontaminated tool.29 
 
But, she says, this cannot be right: 
For what rational reflection about evaluative matters involves, inescapably, is assessing some 
evaluative judgements in terms of others. Rational reflection must always proceed from 
some evaluative standpoint; it must work from some evaluative premises; it must treat some 
evaluative judgements as fixed, if only for the time being, as the assessment of other 
evaluative judgements is undertaken. In rational reflection, one does not stand completely 
apart from one’s starting fund of evaluative judgements: rather, one uses them, reasons in 
terms of them, holds some of them up for examination in light of others.30 
 
“Thus,” she goes on, 
if the fund of evaluative judgements with which human reflection began was thoroughly 
contaminated with illegitimate influence…then the tools of rational reflection were equally 
contaminated, for the latter are always just a subset of the former. It follows that all our 
reflection over the ages has really just been a process of assessing evaluative judgements that 
are mostly off the mark in terms of others that are mostly off the mark. And reflection of 
this kind isn’t going to get one any closer to evaluative truth, any more than sorting through 
contaminated materials with contaminated tools is going to get one closer to purity.31 
 
It is a bit hard to say exactly what the argument here is supposed to be. Plausibly, though, Street’s 
concern has to do with the under-determination of the truth of our beliefs by the evidence available 
to us in reflection. The thought seems to be that reflection can play the corrective role the realist 
                                                 
28 See “Darwinian Dilemma,” pp. 122-125. The quote comes from p. 123.  
29 Ibid., p. 123. 




needs it to only if it allows us to critically assess our beliefs and inclinations so as to rule out the 
possibility that we are deeply and pervasively mistaken about ethical reality—to borrow a phrase of 
John McDowell’s, we need to be able examine our justificatory practices from “sideways on.”32 If, 
though, reflection is as she suggests, this is impossible, and the best rational support we can possibly 
have for particular ethical claims leaves that possibility open. For since ethical reflection is by its 
nature such as to preclude the possibility that we might critically examine the assumptions on which 
it relies, we have no way of knowing whether or not we are on the right track. Rather, for all we do 
or can know, reflection could be a wildly unreliable way of sorting true from false beliefs: like 
envatted brains trying to discern the truth about their surroundings, we might just be spinning our 
wheels.  
So understood, Street’s remarks suggest she has in mind something like the following 
argument: 
1. UNDERDETERMINATION: If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and S 
lacks a rational basis that favors p over q, then S lacks knowledge that p.33 
2. The rational support I have for my moral beliefs does not favor those beliefs over radical 
skeptical hypotheses. 
3. So I have no moral knowledge. 
 
By way of elaboration, I’ll make a couple of remarks about each of the argument’s premises. 
Premise (1). The argument’s first premise, UNDERDETERMINATION, is a general 
epistemological claim that is hard to dispute, as the following two arguments show.  
Consider first two incompatible scenarios, (1) and (2): 
 
1. The sun will set in an hour 
2. The sun will set in an hour and a quarter 
 
UNDERDETERMINATION entails that 
 
If I lack a rational basis that favors (1) over (2), I lack knowledge that (1). 
 
                                                 
32 See Mind and World, pp. 34-36, 41-42. 
33 I take this formulation of UNDERDETERMINATION from Pritchard, Epistemic Angst, p. 30. 
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Now suppose I have more reason to believe (2) than to believe (1). Perhaps a quick look at the 
horizon suggested to me I had an hour left before sunrise, but the forecast for today indicates that I 
actually have an hour and a quarter. Do I know that (1)? Plainly not; if I did, I would be justified in 
believing that (1), but since I have more reason to believe that (2), I am plainly not justified in 
believing that (1). That is to say, since I lack a rational basis that favors (1) over (2), I lack knowledge 
that (1). 
Turn now to a second argument. Consider the following radical skeptical hypothesis: 
MORAL INVERSION: although things seem otherwise to me as a result of evolutionary, 
cultural, psychological, and other irrelevant influences on my moral thinking, the moral facts 
are in fact the opposite of what I take them to be. So, for example, I regard cruelty as a vice, 
but in fact it is admirable. 
 
Now suppose Street is right: the nature of ethical reflection is such that I lack a rational basis for 
holding the ethical beliefs I do over those whose truth MORAL INVERSION entails. In that case, any 
moral beliefs I go on to form are, in terms of the rational support I have for them, no better than a 
wild guess, and so, while they might turn out to be true, their truth would in that case be accidental. 
Since accidentally true belief is not knowledge,34 it follows that moral knowledge is impossible. Here 
again, the fact that I lack a rational basis that favors one scenario over some other, incompatible one 
entails that I lack knowledge that the former obtains, just as UNDERDETERMINATION suggests. 
Premise (2). The under-determination-based argument’s second premise derives from the 
sorts of considerations Street puts forward in the passages above. However much support we might 
take ourselves to have for some ethical belief, the thought goes, our evidence will be compatible, not 
just with MORAL INVERSION, but in fact with any number of radical skeptical hypotheses. Given the 
nature of ethical reflection, there is just no way for us to acquire evidence that favors any ethical 
                                                 
34 The classic defense of this claim is Gettier’s “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Though she doesn’t use this 
language herself, some of Street’s remarks suggest her concern is best cashed out in these terms. See, in particular, 
“Darwinian Dilemma,” pp. 121-122, where she introduces her well-known Bermuda analogy, and cf. p. 124. See too her 
“Objectivity and Truth,” §9, where she suggests that realists who take themselves to be reliable must regard their 
reliability as “sheer good fortune” (p. 315) and themselves as among the “normative elect” (p. 317).  
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beliefs over skeptical hypotheses, like MORAL INVERSION, that entail their falsity. 
Before I move on to the final way debunkers might counter the response canvassed in §1.2.1 
above, allow me to make a couple of more general observations about this argument. 
First, note that this concern about the possibility of acquiring moral knowledge through 
reflection applies only to realists, since it is the independence of fact and belief that is supposed to 
entail the insufficiency of all available evidence. If the facts in ethics were dependent on our attitudes 
in the way anti-realists claim, it would at least be possible that the evidence for our beliefs we acquire 
through reflection would be inconsistent with their widespread falsity. Consider, for example, the 
anti-realist thesis RE: 
RE: the facts are whichever ones we would take to obtain were our ethical beliefs in 
reflective equilibrium. 
  
Suppose RE is true, and suppose that I would believe that P were my beliefs in reflective 
equilibrium. If I manage to achieve reflective equilibrium, the evidence for P that I acquire in 
reflection would not leave it open that not-P. Similarly for other theses that make the facts in ethics 
dependent on our attitudes in other ways.35 
Notice next that the more general skeptical challenge on which this version of the debunking 
argument depends has the same basic structure as under-determination-based skepticism about the 
external world.36 According to this latter sort of skepticism, the evidence available to us concerning 
the external world is consistent with the possibility that we are massively deceived as to its character, 
whether because we are brains in vats, because we are being deceived by some powerful evil demon, 
or for some other reason; according to evolutionary skeptics who avail themselves of the arguments 
just sketched, the same is true regarding our evidence for ethical claims. 
  
                                                 
35 Street in effect notes as much at “Darwinian Dilemma,” §10. 
36 For a related point, see Sturgeon, “Moral Explanations,” pp. 251-253. 
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1.2.3. Rejoinder 3: The Benacerraf-Field Challenge and the “Access” Problem 
The third and final rejoinder debunkers might plump for appeals to a different general skeptical 
challenge, one that draws on the so-called “Benacerraf-Field challenge” to mathematical platonism. 
Hartry Field gives a good, rough characterization of the challenge in the following passage: 
if there are mathematical entities of the sort the platonist believes in (mind- and language-
independent, having no spatio-temporal location, unable to enter into physical interactions 
with us or anything we observe) then there seems to be a difficulty in seeing how we could 
ever know that they exist, or know anything about them; the platonist needs to explain how 
such knowledge is possible, and no answer is evident except one that posits mysterious 
powers of access to the platonic realm.37 
 
Field’s remarks are liable to remind some readers of the epistemological component of Mackie’s 
regrettably named “argument from queerness,” contained in the second sentence of the following 
passage: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a very 
strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were 
aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, 
utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else.38 
 
If my experiences talking with other philosophers are at all representative, concerns of this sort are 
widespread. Even so, there is some controversy as to what exactly the problem is supposed to be.39 
In my view, the Benacerraf-Field Challenge is better understood as a pair of closely related but 
nevertheless distinct problems, one due to Paul Benacerraf and the other due to Harty Field. 
 We can start with the challenge due to Benacerraf. The story begins in 1967, when Alvin 
Goldman proposed the causal theory of knowledge: 
GOLDMAN’S CAUSAL THEORY: S knows that p if and only if the fact p is causally connected 
in an “appropriate” way with S's believing p.40 
 
Goldman himself was pretty liberal about the kinds of causal connections he considered appropriate. 
                                                 
37 Field, Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, p. 25. 
38 Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, p. 38. 
39 For some of the difficulties, see Justin Clarke-Doane, “What is the Benacerraf Problem?” and Lutz, “The Reliability 
Challenge in Moral Epistemology.” 
40 Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” p. 369. 
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For example, he suggests at one point that “[r]emembering, like perceiving, must be regarded as a 
causal process”41 and, a bit later, that “causal chains with admixtures of logical connections are 
causal chains.”42 He is also happy to allow that a relevant causal connection obtains if S’s belief that 
p and the fact that p have a common cause.43 Notably, Goldman is very clear in his initial 
formulation that he takes the theory to be applicable only to empirical knowledge. For knowledge of 
non-empirical truths, he says, “the traditional analysis is adequate.”44 
 A few years later, in 1973, Paul Benacerraf—apparently thinking Goldman insufficiently 
ambitious—bit the bullet Goldman couldn’t bring himself to bite, drawing on the causal theory to 
argue that, if platonism is true, mathematical knowledge appears to be impossible.45 For in that case, 
he wondered, how might there be an appropriate causal connection between our mathematical 
beliefs and the corresponding mathematical facts?  
In its initial formulation, Benacerraf’s challenge invites a response from platonists Goldman 
no doubt anticipated. Where Benacerraf saw in the conflict between the causal theory and platonism 
a problem for the latter, platonists will draw the exact opposite conclusion, admitting the conflict 
but insisting, as Goldman in effect did himself, that it is not platonism but the causal theory that has 
to go. As David Lewis once put the point, “causal accounts of knowledge are all very well in their 
place, but if they are put forward as general theories, then mathematics refutes them.”46 
 Still, one might wonder if this actually settles the crucial issue here. As an objection to 
formulations that appeal to the causal theory, which has long been rejected anyway, Lewis is 
probably right that this response is good enough. Yet there are compelling, general reasons to think 
that Benacerraf was onto something here. In fact, I will argue in chapter 3 below, there is good 
                                                 
41 Goldman, “A Causal Theory of Knowing,” p. 360. 
42 Ibid., p. 368. 
43 Ibid., p. 364-365. 
44 Ibid., p. 357. 
45 Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth.” 
46 Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds, p. 109. 
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reason to think the no-accident condition on knowledge is best understood, if not quite in causal, at 
least in explanatory terms.47 The more compelling these reasons are, the less satisfying it will seem 
for platonists and other kinds of realists about a priori discourses to dismiss Benacerraf-style 
challenges by noting that they make mathematical knowledge impossible. At some point, it would 
seem, they need to explain how our beliefs about the relevant domain can satisfy the relevant 
condition on knowledge. Call this Benacerraf’s Challenge. 
* * * 
This brings us to the second challenge, this one coming out of Hartry Field’s 1983 attempt 
to re-frame Benacerraf’s challenge so that it would not depend on the by-then widely-rejected causal 
theory. Here is Field: 
Benacerraf’s challenge—or at least, the challenge which his paper suggests to me—is to 
provide an account of the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about these remote 
entities can so well reflect the facts about them. The idea is that if it appears in principle 
impossible to explain this, then that tends to undermine the belief in mathematical entities, despite 
whatever reason we might have for believing in them.48  
 
Together with Field’s other remarks, this passage suggests the following argument: 
1. We are generally reliable about mathematics. 
2. The correlation mentioned in (1) is striking and demands explanation. 
3. It appears to be impossible in principle for platonists to explain (1) 
4. If a theory entails that some striking correlation is inexplicable, we ought to reject that 
theory. 
5. So unless platonists can come up with some way to explain (1), we ought to reject platonism. 
 
One might wonder here at premise (3). In particular, one might wonder why platonists 
cannot explain our reliability about mathematics in a way that echoes the explanation of why we 
form the ethical beliefs we do I canvassed in §1.2.1 above. Thus, they might say, I am reliable in 
mathematics because I work hard to make sure that I am. When I am inclined to form some 
                                                 
47 Others who have argued for a position like this include Masahiro Yamada, Kieran Setiya, and David Faraci. See 
Yamada, “Getting It Right by Accident”; Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, ch. 3, and David Faraci, “Groundwork for an 
Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.” For similar readings of Benacerraf’s challenge, see Lutz, “The 
Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology,” §4; Faraci, “Groundwork,” §8.3; and Crow, “Causal Impotence and 
Evolutionary Influence,” §2.1. 
48 Field, Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, pp. 25-30, 230-239. The quoted passage is from p. 26. 
29 
 
mathematical belief, I ask myself whether these inclinations are in some way suspect—whether, for 
instance, I might have made a mistake in calculating. So I check my work and seek others’ input, 
thinking carefully about how to respond to challenges other people raise to my beliefs. I try to 
remain open-minded and scold myself when I fail to. If I notice that two or more of my beliefs are 
inconsistent, I think hard about how best to reconcile them. And so on. Why is this kind of 
explanation of reliability supposed to be off the table?  
However, its considerable appeal notwithstanding, this response misses the good point Field 
is making when he says that, given the way platonists conceive of mathematical entities, he is “not 
optimistic” about their ability to provide the relevant explanation.49 For as the passage above 
indicates, the kind of explanation of reliability Field is after is of a different sort entirely. That sort of 
explanation would do something the explanation just mentioned does not, namely “provide an 
account of the mechanisms that explain how our beliefs about these remote entities can so well 
reflect the facts about them.”50 Joshua Schechter puts the thought well in the following passage: 
We have some understanding of how perception can yield veridical beliefs about the external 
world. We possess a sketch of how the mechanisms underlying perception work and 
understand how they may yield true beliefs. But this explanation doesn’t extend to the cases 
of logic, mathematics, modality, and other a priori domains. Nor is there available any well-
developed alternative account. We simply do not understand how we can be reliable about 
these domains, given that our beliefs were not arrived at via some kind of perception.51  
 
Presumably, Field’s thought was that, until they can provide an account of this sort, the kind of 
explanation outlined in the previous paragraph can do them no good, since it leaves mysterious the 
crucial thing, namely how it is even so much as possible for us to know platonistically construed 
mathematical facts. Field’s Challenge is simply to give an account of this sort. 
* * * 
                                                 
49 Field, Realism, Mathematics, and Modality, p. 27. 
50 Ibid., p. 26. 
51 Schechter, “The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic,” p. 438, quoted at Dreier, “Quasi-Realism and 
the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence,” p. 271. 
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 Benacerraf’s Challenge and Field’s Challenge are closely related, since a response to the former will 
sometimes suggest or involve a response to the latter and vice versa. Nevertheless they are not 
identical, and so I think we do well to distinguish them from one another. Each is a formidable 
challenge to realists about any a priori domain and, in particular, to would be anti-debunkers who 
wish to appeal, as I do, to our capacity to acquire moral knowledge through reflection to explain 
why we form the moral beliefs we do. Even so, I will argue in chapter 3, both are answerable, at 
least by the right kind of moral realist. 
 
1.3. Two More Debunking Arguments 
This completes my overview of the debunking argument I mean to take up together with the three 
ways of developing it in response to the objection I mean to press. However, this is not the only 
debunking argument that has been discussed in the literature. Some readers will accordingly wonder 
why I have singled this one out. In this short section, I briefly lay out each of the other two 
debunking arguments that have received significant attention in the literature, explaining in each case 
why I doubt meeting the debunking challenge requires any extensive engagement on my part with 
these other arguments. 
 
1.3.1. Debunking Argument 2: Explaining Reliability 
Some philosophers have understood debunkers to be making basically the same argument I just 
attributed to Field. David Enoch, for instance, writes that “Street’s Darwinian Dilemma can be seen 
as a particular instance of the most general epistemological challenge to Robust Realism, properly 
understood.”52 As he understands it, that more general challenge is the following: 
                                                 
52 Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, p. 164. 
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very often, when we accept a normative judgment j, it is indeed true that j; and very often 
when we do not accept a normative judgment j (or at least when we reject it), it is indeed 
false that j. So there is a correlation between (what the realist takes to be) normative truths 
and our normative judgments. What explains this correlation? On a robustly realist view of 
normativity, it can’t be that our normative judgments are causally or constitutively 
responsible for the normative truths, because the normative truths are supposed to be 
independent of our normative judgments. And given that (at least basic) normative truths 
are causally inert, they are not causally responsible for our normative beliefs. Nor does there 
seem to be some third-factor explanation available to the robust realist. And so the robust 
realist is committed to an unexplained striking correlation, and this may just be too much to 
believe.53 
 
Other philosophers who have embraced this interpretation of the debunking challenge include 
Kieran Setiya, Jamie Dreier, and Joshua Schechter.54 
I have already granted that this is a formidable challenge for realists. However, it is not 
plausible as an interpretation of the challenge posed by debunkers for the simple reason that it is not 
a genealogical debunking argument. After all, it does not depend on any claim about the influences 
on or explanation of our beliefs, evolutionary or otherwise. In my view, this argument is much better 
suited for the role I have laid out for it, as a way of blocking the kind of response to debunkers that 
I outlined in §1.2.1 above. Moreover, even those philosophers who disagree with me about this 
should be willing to grant that, in this context, it makes no practical difference. For since I mean to 
respond to this argument in any case, it is irrelevant whether or not we call it a debunking argument: 
either way, there is no need for me to engage with it separately. 
 
1.3.2. Debunking Argument 3: Irrelevant Influences 
This bring us to the interpretation of the debunking challenge that I believe best captures Sharon 
Street’s thought in her “Darwinian Dilemma” paper. On this interpretation, the central claim is, not 
                                                 
53 Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, p. 159. Cf. Enoch, “The Epistemological Challenge to Metanormative Realism: How 
Best to Understand It, and How to Cope with It.” 
54 See Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, ch. 2; Dreier, “Quasi-realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence”; and 
Schechter, “Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics.” As Setiya notes, this interpretation is suggested by Street’s 
“Objectivity and Truth? You’d Better Rethink It.” 
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that we can explain why we hold the beliefs we do without presupposing their truth, but that we 
have good reason to believe that the character of our moral thinking has been shaped to a significant 
extent by natural selection and other irrelevant influences, such that, had those influences been 
significantly different, the content of our beliefs would be as well. In light of that fact, the argument 
then goes, we should conclude that, more likely than not, most of our ethical beliefs are false, at least 
if the facts in ethics are independent of our attitudes. Katia Vavova helpfully reconstructs the 
argument as follows: 
1. Realism. Moral truths are attitude-independent. 
2. Influence. Evolutionary forces have influenced our moral beliefs. 
3. Off-track. Evolutionary forces aim at fitness, not attitude-independent moral truths. 
4. Gap. The fitness enhancing beliefs and the moral truths come apart. 
5. Mistaken. We have good reason to think that our moral beliefs are mistaken. (2-4) 
6. Principle. If you have good reason to think that your belief is mistaken, and no other, better 
reason to think that it is not mistaken, then you cannot rationally maintain it. 
7. No better. We have no better reason to think that our moral beliefs are not mistaken. 
8. Skepticism. We cannot rationally maintain our confidence in our moral beliefs.55 (5-7) 
 
Though it can easily seem plausible, this argument has a fatal flaw. Vavova explains the point 
in the following passage: 
The debunker…aims to provide evidence of error. Evolution influenced our moral beliefs, 
she argues, and evolution selects for survival. But moral truths could be about something 
else. This much is plausible: the moral beliefs and the adaptive beliefs come apart. But its 
plausibility is grounded in our substantive moral beliefs. It is because we think that morality 
is about more than reproductive success that we worry about being inclined toward valuing 
reproductive success. If we cannot make any substantive assumptions about particular moral 
norms, then morality could (conceptually) be about anything. But if morality could be about 
anything, then we have no idea what morality is about. So we have no idea if evolutionary 
forces would have pushed us toward or away from the truth. So we have no reason to think 
we are mistaken.56 
 
In other words, this kind of debunker faces a dilemma of her own. On the one hand, she might deny 
that we have any substantive moral knowledge. In that case, it is unclear why we should accept 
premise (4). On the other hand, the debunker might grant that we have enough substantive moral 
                                                 
55 Adapted from Vavova, “Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism,” pp. 108, 110. Cf. Bedke, “No Coincidence?” 
56 Ibid., p. 112. Cf. Vavova, “Debunking Evolutionary Debunking,” §6. 
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knowledge to confirm that premise (4) is true. In that case, however, it would seem that the realist 
might leverage that knowledge to sort irrelevant or distorting from salutary influences on the 
content of his beliefs so as to ensure that he is not in fact badly mistaken about moral reality; having 
done that, the realist would seem to have very good reason to deny that he is mistaken, evolutionary 
influences on the content of his beliefs notwithstanding. In short, proponents of this argument can 
justify premise (4) only by making a concession that puts realists in a position to deny premise (7). In 
light of this problem with the argument, I see no need to discuss it further. 
 
1.4. Generalizing the Challenge 
I indicated in the introduction that debunking arguments need not draw on facts about the 
evolutionary history of our tendency to make ethical judgments or the evolutionary influences on 
the content of our beliefs. Instead they might focus on other irrelevant influences, such as historical 
or cultural context, upbringing, and political propaganda.57 But up to this point, I have mostly 
spoken as though it were only ethical beliefs such arguments might purport to debunk. This is in 
fact not true. Rather, debunking arguments that target ethical beliefs constitute just one species in a 
much broader genus of arguments. 
For instance, Street herself has made a debunking argument that targets our epistemic 
beliefs,58 and Justin Clarke-Doane has done so with mathematical beliefs.59 Nor is it hard to imagine 
other versions; for instance, challenges might focus on the influence of natural selection on our 
                                                 
57 Jason Stanley has recently argued that, so long as socio-economic inequality persists, those with a greater share of 
society’s resources will develop and propagate ideologies that validate their social status. See Stanley, How Propaganda 
Works. Though neither Stanley nor, to my knowledge, anyone else has developed the kind of argument I am talking 
about, it is not hard to see how they might. For since, according to Stanley, this will happen regardless of whether or not 
that status is deserved, the influence of the wealthy via propaganda would be irrelevant to the truth of the beliefs their 
propaganda encourages. 
58 Street, “Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.” 
59 See Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics: The Evolutionary Challenge.” 
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logical, philosophical, or modal beliefs.60 More generally still, I see no reason to think such 
arguments could not be made regarding any of our beliefs. 
Regardless of which kinds of beliefs and which kinds of influence are at issue, it will be 
possible to make debunking arguments like the one outlined in §1.1 above. For instance, one might 
suggest that since we can explain the content of our aesthetic beliefs without presupposing their 
truth, none of those beliefs are justified. Or again, one might suggest that, to explain our 
philosophical beliefs, we need only draw on the irrelevant influence of our historico-cultural context, 
rendering all our philosophical beliefs unjustified. In any case, reflection-centered responses 
analogous to that outlined in §1.2.1 will be possible, and rejoinders like those I discussed in §§1.2.2-
1.2.4 will be available to debunkers. 
For the most part I will not discuss these other arguments in what follows; however, this is 
not to say that nothing I say here has any wider application. In fact I suspect that the response to 
debunkers I elaborate in the next two chapters is applicable outside of ethics. I feel particularly 
confident that Street’s argument against the possibility of knowledge of objective epistemic facts is 
problematic in almost exactly the same ways as the arguments on which I focus, but I would also 
not be surprised were something like this strategy to suffice to dispense with at least some challenges 
to the possibility of knowledge of objective mathematical, logical, philosophical, and modal beliefs. 
Still, any thorough consideration of these other arguments is far outside the scope of my project.   
 
1.5. Realism and Objectivity 
The debunking argument I mean to take up specifically targets realists. Up until now I have spoken 
as though it were obvious what realism is; in fact, however, there are different kinds of realism, and 
as we will see, it matters a great deal for my purposes which we are talking about. This section aims, 
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first, to map out the conceptual terrain a bit and, second, to say a bit about the kind of realism I am 
concerned to defend. 
 
1.5.1. Explanatory vs. Simple Realism 
What is realism? I take it most self-described realists would agree the view is comprised of 
something like the following three claims: 
1. COGNITIVISM: ethical claims express propositions. 
2. SUCCESS: some of these propositions are true. 
3. OBJECTIVITY: ethical propositions admit of objective truth and falsity.  
 
Still, this basic characterization could be improved in a couple of ways. For instance, this 
characterization of COGNITIVISM is too simple, as is clear from Mark Kalderon’s taxonomy of meta-
ethical positions in Moral Fictionalism.61 A more thorough discussion would distinguish this claim 
from another, closely-related claim, namely that acceptance of an ethical sentence constitutes belief 
in the corresponding proposition rather than, say, entertainment of a useful fiction. (Fictionalists say 
it doesn’t, realists that it does.) For our purposes, though, the more important issue with this 
characterization is its relative vagueness about the realist’s third claim, OBJECTIVITY. What exactly 
does it mean to say that ethical propositions admit of objective truth and falsity? 
A common sort of answer appeals to the independence of ethical truths from people’s 
beliefs or attitudes. The following proposal, adapted from a proposal discussed in a recent article by 
Elizabeth Tropman, is representative: 
The moral proposition MP admits of objective truth just in case MP’s truth value is 
independent of any actual or hypothetical agent’s (i) belief or non-cognitive attitude about 
x’s being m and (ii) non-cognitive attitude about x.62 
 
Tropman states the proposal in terms of a particular kind of moral proposition, that some x has 
some moral property m, but it is meant to be perfectly general, applying in addition to claims 
                                                 
61 See Moral Fictionalism, ch. 3. 
62 See Tropman’s discussion of (M7) at “Formulating Moral Objectivity,” pp. 10f. 
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involving ethical or normative relations such as being worse than or being a reason for, as well as to 
various embedded moral claims, such as that if things were thus and so, it would be wrong to lie. I 
take it Tropman’s reason for opting for this formulation rather than one that attempts to explicitly 
mention every other sort of moral proposition is just that a formulation of the latter sort would be 
unwieldy. I agree and will follow her in this, but readers should bear in mind that the theses under 
discussion are meant to apply to other sorts of propositions. 
Whatever its appeal, this common understanding of the notion has unwelcome implications, 
for if this is how we understand the notion of objectivity, we will be forced to regard certain kinds 
of humdrum attitude-dependence as a threat to the objectivity of ethics. Consider, for example, 
these cases from Tropman:  
The fact that I would like my neighbor, Sara, to pick up my mail and care for my garden 
while I am away could make her doing these things morally permissible, and even under 
certain circumstances required. If her help would be unwelcome, then on any number of 
ethical frameworks her intervention would be the wrong thing to do, and wrong because it 
would not be welcomed.63 
 
Here Tropman’s attitude toward her neighbor’s picking up her mail makes a moral difference, one 
that seems perfectly compatible with its being objectively permissible for Sara to do these things. 
Yet, because of its clause (i), the above account of moral objectivity forces us to say otherwise. If, 
then, we want to make room for the possibility of objective ethical truth in cases like this, we need 
to find a different way of spelling out what’s involved in the notion of objectivity. 
I believe we should adopt the following proposal instead, again adapted from Tropman:  
the moral proposition MP that x is m admits of objective truth just in case just in case MP’s 
truth does not depend only on any actual or hypothetical agent’s (i) belief or non-cognitive 
attitude about x’s being m or (ii) non-cognitive attitude about x.64 
 
This formulation allows that it might be objectively true that it is permissible for Sara to pick up 
Tropman’s mail, since the permissibility of Sara’s act doesn’t depend only on Tropman’s attitude 
                                                 
63 Tropman, “Formulating Moral Objectivity,” p. 11. 
64 See Tropman’s discussion of (M9) at ibid., pp. 13ff. 
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toward it. In addition, it depends on the facts that, by doing so, Sara won’t be breaking a promise 
someone is relying on, won’t be harming anyone, and so on.  
Yet although this second formulation is certainly an improvement on the first, it has 
problems of its own. In particular, it is ambiguous between a truth-conditional reading and an 
ontological reading. On the first, truth-conditional reading, it amounts to saying that  
TRUTH-CONDITIONAL OBJECTIVITY: The moral proposition MP that x is m admits of 
objective truth in the sense that its truth does not depend only on any actual or hypothetical 
agent’s (i) belief or non-cognitive attitude about x’s being m or (ii) non-cognitive attitude 
about x. 
 
On the second, ontological reading, by contrast, the claim is that 
 
ONTOLOGICAL OBJECTIVITY: The moral proposition MP that x is m admits of objective 
truth in the sense that x’s having the property m does not depend only on any actual or 
hypothetical agent’s (i) belief or non-cognitive attitude about x’s being m or (ii) non-cognitive 
attitude about x.65 
 
So we can ask: which of these theses do realists typically have in mind, and if both, how do they 
understand the relationship between them? 
 My guess is that all self-described realists would endorse both theses and regard them as 
mutually entailing; at any rate, that is true of the two broad types of realist I will be concerned with 
here. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, this leaves considerable room for disagreement. In particular, realists 
who affirm both TRUTH-CONDITIONAL OBJECTIVITY and ONTOLOGICAL OBJECTIVITY and regard 
these theses as mutually entailing might disagree as to which plays the moral fundamental 
explanatory role. Proponents of what I will call explanatory realism take a metaphysics first approach, 
contending that their ontological objectivity explains the truth-conditional objectivity of ethical 
                                                 
65 Cf. John Searle’s distinction between the “epistemic” and “ontological” senses of objectivity at The Construction of Social 
Reality, pp. 7-9. 
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propositions, while proponents of simple realism instead take a discourse first approach, suggesting 
that their truth-conditional objectivity explains the ontological objectivity of ethical propositions.66 
None of this, of course, is to meant to suggest that this is the only issue realists might 
disagree about if they affirm both TRUTH-CONDITIONAL OBJECTIVITY and ONTOLOGICAL 
OBJECTIVITY and regard these theses as mutually entailing. Among other things, realists of this sort 
might disagree about the character of ethical properties and relations—whether they are natural or 
non-natural, e.g. However I will have little to say about these other disagreements, since for my 
purposes, that between explanatory and simple realists is far more important. For while I suspect 
debunking arguments are decisive against explanatory realists, I mean to argue that simple realists 
can answer them. 
 
1.5.2. A Brief Sketch of Simple Realism 
Explanatory realism is, I take it, familiar enough, but many readers may be puzzled about how to 
understand what I’m calling simple realism. In this section, therefore, I’ll say a bit about the 
character and consequences of simple realism, or at least the version of the view I favor. 
Very generally, I think about participating in moral discourse and, with it, practical reasoning 
more generally, as incredibly complicated skills, akin in this respect to playing music or painting. Like 
sports and games, practical reasoning is a rule-governed activity, one where the point is not to win 
but to live well. We begin to learn these rules when we learn language, and some command of them 
is required for basic linguistic and conceptual competence. These linguistic -conceptual rules are 
constitutive of moral discourse and thought in the sense that they determine the meanings of our 
words and the extension of our concepts, just as the rules of chess determine what it is to be a rook 
or a pawn. And as with other complex skills, the learning process extends far beyond childhood.  
                                                 




Its comparison of moral education to the process of learning other complex skills and its 
emphasis on the need for moral judgment makes the view broadly neo-Aristotelian, while its 
suggestion that moral judgement is itself a skill has echoes in the Stoics; more recently, Hubert and 
Stuart Dreyfus and by Nigel Desouza have defended views in this vein.67 The view also bears some 
similarity Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau’s “moral fixed points” view, according to which 
any moral system deserving of the name must include a variety of conceptual moral truths.68 
However it is even closer to Amie Thomasson’s “normativist” view of modality, about which I say 
more later.69  
I take it that the rules governing moral discourse fall into two broad categories, introduction 
rules and exit rules. Introduction rules say when a term or concept applies. Exit rules say which 
linguistic or conceptual moves—that is, which inferences—are appropriate given that some term or 
concept does apply. Because moral reasoning is part of practical reasoning more generally, exit rules 
link moral verdicts with actions, often in conjunction with claims about prudential or other 
concerns. An example of an introduction rule is that other things being equal, it is bad to break a 
promise. An example of an exit rule is that, other things being equal, you ought to babysit for your 
friend if they ask you, provided it would not be terribly inconvenient and that could do so without 
wronging anyone (for example, by making yourself unable to fill in for a colleague whose class you 
had already promised to teach that night).  
Importantly, competence with the relevant terms and concepts does not require that one be 
able to explicitly state the rules that govern those terms and concepts. Speaking specifically of 
                                                 
67 See Dreyfus and Dreyfus, “Towards a Phenomenology of Ethical Expertise” and Desouza, “Pre-Reflective Ethical 
Know-How.” I have developed similar ideas in my “The Virtuous Person as Master” and “The Stoics on Learning to Be 
Good.” 
68 Cuneo and Shafer-Landau, “New Directions for Moral Nonnaturalism: The Moral Fixed Points.” 
69 See Thomasson, “Norms and Necessity” and “How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths.” 
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introduction rules, which she calls “application conditions,” Amie Thomasson helpfully explains the 
point as follows: 
rather than thinking of application conditions as definitions competent speakers (or anyone 
else) could recite, we should instead think of them as rules for when it is and is not proper to 
use a term, which speakers master in acquiring competence with applying and refusing a new 
term in various situations, and that (once mastered) enable competent speakers to evaluate 
whether or not the term would properly be applied in a range of actual and hypothetical 
situations. Although the application conditions for many basic nouns might not be statable 
at all, they will be learnable, as infants learn (through the approval and disapproval, the 
comprehension or bewilderment of their caregivers and eventually peers) that in 
circumstances like these it is appropriate to say ‘this is a K’ or ‘there is a K’, while in 
circumstances like these it is not. They thereby learn when the term is to be applied and when 
refused, and so master the application conditions for these semantically basic terms.70 
 
This may remind readers of Aristotle’s emphasis on the necessity of phronesis and of John 
McDowell’s claim that ethics is not “codifiable.”71 
I regard moral theory as an attempt to work out the content of these rules. In principle, 
simple realists could defend solutions like those I develop in the following chapters regardless of 
which first-order moral theory they think best, so my project doesn’t require that I commit myself 
on this score. However, I do have a preference, and in the interest of putting my cards on the table 
and of giving readers a better sense of how simple realism might be fleshed out, I’ll say a bit about it. 
I am inclined to think our best moral theory will be composed mostly if not wholly of what 
Mark Lance and Margaret Little call “defeasible generalizations.”72 These are claims like the 
following: 
• Defeasibly, matches light when struck. 
• Subject to provisos, an increase in supply leads to a drop in price. 
• Ceteris paribus, sheep reproduce only with other sheep. 
• Other things being equal, fish eggs develop into fish. 
• In normal conditions, appearances are epistemically trustworthy.73 
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Such claims, Lance and Little argue, are not well understood either as shorthand for claims that 
spell out all of the relevant defeating conditions or as statistical generalizations. Rather, they are 
best understood as saying that the circumstances in which the predicate holds true of the subject 
are privileged, since such circumstances are especially revelatory of the subject’s nature or of that 
of the domain of reality of which it is a part. They inform us, that is, about a deep connection that 
exists between the subject and the predicate. 
Lance and Little explain the point in the following passage, focusing on the defeasible 
generalization that matches light when struck: 
Very roughly put, to understand the defeasible connection between striking and lighting 
that governs the concept match...is to know what conditions are privileged, to understand 
the various ways in which conditions can vary from the privileged ones, and to understand 
the differences those deviations make. It is to understand, for instance, that matches don’t 
light when wet, unless again they are in the presence of a particularly heavy concentration 
of oxygen, but even then not if the temperature is near to absolute zero, and on and on. 
One will not be able to spell out exhaustively what privileged conditions consist in, nor the 
set of possible departures. But someone with a broad understanding of matches will have a 
good practical understanding of privileged conditions and deviations in the relevant 
domain—as evidenced by the fact that they generally succeed in their attempts to light 
matches, don’t waste their matches by making attempts when there is no hope of success, 
etc.74 
 
To understand a defeasible generalization—to have, as Lance and Little say, a grasp of the modal 
geography near to the privileged world(s)75—is thus not just to know which worlds are privileged 
and which are not, but to know what differences those differences make—to know, for instance, 
that in worlds in which predators eat the fish eggs before they hatch, fish eggs don’t develop into 
fish. 
                                                                                                                                                             
73 These are Lance and Little’s examples. See “Where the Laws Are,” p. 151.  
74 “From Particularism to Defeasibility in Ethics,” pp. 62-63. 
75 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
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 In my view, the introduction and exit rules that govern the game of giving and asking for 
ethical reasons take the form of defeasible generalizations. I take it all of the following are plausible 
candidates: 
• Ceteris paribus, lying is wrong. 
• Other things being equal, the fact that some activity would cause someone pain is a reason 
not to engage in it. 
• Defeasibly, it would be wrong not to help someone in need if one could easily do so. 
• Generally speaking, it is wrong to keep more than enough of some essential resource for 
oneself if others are struggling to meet their basic needs. 
• Typically, one ought to comply with others’ expressed wishes. 
 
As with the non-ethical generalizations discussed above, these ethical defeasible generalizations say 
how things stand, ethically speaking, in privileged conditions. In non-privileged conditions, things 
may be different, and full understanding of each of these generalizations requires knowing exactly 
how. For instance, understanding the first involves knowing that it is not wrong to lie to the slave 
patrol when they ask if you’re harboring a runaway or to ICE agents asking after the whereabouts of 
a refugee so that they can return them to be tortured at home.76 
* * * 
One worry readers may have about this version of simple realism concerns its claims about 
the structure of moral theory. In particular, some will worry, a moral theory composed of defeasible 
generalizations leaves us with an unconnected heap of duties.77 Yet Lance and Little argue 
convincingly that, far from forming an unconnected heap, a moral theory composed of defeasible 
generalizations might be richly interconnected, its tenets mutually supporting and illuminating one 
another. The point is best brought out with examples, so consider the claims that (defeasibly) the 
fact that it would cause another physical pain is a wrong-making feature of an act and that 
(defeasibly) one ought to comply with others’ expressed wishes. The precise ways in which these 
                                                 
76 Lance uses the latter example in “The Functions of Moral Practice.” 
77 A phrase I take from David McNaughton. See his “An Unconnected Heap of Duties?” 
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facts relate to another change across contexts, but at least most of the time, the latter has a sort of 
explanatory priority over the former. Note, for instance, that the reason it is permissible for a medical 
professional to cause someone pain by, say, giving someone a shot they need is often or anyway may 
be that the patient has sought help and given the medical professional permission to do so: causing 
pain is here permissible precisely because complying with the patient’s expressed wishes requires 
that pain be caused in this way. The same explanatory priority is present in radically different 
contexts, such as that of the sexual practices of BDSM, which Lance and Little have discussed in 
several of their articles.78 Here the significance of both causing pain and complying with others’ 
expressed wishes is often (though not necessarily) the exact opposite of what it normally is. In the 
BDSM room, one ought to flout others’ expressed wishes in many cases, though, at least most of 
the time, and in the most common versions of the practice, not when pre-arranged safe words are 
uttered. Similarly, the fact that an act would cause another pain is often, not just not a reason to 
refrain from performing it, but in fact a positive reason to perform it. In both cases, this fact is to be 
explained with respect to prior agreements made in those privileged conditions in which one ought 
comply with another’s expressed wishes: it is only because two people have agreed beforehand to 
take part in this practice that it can be permissible for them to flout one another’s wishes and cause 
one another pain in the BDSM room. This is just one example; still, I hope that it gives some sense 
of the ways a moral theory composed of defeasible generalizations might yet recognize how deeply 
imbricated and intertwined are the rules governing moral reflection.  
Another worry about simple realism—much more important for our purposes—is that, 
given that they think of ethical discourse as at root just a special kind of language-game, it is not 
clear how simple realists can admit talk of ethical relations, properties, and facts. In fact, they can do 
so in a way that is surprisingly straightforward, drawing on what Amie Thomasson’s so-called “easy” 
                                                 
78 See, inter alia,“Where the Laws Are,” pp. 162-165. 
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approach to ontology.79 Very generally speaking, Thomasson’s view is that competent speakers may 
answer existence questions by observing that the application conditions for some term obtain and 
inferring, on that basis, that the object in question exists. Thus, confronted with the question 
whether there are tables or just atoms arranged table-wise, we may answer that, since there are atoms 
arranged table-wise, there are tables. Similarly, simple realists may easily answer questions about the 
existence of ethical relations, properties, and facts by drawing on their command of the rules 
mastery of which is necessary for competence with the relevant terms and concepts. Thus, given 
that the fact that it would hurt someone is generally a reason not to perform an act, we might infer 
that the fact that the relevant act would hurt someone stands in the reason relation to that act, and 
from there, that there are ethical relations. From the fact that lying is defeasibly wrong, we may infer 
that lying has the property of wrongness and, from there, that there are ethical properties. Finally, 
assuming a deflationary view of facts, simple realists may infer that, since lying is wrong, it is a fact 
that lying is wrong, and that there are accordingly ethical facts.80 In this respect, the version of 
simple realism I’m endorsing takes its cue from Carnap (in, for example, “Empiricism, Semantics, 
and Ontology”), as does Thomasson’s own approach. 
Notably, ethical relations, properties, and facts, so understood, cannot do any meaningful 
explanatory work. Instead, as Thomasson explains with reference to modal properties,  
any such attempted explanation would just be a dormitive virtue explanation. If we become 
entitled to say, ‘Barak [sic] Obama has the property of being necessarily human’ on the basis 
of a trivial inference from the true claim ‘Barak [sic] Obama is necessarily human’, then we 
cannot appeal to the modal property to explain the truth of the original modal claim. 
Instead, reference to the modal property falls out of the hypostatization from the original 
truth. So, this could no more ‘explain’ than we can explain why the poppies make us sleepy 
by (using the hypostatized trivial inference and) saying ‘poppies have the dormitive virtue’.81 
 
                                                 
79 See Thomasson, Ontology Made Easy, esp. chs. 2-3. 
80 Cf. Thomasson, “How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths,” pp. 12-13. 
81 Thomasson, ibid., p. 13, note 13. 
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Here we come to the central difference between explanatory and simple realists. The point of saying 
that the former take a metaphysics first approach is precisely that they accord ethical relations, 
properties, and facts robust explanatory roles: that it has the property we call “wrongness” explains 
why lying is wrong, that it is a fact that lying is wrong explains why “lying is wrong” is true, and so 
on. On the simple realist’s discourse first approach, by contrast, it is rather the structure of our 
language and the contours of our concepts that explain why lying has this property and why it is a 
fact that lying is wrong. 
This last point brings us to what is, for my purposes, the most significant consequence of 
simple realism: its implications for how we go about determining whether ethical propositions admit 
of objective truth. Typically, the question is thought to hang on the existence of mind-independent 
properties or relations. This is the explanatory realist’s view. On the simple realist view, however, the 
question turns out to be a first-order ethical question, to be decided by ethical reflection. For 
consider what we need to determine if we want to know whether or not ethical propositions admit 
of objective truth on the truth-conditional reading simple realists take to be more fundamental. On 
that view, recall, 
TRUTH-CONDITIONAL OBJECTIVITY: The moral proposition MP that x is m admits of 
objective truth in the sense that its truth does not depend only on any actual or hypothetical 
agent’s (i) belief or non-cognitive attitude about x’s being m or (ii) non-cognitive attitude 
about x. 
 
It follows that, if we want to know whether or not moral propositions admit of objective truth, all 
we need to do is think about the circumstances under which they would be true—their truth-
conditions. We might do so by asking whether or not their truth depends only on the relevant sorts 
of facts about people’s beliefs and attitudes. Or, what comes to the same thing, we might inquire 
after the truth of the following counterfactual:  
for any actual or hypothetical agent, any belief or non-cognitive attitude about x’s being m, 
and any non-cognitive attitude about x, it might be false that x is m even if that agent had 




That is, we might ask whether or not there is any combination of actual or hypothetical agents, 
beliefs or non-cognitive attitudes about x’s being m, and non-cognitive attitudes about x, such that, 
necessarily, if that agent had those beliefs or attitudes, it would be true that x is m. In any case, the 
important thing is that the crucial question is an ethical rather than a metaphysical one.82 To be sure, 
from the claim that the proposition that lying is wrong admits of objective truth, so established, we 
might infer that the property of wrongness is mind-independent, and from there that there are 
mind-independent ethical properties. But as with ethical properties more generally, wrongness’ 
mind-independence cannot in this case do the explanatory work the explanatory realist wants it to 
do. In this sense, the simple realist agrees with Hilary Putnam that “the question is the objectivity of 
the discourse in question, and not the existence of some realm of non-natural objects.”83 
 This concludes my brief sketch of at least one form of simple realism. Much more would 
need to be said in a fuller treatment, and I do say some of it in the following chapters. For now, 
though, and for my purposes, this is enough. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
This completes my presentation of the debunking challenge. As we saw, many different arguments 
have been discussed in the literature on debunking arguments. One—Street’s—is not particularly 
compelling, and another—Enoch’s—is not really a debunking argument at all. The only debunking 
argument that really merits an extended response begins with an explanatory claim—that the best, 
complete explanation of why we form the moral beliefs we do neither presupposes nor entails their 
truth—and aims to show, on that basis, that none of our moral beliefs are justified, and that, for 
                                                 
82 I thus partially agree with Ronald Dworkin’s well-known claim that meta-ethical questions are all, ultimately first-order 
ethical questions. See “Objectivity and Truth,” pp. 96-99, esp. p. 98. 
83 Putnam, Ethics without Ontology, p. 72. Putnam attributes this formulation to Georg Kreisel, as does Dummett in his 
essay, “Realism” (see p. 146); however, neither gives a reference, and I have not been able to find one. 
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every moral proposition P, we are rationally committed to withholding belief that P.  
I suggested that this explanatory claim is mistaken: at least for some people, and at least for 
some of their beliefs, the best, complete explanation of why they hold them must appeal to their 
capacity to acquire moral knowledge through reflection, a capacity that enables them to sort the 
wheat from the evolutionary chaff so as to ensure that they see things aright. Debunkers, I said, 
might offer three rejoinders to this suggestion. First, they might suggest that this explanation is 
redundant. Second, they might appeal to under-determination-based skepticism. Finally, they might 
invoke a metaethical analogue of the Benacerraf-Field Challenge for mathematical platonism. This 
last, I suggested, is actually best understood as two distinct challenges, Benacerraf’s Challenge and 
Field’s Challenge, the former of which alleges that there is a causal or explanatory constraint on 
knowledge that our beliefs cannot satisfy if realism is true, and the latter of which challenges realists 
to explain the mechanism that allows us to so often get things right in ethics. 
 The aim of the following chapters is to defend the reflection-centered response to 
debunking arguments I sketched out in §1.2.1 above by responding to each of the three rejoinders I 
canvassed for debunkers. The next chapter responds to the first two, and my third chapter takes up 













The aim of this chapter is to show that the first two of the three rejoinders I canvassed in 
the previous chapter—namely the Harman-inspired redundancy rejoinder and the 
underdetermination-based argument I attributed to Street—take for granted the same confused 
conception of the ways in which we can intelligibly take ourselves to be liable to go wrong in ethical 
reflection. Because it is a bit easier to see the mistake to which I want to draw attention in this 
context than in the context of the other, Harman-inspired rejoinder I discussed in §1.3.2, I will 
spend most of my time in this chapter on the underdetermination-based argument I attributed to 
Street, according to which realism precludes the acquisition via reflection of knowledge of ethical 
facts by rendering inadequate the evidence available to us in reflection. I will suggest that, 
appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, Street has given us no reason to think it inappropriate 
for realists to appeal to the potentially corrective influence of reflection on the content of our beliefs 
to explain why we hold the beliefs we do. Afterward, in §2.6.2, I will turn to the Harman-inspired 
defense of the debunking challenge, explaining how the same confusion I claim to find in Street’s 
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argument pervades that other defense of debunking arguments as well. 
 
2.1. Rule-Following Skepticism 
Since my thought here is inspired by Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule-following, especially as 
interpreted by David Finkelstein, Jim Conant, Cora Diamond, and John McDowell,1 I think the best 
way to explain what I have in mind is to make the parallel explicit. I therefore begin with a 
discussion of Wittgenstein. This section sets out the basic problem, and the next explains 
Wittgenstein’s response. 
 
2.1.1. Skepticism about Rules 
At Investigations §431, Wittgenstein has an interlocutor articulate the basic thought behind skepticism 
about rule-following: “There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled by the 
act of understanding.” To bring out what’s going on in this remark and in Wittgenstein’s discussion 
of following rules more generally, I want to focus on a pair of questions: what kind of gulf might the 
rule-following skeptic have in mind here, and why might an “act of the understanding” be thought 
to enable us to bridge it? 
One set of answers is suggested by the following example from David Finkelstein.2 While an 
American who speaks little Italian is in Rome, a local police officer approaches her and shouts 
something. The American can tell by the officer’s tone and body language that he wants her to do 
something, but she’s not sure just what. Here there is a kind of gulf between the order and its and its 
execution: the American hears that order, but she has no idea what it would take to execute it. If this 
is the kind of gulf the skeptic has in mind, it is not hard to see why he might think an “act of the 
                                                 
1 See Finkelstein’s “Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism”; Conant, “Two Varieties of Skepticism”; Diamond, “Realism 
and the Realistic Spirit”; and McDowell, “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” and 
“Motivating Inferentialism: Comments on Chapter 2 of Making It Explicit.” 
2 See his “Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism,” p. 61. 
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understanding” is required: for the tourist to figure out what the order means—for her to bridge the 
gulf between the order and its execution—she need only interpret the officer’s words, perhaps with 
the aid of a dictionary or a bilingual passerby.   
Importantly, however, this is not the kind of gulf that worries the rule-following skeptic. 
That gulf—a gulf that, both in order to distinguish it from that confronted by the American tourist 
and as a nod to Wittgenstein’s own phrase “Über-Ausdruck,”3 I will refer to as a “super-gulf”—is 
supposed to be more pervasive and, in a sense, deeper. This gulf, the skeptic would say, yawns even 
between the Roman policeman’s interpreted order and its meaning. Indeed, according to the skeptic, 
we are all in the situation of the uncomprehending American tourist in Rome with respect to all 
orders, even the most familiar. Moreover, the skeptic holds, the interpretive process that helped the 
tourist cannot help us here.   
The skeptic’s worry is motivated by the thought that there is available to us an enormous 
variety of interpretations of any given word or sentence, between which it is not clear how we are 
supposed to choose. We see this thought reflected already in the despair to which the attempt by 
one of Wittgenstein’s interlocutors to determine who or what is meant by the name “Moses” leads 
in Philosophical Investigations §87:  
87. Suppose I give this explanation: “I take ‘Moses’ to mean the man, if there was such a 
man, who led the Israelites out of Egypt, whatever he was called then and whatever else he 
may or may not have done.” — But doubts similar to those about the name “Moses” are 
possible about the words of this explanation (what are you calling “Egypt”, whom the 
“Israelites”, and so forth?). These questions would not even come to an end when we got 
down to words like “red”, “dark”, “sweet”. — “But then how does an explanation help me 
to understand if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never 
completed; so I still don’t understand what he means, and never shall!”4 
 
More famously, though, and perhaps also more clearly, we see the source of the skeptic’s worries in 
Wittgenstein’s example of a teacher who attempts to teach a student to extend the series 0, n, 2n, 3n, 
                                                 
3 See Philosophical Investigations §192.  
4 Translation modified. 
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…  when given an order of the form “+n.”5   
Having done exercises with him up to 1,000, the teacher one day tells the student “+2”; the 
student expands the series just fine up to 1,000 but then writes 1,004, 1,008, 1,012. What has been 
thought so disturbing about this example is that fact that, while incorrect, the student’s 
interpretation of the teacher’s instructions could very well be perfectly consistent with them. Sure, 
the teacher will likely have said something to the effect that the student is to write the next number 
but one, but more likely than not he will not have specified that the student is to write “1,002” after 
“1,000.” And even if he has, nothing about the way the teacher or anyone else has used the phrase 
“write 1,002” in the past entails that it does not in this case mean that the student is to write “1,004.” 
Perhaps to grasp the meaning of that phrase just is to realize that, whereas in all previous cases 
complying with that order required writing “1,002” at this point, in this one doing so requires writing 
“1,004”; perhaps that just is what it would be to “go on in the same way.” At any rate, the skeptic 
asks, how is the student to know otherwise?  
The issue is further complicated by the appearance that nothing the teacher says by way of 
clarification could possibly rule out any misunderstanding on the part of the student. For just as any 
instructions the teacher gives are compatible with various ways of extending the series, so too 
anything the teacher might say to clarify his instructions will admit of an enormous variety of 
understandings. If, for example, the teacher were to explain that after 1,000, the student is to write 
“1,002, 1,004, and so on,” the student might take it that he is to continue with “1,008, 1,016, 
1,032….” Similarly for any interpretation of the teacher’s words, which must itself be couched in 
words that admit of various interpretations. And so, here just as in the Moses case, an infinite 
regress can seem to threaten any attempt to arrive at clarity.   
The question that exercises the interlocutors that feature in Wittgenstein’s text, and the one 
                                                 
5 See Philosophical Investigations, §185. For similar passages, see (inter alia) Philosophical Investigations §§79, 85-87, and 454 and 
Zettel, §238, some of which I discuss later in this chapter. 
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that has exercised many of his readers, is how, in spite of all this, the interlocutor might determine 
who is supposed to be designated by the name “Moses,” or how the student might determine which 
way of going on in particular is supposed to be picked out by the teacher’s order “+2”—how, in 
other words, either might bridge the super-gulfs that are here supposed to threaten understanding.6 
It is precisely because interpretation suffices to bridge run-of-the-mill word-meaning gulfs 
like that confronted by the American tourist in Rome that the skeptic insists that, here as there, an 
act of the understanding of some sort is all that we need to bridge the super-gulf. He sees that an act 
of the understanding was perfectly sufficient in those other cases and so surmises that the same must 
be true here, even as he rejects the suggestion that interpretation might do the trick in this case. To 
cure this disease, the skeptic insists, we are going to need stronger medicine.   
Naturally enough, many philosophers have reacted to these considerations by casting about 
for some other way to bridge the skeptic’s super-gulf,7 but for my purposes, these proposals matter 
less than Wittgenstein’s own, very different response to the rule-following skeptic. 
 
2.2. Wittgenstein’s Response to the Rule-Following Skeptic 
Wittgenstein does not make any attempt to explain how we might bridge the skeptic’s supposed 
gulf; instead he asks—and invites his readers to ask—“what gulf?” Wittgenstein’s thought is that the 
alleged super-gulf with which the rule-following skeptic is concerned is nothing more than a kind of 
mirage. That is to say: he thinks it is in fact a specious threat that we seem to confront only once we 
                                                 
6 Though perhaps the best option, this way of putting the point has the unfortunate defect of making it sound as though 
rule-following skepticism is exclusively a form of what James Conant has called “Cartesian” skepticism, or (very roughly) 
skepticism about the possibility of a certain sort of knowledge (see Conant’s “Two Varieties of Skepticism”). In fact, as 
the example of Kripke makes clear, as McDowell has in effect been saying for years (see both “Wittgenstein on 
Following a Rule” and “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”), and as Conant himself notes, 
Wittgenstein was concerned with both Cartesian and what Conant calls “Kantian” skepticism. Skepticism of this latter 
sort is (once again very roughly) skepticism about how a certain commonplace feature of our experience or thought is 
possible—how, in this case, words could possibly have meanings. Here I only discuss the Cartesian form of skepticism 
about rules, since that is more relevant for my purposes than is the Kantian alternative. 




have lost ourselves in a kind of delusion, a misunderstanding not just of our own words, but also—
and more importantly—of ourselves and our own real needs in philosophy that Cora Diamond has 
aptly called a “philosophical fantasy.”8 “Fantasy” in this usage contrasts with philosophical “realism” 
of a kind analogous to realism in literature and painting. In literature, realism is characterized by an 
accurate portrayal of the way the world works: a social movement succeeds, for example, not 
through the sudden and inexplicable acquiescence of those who stand in the way of progress but as 
a result of the hard work of organizing and education and only after what can sometimes seem too 
many setbacks to count. And in portraiture and landscape painting, realism is fidelity to the subject, 
an attempt to portray the person or the landscape as he or she or it really is. Similarly, philosophical 
realism in the sense relevant here involves fidelity to the ways we ordinarily speak and think, and 
getting caught up in philosophical fantasy in Diamond’s sense involves losing sight of all this. The 
point of saying that the skeptic is caught up in fantasy, then, is that the skeptic’s questions can only 
seem compelling—can only even seem to make sense—when, typically without meaning to do so or 
even realizing that we have, we divorce ourselves in our thinking from the real-life contexts in which 
questions about the meaning of a word or an order actually come up, contexts in which, more often 
than not, such questions are typically no harder to answer than is the American tourist’s question 
about the meaning of the Roman policeman’s order. 
Wittgenstein employs a variety of strategies in his attempts to expose the rule-following 
skeptic’s fantasy as such, but for our purposes, two in particular are especially relevant.  
 
2.2.1. Strategy 1: Assembling Recollections for a Particular Purpose 
The first of these involves reminding his readers of the ways we ordinarily think and talk about gulfs 
                                                 
8 See her “Realism and the Realistic Spirit.” 
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between rules and their meanings.9 We see this, for example, at Investigations §85: 
85. A rule stands there like a signpost. — Does the signpost leave no doubt about the way I 
have to go? Does it show which direction I am to take when I have passed it, whether along 
the road or the footpath or cross-country? But where does it say which way I am to follow it; 
whether in the direction of its finger or (for example) in the opposite one? — And if there 
were not a single signpost, but a sequence of signposts or chalk marks on the ground — is 
there only one way of interpreting them? — So I can say that the signpost does after all leave 
room for doubt. Or rather, it sometimes leaves room for doubt, and sometimes not. And now this is no 
longer a philosophical proposition, but an empirical one.10 
 
A signpost is an expression of a kind of rule—a rule for how to proceed along a road or a path. And 
as with other rules, the majority of §85 is supposed to indicate, one might get worked up about the 
fact that signposts admit or anyway might appear to admit of an overwhelming variety of 
interpretations. But—Wittgenstein means to show us in the bits I have emphasized—concern with 
this vertigo-inducing variety of interpretations is a sign, not of having achieved some insight into the 
naïveté exhibited by most of us in our routine dealings with signposts, but of having gotten caught 
up in philosophical fantasy. The point is simply to remind us what it really is like to encounter a sign, 
to help us remember that when we encounter a signpost in the course of our ordinary lives, we 
typically do not find ourselves needing to choose one among infinite possible interpretations. Far 
from it: more often than not, there is no need to choose because there are no options to choose 
between, no choice to make. For most people, most of the time, a reasonably well-made sign neither 
needs nor even so much as brooks interpretation. (How am I supposed to “interpret” a sign that 
obviously says El Paso is 250 miles down the road?) Having recalled this humdrum fact to his 
readers’ attention, Wittgenstein hopes they might begin to wonder at the skeptic’s insistence that 
between every rule and its meaning there stands a gulf that must be filled by an “act of 
understanding.” 
This general thought comes out even more clearly in Investigations §213: 
                                                 
9 Cf. Investigations §127. 
10 Emphasis added. 
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213. “But this initial segment of a series could obviously be variously interpreted (for 
example, by means of algebraic expressions), so you must first have chosen one such 
interpretation.” — Not at all! A doubt was possible in certain circumstances. But that is not 
to say that I did doubt, or even could doubt.11  
 
Here as before, the idea is to bring us back down to earth—to remind us of what it is actually like to 
use the words with which we have become concerned and so to help us see more clearly what it 
looks like when they are not idling but doing their work.12 The distinctive feature of this passage that 
makes it worth quoting is the last bit, where Wittgenstein makes explicit his observation that, very 
often, it is not just that as a matter of fact I do not doubt that I am following the rule rightly, but, in 
addition, that in many cases I wouldn’t even so much as know how to do so. When, for example, I 
read in a bread recipe that I am to mix one tablespoon of salt and two tablespoons of sugar in with 
the flour before I add the water, it is hard even to make sense of the idea that I might have 
misunderstood the rule—that, in other words, there might be some gulf between its expression and 
its content that I need to bridge. For here the meaning of the rule is patent—the rule wears its 
meaning on its face, as it were. Were someone to ask me how I can be sure what the recipe requires 
of me, I simply wouldn’t understand what he was asking—this despite the fact that, if I set my mind 
to it, I probably could come up with a whole bunch of odd ways of interpreting it.13 Here as before, 
Wittgenstein’s hope is that this observation will give pause to those taken in by the skeptic’s fantasy. 
We see the same strategy at work in some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the closely-related 
concept of explaining the meaning of a word. Consider, for instance, the rest of a passage we 
considered earlier. After his hypothetical interlocutor has worked himself up into a panic about how 
he might come to know who the name “Moses” is supposed to designate, Wittgenstein makes the 
following remark: 
87. As though an explanation, as it were, hung in the air unless supported by another one. 
                                                 
11 Emphasis added. 
12 Cf. Investigations §132. 
13 I take this example from Finkelstein. For talk of the face of a rule in Wittgenstein, see (inter alia) Investigations §228. 
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Whereas an explanation may indeed rest on another one that has been given, but none 
stands in need of another — unless we require it to avoid a misunderstanding. One might 
say: an explanation serves to remove or to prevent a misunderstanding — one, that is, that 
would arise if not for the explanation, but not every misunderstanding that I can imagine. 
It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed a gap in the foundations; so that secure 
understanding is possible only if we first doubt everything that can be doubted, and then 
remove all these doubts. 
The signpost is in order — if, under normal circumstances, it serves its purpose.14 
 
Or again, consider Investigations §§208 and 210: 
208. How do I explain the meaning of “regular”, and “uniform”, “same” to anyone? — I’ll 
explain these words to someone who, say, speaks only French by means of the 
corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I’ll teach him to use 
the words by means of examples and by exercises. — And when I do this, I do not communicate less to 
him than I know myself. 
 
210. “But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand? Don’t you 
leave it to him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples — but he has to guess 
their drift, to guess your intention.” — Every explanation which I can give myself I give to him too. 
— “He guesses what I mean” would amount to: “various interpretations of my explanation come to his 
mind, and he picks one of them”. So in this case he could ask; and I could and would answer him.15  
 
Once we have lost sight of the ways doubts about the meanings of words come up and are settled in 
the course of ordinary life, it is easy to get caught up in exactly the sort of panic in which 
Wittgenstein’s interlocutor finds himself in Investigations §87. It can seem as though it were the case, 
not only that the name “Moses” itself demands further explanation, but that the words that 
compose any explanation we might be given do as well—that, if we are to understand what a word 
means, another speaker should have to somehow communicate to us something for which—it now 
appears—words could not but be hopelessly inadequate vehicles. But, Wittgenstein reminds his 
interlocutor with characteristic brusqueness, “the signpost is in order — if, under normal 
circumstances, it serves its purpose.” The point, once again, is to remind us that although the 
meaning of a signpost might from time to time come into question (as might that of any sign), it 
often does not—indeed, as we saw a moment ago, often could not.  
                                                 
14 Translation modified. 
15 Emphasis added. 
57 
 
Of course, sometimes people do find themselves unsure as to what a word means, who a 
name designates, what a sign directs us to do, etc. But in these cases it is typically clear what it would 
take to explain things to them. Perhaps someone is unsure whether when I say “Moses” I am 
referring to the biblical figure or to the old man who lives down the street. So she can ask, and I can 
indicate, which I mean, and that will be the end of it; no nebulous, extra-linguistic something need 
pass between us. When the concerns that exercise the skeptic are in this way brought down from the 
clouds and put back into the contexts in which we are familiar with them, over and over again we 
find that they lose their power.16 Here nothing seems mysterious, words don’t appear powerless. 
What Wittgenstein hopes to bring out by doing this over and over again is that we are confused 
about the source of our difficulties. We think we have to understand something inscrutable, but this 
is fantasy. The reality is that doubt, understanding, explanation, interpretation—these are all 
phenomena that take place amidst and can only come into view against the background of a more-
or-less shared understanding of the linguistic practice. Our troubles arise when and because we lose 
sight of that.17 
There is a way of misunderstanding what Wittgenstein is up to in these passages common 
enough to be worth mentioning before turning to the other strategy for exposing the skeptic’s 
fantasy I want to discuss. One might be puzzled at the critical use of the term “fantasy,” which 
suggests that the skeptic’s words have only the appearance of meaningfulness. For this suggestion, it 
can easily seem, goes significantly beyond the evidence provided. What has been shown, it can seem, 
is not that there is in fact nothing for the skeptic to mean by his words, that there is in fact no 
problem where the skeptic sees one, but rather just that the uses of language we see in the 
articulation of skeptical doubts are unusual and the problems that preoccupy rule-following skeptics 
                                                 
16 Cf. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, pp. 217-221. 
17 The point here is similar to the one Heidegger makes in Being and Time about the existence of the external world. See 
Being and Time, division one, part III. You might say that meaning is a phenomenon that only shows itself when we are, 




Understandable as it is, this reaction misses the essential point of Wittgenstein’s criticism. 
Wittgenstein’s aim is not just to point out that the skeptic’s words diverge from ordinary usage. 
Whatever interest that project might have, the objection is correct to suggest that, by itself, it cuts no 
critical ice against the skeptic, as Wittgenstein himself certainly realized. He intended such 
observations not, as the objection suggests, as an end in themselves, but rather as a sort of 
provocation. Having reminded the rule-following skeptic of the contours of ordinary usage, 
Wittgenstein hopes to prompt a certain sort of reflection. He wants to put the skeptic back on his 
heels, to prompt him to ask himself what it actually looks like for people to do the things we call 
knowing the meaning of a word, explaining its meaning, interpreting an ambiguous sign, etc.—when 
the meanings of signs actually do come into question for us and how we deal with those situations. 
And he wants the skeptic to ask himself: in which if any of these ways is he using the relevant words 
when he attempts to articulate his skeptical doubts? Wittgenstein’s hunch is that the skeptic will find 
that, for any ordinary usage of the relevant words he can come up with, that usage will lack the 
devastating critical force the skeptic hitherto took his words to have. And, he hopes, this discovery 
will prompt the skeptic to wonder whether his words ever had any such force to begin with. 
Consider, for instance, the skeptic’s question as to how the student is to know that carrying 
out the order “+2” requires that he write “1,002” after “1,000.” While it would certainly be odd, it’s 
not so hard to imagine a student understanding the order to mean that he is to write the series of 
even numbers up to “1,000” and then continue the series by writing every fourth number up to 
2,000, every sixth number up to 3,000, etc. How is the student to realize that she’s misunderstood? 
What can she do to recognize her error? Well, suppose that she does go on to write “1,004, 1,008, 
…” after “1,000,” and the teacher balks. The student can then ask: “Is that not right? Was I 
supposed to do things differently?” And the teacher may then explain that it’s not; “after 1,000,” he 
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can tell the student, “you should have written 1,002, 1,004, and so on, just as you did when you 
began at 0.” More likely than not, that would be the end of it. If this did not suffice, if the student 
kept on making mistakes, as I suppose might happen, we would not conclude that it is impossible to 
know how to continue the series, but that the student is perhaps incorrigible, or at the very least that 
it is going to take more or a different kind of instruction than we are used to for her to cotton on. 
And were someone to suggest that we in fact ought to conclude that this episode shows it is indeed 
impossible to know how to continue the series, the response would be, roughly, and in full, “Huh?” 
In the background of all this is a rich vision of language that is for the most part only hinted 
at by Wittgenstein himself. One aspect of this vision is a kind of radical contextualism according to 
which the meanings of our words are dependent in enormous and uncodifiable ways on the 
circumstances and contexts in which we use them. Consequently, Wittgenstein thinks that the only 
way to determine what a given utterance means is by bringing to bear on that utterance the 
sensibilities we acquire by learning language and in virtue of which we count as competent speakers, 
asking ourselves what we might mean were we to utter the relevant words in the relevant 
circumstances—by considering, in Austin’s words, “what we should say when, and so why and what we 
should mean by it.”18  
Another, absolutely crucial aspect of Wittgenstein’s vision is that there are limits to the ways 
in which we might intelligibly use an expression, limits that are only discernible by competent 
speakers through this kind of immanent interrogation of our linguistic practices. This might be 
thought an objectionable form of conservatism, one that sees us as bound to whatever forms of 
expression we find ourselves with. But the point is not at all to deny that languages can change over 
time as new words are introduced and new usages are coined; the thought, rather, is that new words 
are introduced only by stipulating for them a use of a familiar sort, or by stipulating for them a new 
                                                 
18 Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” p. 129 (emphasis in the original). On this general approach, Cavell, “Must We Mean 
What We Say?” 
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usage introduced by extending or altering some older, more familiar one in comprehensible ways—
comprehensible, again, from the point of view of competent speakers bringing to bear their 
linguistic sensibilities on the examination of particular, contextually situated usages of words.19  
The strategy for exposing the skeptic’s fantasy that I have been discussing is informed by 
this vision of language. A crucial—indeed perhaps the central—Wittgensteinian insight is that, very 
often when doing philosophy, we find ourselves attempting to “speak outside language games,” in 
Stanley Cavell’s evocative phrase.20 That is to say, we attempt to use words and phrases in ways and 
in contexts for which no place has been prepared by our practice and of which there is accordingly 
no sense to be made. In doing so, we are liable think we have somehow managed to transfer the 
meaning the relevant utterance has in those contexts in which it is at home with it into whichever 
new context in which we are trying to use it.21 Wittgenstein’s critical aim with these reminders about 
the contours of ordinary usage is to expose this impression as but a sort of hallucination of 
meaning,22 to activate our linguistic sensibilities and thereby draw to our attention the discrepancy 
between what we can mean by our words and what we are trying to say—or better, since there is in 
fact nothing to be said, what we think we are trying to say. In such cases, it’s true, our words can be 
given a meaning by assimilating them to the sorts of usages for which our practices have prepared the 
way, but—so goes the Wittgensteinian thought—these more familiar ways of using the relevant 
word(s) will strike us, when we are in a philosophical mood, as falling short of what we really meant. 
Pressed to say what we did mean, Wittgenstein suspects, we will find ourselves unable to make 
ourselves understood in ways that feel true to us. The conclusion Wittgenstein wants us to draw is, 
not—as we are wont to do—that ordinary language is simply inadequate to our purposes, but that 
                                                 
19 On this aspect of Wittgenstein’s thought see Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment, ch.1, §§3-4, esp. pp. 40-43. And cf. Cavell, 
The Claim of Reason, pp. 171-173. 
20 See Philosophy the Day After Tomorrow, pp. 206-207. 
21 Cf. Investigations §117. 
22 Cf. Investigations §260. 
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we in fact never meant anything at all by our words to begin with.23 
 
2.2.2. Strategy 2: Exposing Logical Chimeras 
Another way Wittgenstein tries to expose the skeptic’s fantasy is by showing how, as he puts it at 
Investigations §94, “our forms of expression…send us in pursuit of chimeras.”  
In ancient Greek mythology, the chimera was a strange animal formed by the combination 
of several different animals—in Homer’s telling, “a foaming monster...of ghastly and inhuman 
origin, her forepart lionish, her tail a snake’s, a she-goat in between. This thing exhaled in jets a 
rolling fire.”24 Similarly, the kinds of chimeras Wittgenstein has in mind—following Cora Diamond 
and Jim Conant, we can call them “logical chimeras”—are fantastic entities constructed through 
confused attempts at combining into one thing a variety of different logical features.25 Crucial to the 
point of the analogy is that, like the chimera Homer wrote about, a logical chimera is, so to speak, 
mythological or fantastic: as Jim Conant puts the point, a logical chimera is “the appearance of a 
kind of combination which if we think it through is only the illusion of a combination of features.”26  
One of the clearest and most dramatic examples in Wittgenstein’s writings of an attempt to 
show how our language sends us in pursuit of logical chimeras comes in Investigations §§193-194, in 
what we might call the parable of the super-rigid machine. In this section of the text, Wittgenstein is 
engaged with an interlocutor—call him the platonist about rules—who, having been taken in by 
rule-following skepticism, makes a desperate attempt to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable 
pictures of what is going on when we learn to follow rules and teach others to do the same. On the 
                                                 
23 Cf. Investigations §464. For thoughtful discussions of this mode of criticism and the view of language and conception of 
nonsense that underlie it, see, in addition to those sources cited earlier in this paragraph, Diamond, “What Nonsense 
Might Be”; Conant, “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use”; and Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment, chs. 2-3.  
24 Homer, Iliad, book VI, lines 179-182. 
25 For this term as well as for my understanding of the role of logical chimeras and the parable of the super-rigid 
machine in Wittgenstein’s thought I am deeply indebted to lectures given by Cora Diamond and James Conant at the 7th 
annual summer school, organized by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society and held August 5-8, 2015 in Kirchberg 
am Wechsel, Austria. Especially relevant are the lectures from sessions 4 and 5. 
26 The quote comes from lecture 4, around 1:04:45. 
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one hand, we have the picture of a rule as a kind of infallible guide, something that tells us what we 
are to do at each step; on the other we have the messy, real-life practice of teaching and learning 
rules, conducted as it is using words and gestures that—so it has come to seem to the platonist—
always admit of misunderstandings and so demand interpretation. Put together, these pictures make it 
hard to resist the obviously unacceptable conclusion that the usual modes of instruction could not 
possibly enable the teacher to convey to his student the nature of the pattern she is to enact. The 
platonist’s idea is that the way to solve this problem is by thinking of the meaning of the rule as 
some thing that stands behind the teacher’s order “+2” and determines the way it is meant—some 
intrinsically meaningful item that would enable the student to determine in every case what it would 
take to apply the rule or execute the order. (For reasons that will become clear shortly, its nature is 
intentionally left indeterminate in Wittgenstein’s text.) If the student were able to somehow see his 
way through the teacher’s unavoidably ambiguous explanations and instructions and grasp this thing, 
whatever exactly it is, she would no longer be in any doubt about how the series is supposed to be 
extended after 1,000.27 For unlike the teacher’s words, this thing does not admit of more than one 
interpretation. It is intrinsically meaningful and so stops the regress; as Wittgenstein puts the 
platonist’s thought in The Blue Book, “every sign is capable of interpretation; but the meaning mustn’t 
be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.”28 In the platonist’s mind, the only question 
worth asking here is accordingly how the student might manage to get hold of this amorphous 
regress-stopper. 
It is at this point in the dialectic that Wittgenstein introduces the idea of the super-rigid 
machine as a sort of analogue of the regress-stopper with which his interlocutor is preoccupied. 
Here the confusion stems from the observation that we can treat a machine or a picture thereof as a 
                                                 
27 At Investigations §218 and elsewhere Wittgenstein portrays the process the platonist envisions here as that of engaging 
mental wheels with an infinitely long set of rails. 
28 The Blue Book, p. 34. 
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sort of symbol of its way of acting or its mode of operation (its Wirkungsweise, Wittgenstein says). 
Thus we can say (for instance) that in a sense a machine contains its Wirkungweise within itself, and—
accordingly—that once we have familiarized ourselves with the machine “everything else, in 
particular the movements it will make, seem already to be completely determined.”29 Trouble arises 
once we reflect on the fact that any real-life machine is liable to break down or malfunction. In light 
of this possibility, this way of speaking can easily come to strike us as puzzling. It seems right that 
the future movements of the machine are all determined in advance, and yet—it also seems—that 
cannot possibly be the case! For when dealing with any actual machine, we can never rule out ahead of 
time the possibility of a malfunction. At this point we are liable to think the solution may lie in 
thinking of talk of the machine as containing its Wirkungsweise within itself as a description of a kind of 
super-machine, of which blueprints would be literal pictures. Like the real-life machine, the super-rigid 
machine is supposed to be in some sense instantiated and at least epistemically accessible if not quite 
palpable, but unlike any actual machine, it is supposed to be incapable of malfunctioning. But what, 
the parable is intended to prompt us to ask ourselves, could possibly have all these features? 
Wittgenstein’s thought is that the search for an answer will leave us empty-handed and—he hopes—
prompt us to wonder whether or not the ideally rigid machine we thought we were after was really 
just a chimera, a fantasy born of a misunderstanding of the grammar of talk of the machine’s 
Wirkungsweise being in it from the start. 
Similarly with the regress-stopper by getting hold of which, the platonist about rules hopes, 
the student might bridge the super-gulf that yawns between his teacher’s order and its meaning. In 
order that it might express the meaning of the order, this “last interpretation” must presumably be 
couched in words, just like any other interpretation.30 But unlike other interpretations, it is supposed 
to be impossible to misunderstand: otherwise it could not stop the regress. And so, here again, 
                                                 
29 Investigations §193 (translation modified). 
30 This is clearer in The Blue Book, p. 34, than in the Investigations. 
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Wittgenstein hopes his readers will ask themselves: what could possibly satisfy these constraints? 
Nothing, it seems: for if the regress-stopper is to be couched in words, as it seems it must, we will be 
able to envision cases in which it will be misunderstood and so itself require interpretation, but if it 
is to stop the regress, there mustn’t be any such cases.31 The hoped-for result is that, having seen that 
this regress-stopper is nothing but a chimera, the platonist will re-examine the assumption, which 
she shares with the skeptic, that sent her in search of it in the first place, namely that super-gulfs are 
ubiquitous.32 
* * * 
In both these ways, then—reminding us of the ways we ordinarily think and talk about gulfs 
between words and their meanings and helping us to see how our words send us in pursuit of logical 
chimeras—Wittgenstein means to help his readers to see that the right response to the skeptic’s 
questions is, not to elaborate some complicated account of how we can bridge the super-gulf that 
she’s gotten herself worked up about, but rather just to request some clarification. Asked, for 
instance, how I know what the instruction “mix one tablespoon of salt and two tablespoons of sugar 
in with the flour before adding the water” requires me to do at this point,33 I should simply say: 
“What’s to understand? Isn’t the instruction clear enough as is?”34 
 
2.3. The Debunkers’ Fantasy 
There are of course many differences between rule-following skepticism and the evolutionary 
debunking arguments I discussed in the previous chapter. However—I want now to suggest—there 
is also a highly significant similarity: just like skepticism about following rules, two of these 
debunking arguments stem from and rest on a confused conception of the ways we might go wrong 
                                                 
31 Cf. Finkelstein, “Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism,” p. 63. 
32 Cf. Investigations §§308-309 and Crary, Beyond Moral Judgment, pp. 23-25. 
33 Cf. Investigations §198. 
34 Cf. Finkelstein, “Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism,” p. 69. 
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in our thinking, one that only seems compelling when we are caught up in philosophical fantasy. 
Once we see through the confusion, I’ll argue, it becomes clear that evolutionary debunking 
arguments of these kinds give us no reason to think our ethical beliefs are unjustified.  
Though both the first and the second way of defending debunking arguments discussed in 
chapter 1 ultimately depend on this same confusion, the majority of my discussion centers on the 
second, underdetermination-based rejoinder. Due to Sharon Street, this argument in effect alleges 
that, regarding any ethical claim P, there is always room to ask whether or not it is really the case that 
P, where the point of the question—call it a “really question”—is that we might be radically, 
systematically mistaken in our ethical thinking; in other words, the point is that there might be 
something like what I have been calling a super-gulf, in this case not between our words and their 
meanings but between our ethical beliefs and the facts. The argument contends, moreover, that the 
evidence available to us in ethical reflection is always and necessarily going to be too weak to allow 
us to rule out that possibility. In my view, however, the very idea that we might be mistaken in this 
way is confused, a product of philosophical fantasy just like the super-gulf that figures in rule-
following skepticism.  
Ultimately, I will argue that this same fantasy is equally at work in the first, Harman-inspired 
defense of debunking arguments I discussed (see §1.2.2). For the time being, however, I want focus 
on bringing out the ways it shows up in Street’s underdetermination-based defense. I will do so 
using the same two strategies Wittgenstein uses in the rule-following case: by adducing reminders of 
the ways we ordinarily think and talk about gulfs between our ethical beliefs and the facts, and by 
trying to bring out the chimerical character of the kind of investigation questions about super-gulfs 
seem to invite us to undertake. In the next two sections, I discuss each of these at length, beginning 




2.4. Strategy 1: Reminders of the Ordinary 
Street’s claim is that realism precludes the possibility that we might come to know ethical facts via 
reflection because it entails that the evidence available for ethical claims can never be such as to 
allow us to rule out the possibility that we are radically mistaken. Now, since Street’s claim about the 
nature of ethical reflection is perfectly general, it entails that, for any particular ethical claim 
whatsoever, we not only can make sense of the possibility that we are radically mistaken about its truth 
value but, in addition, cannot rule that possibility out (at least if we assume realism). We can 
accordingly evaluate Street’s argument by considering how plausible its implications are in particular 
cases. Since I think this makes the problem with that argument easier to see, that is what I propose 
to do, focusing on an episode from Cormac McCarthy’s remarkable novel, Blood Meridian. 
Early in Blood Meridian—a western set mostly in Texas and Northern Mexico in the mid-19th 
century—we meet a remarkable character introduced simply as “the judge.” When we meet him the 
judge is in Nacogdoches, Texas; it has been raining for fourteen days continuously, and people are 
gathered in a tent listening to a preacher who has been holding a revival there since the rain began. 
The judge enters the tent, walks up to the front by the preacher, interrupts him, and addresses the 
crowd: 
Ladies and gentlemen I feel it my duty to inform you that the man holding this 
revival is an imposter. He holds no papers of divinity from any institution recognized or 
improvised. He is altogether devoid of the least qualification to the office he has usurped 
and has only committed to memory a few passages from the good book for the purposes of 
lending to his fraudulent sermons some faint flavor of the piety he despises. In truth, the 
gentleman standing before you posing as a minister of the Lord is not only totally illiterate 





On a variety of charges the most recent of which involved a girl of eleven years—I 
said eleven—who had come to him in trust and whom he was surprised in the act of 






Not three weeks before this he was run out of Fort Smith Arkansas for having 
congress with a goat. Yes lady, that is what I said. Goat.35 
 
Not surprisingly, chaos ensues. Guns are fired, people are trampled, and a posse begins to form for 
the purpose of pursuing the preacher. Shortly thereafter, the judge buys people drinks at a nearby 
saloon. We learn then that the judge not only has never been to Fort Smith, but has never even seen 
the preacher before. “Never even heard of him,” he adds.36  
I take it that, before even thinking about it explicitly, most readers will have formed the 
opinion that it was wrong of the judge to say what he did here. Yet Street would have us take 
seriously the possibility that that belief is false. So I want to take some time to consider what it might 
actually look like for us to entertain the possibility that it was not really wrong for the judge to say 
what he did, to consider, as Austin so nicely put it, “what we should say when, and so why and what we 
should mean by it.”37 Suppose that we were to ask ourselves if in fact it might not have been wrong 
of the judge to say what he did. What exactly might this look like? How might a question like this 
arise? And what sorts of considerations might lead us to ask it?  
 
2.4.1. Non-Evolutionary Gulfs 
I can think of at least two types of question we might be asking here. 
Often when we ask questions like this our concern is that we might have failed to rule out 
the possibility that some salient fact obtains, as when the possibility that he might have been trying 
to kill a lethal insect that was about to bite her leads me to reconsider my judgment that it was 
wrong of my brother-in-law to slap my niece’s arm (I take it such facts are defeating conditions for 
the relevant defeasible generalizations). Given that, in the case as described in the novel, it is clear 
                                                 
35 Cormac McCarthy, Blood Meridian, p. 7. 
36 Blood Meridian, p. 9. The whole story is contained on pp. 5-9. 
37 Austin, “A Plea for Excuses,” p. 129. 
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that the judge had absolutely no reason to think that what he was saying was true and that his 
purpose in lying as he did was not to help anyone, to prevent anyone from being injured or anything 
of the sort, it is hard to see how this kind of question might come up. But that becomes much easier 
if we alter that case just slightly.  
Consider, for instance a variant of the original case in which we don’t know what the judge’s 
intentions were. Perhaps his true purpose in saying what he did was to disperse the people in the 
crowd so that they might escape any harm they might otherwise suffer from a fast-approaching 
explosion. Suppose too that, for all we know, the judge had taken steps to ensure that the preacher 
would not be harmed nor his reputation tarnished. Otherwise, let things be as described in Blood 
Meridian. 
Here it’s easy to see what might lead us to wonder whether or not it was really wrong of the 
judge to say what he did. For, we might think, if this really was the judge’s intention, then although 
his methods would certainly have been unorthodox, and although it is, at the very least, unclear 
whether or not his methods are likely to be effective, in this case it would at least be true that the 
judge’s intentions were good, and so the possibility that his act was not wrong after all seems at least 
worth exploring. If we can rule out the possibilities that these were in fact his intentions and that he 
had in fact taken such precautions, we can be confident in our initial impression. But if not, we 
would do well to reconsider.  
In some cases, though, our questions go much deeper. Blood Meridian is a dark, violent 
book—“arguably the bloodiest work of serious literature since the Iliad”38—and it presents a 
distinctive and unsettling vision of the world. Some sense of this is afforded by this vivid description 
of the book, due to Ian Moore:  
Set in Mexico and the American Southwest in the aftermath of the Mexican-American War 
and based on historical events, [Blood Meridian] tells of a gang of mercenaries hired by the 
                                                 
38 Wallach, “Twenty-Five Years of Blood Meridian,” p. 5. 
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Mexican government to decimate hostile Indians and submit their scalps as receipts. After 
some initial success hunting Apaches, the gang becomes less discerning, eventually 
slaughtering the very citizens whom they had contracted to protect. It turns out a Mexican 
scalp is not so easy to distinguish from an Apache one. Yet they are not the only 
perpetrators in this indiscriminate landscape. Comanches hang dead babies from a tree, 
“holes punched in their underjaws [...] Bald and pale and bloated, larval to some 
unreckonable being” (60). Members of one tribe crucify members of another (258). 
Chihuahuans display the decapitated head of an American enemy at a bazaar in the city plaza 
(73) while Indian scalps stream like flags from the cathedral (76). Churches serve only to 
bear traces of war and of a god absconded (27-28). And nature too is bloody and bellicose: 
“The sun was just down and to the west lay reefs of bloodred clouds up out of which rose 
little desert nighthawks like fugitives from some great fire at the earth’s end” (23; cf. 110).39  
 
On Moore’s interpretation, the judge—an enormous, hairless, albino polymath—functions as a 
spokesman of sorts for the book’s dark vision, advising the gang of scalp-hunters and criticizing 
those he sees as insufficiently ruthless. 
As Moore spells out in detail, the judge sees the kinds of warfare and violence that permeate 
the novel as at once the ultimate test of a person’s mettle and as the ideal setting for the realization 
of human excellence and flourishing. In Moore’s words, 
For the judge, war is the governing principle of the universe, and if we are to live 
meaningfully and authentically, we must endeavor to correspond to it through our own acts 
of war.40 
 
Or again: “We can live in accord with the war of the world and find value, freedom, and purpose in 
doing so, or we fail to do so and be shaped as but ‘antic clay’ (319; cf. 5).”41 At one point the judge 
even goes so far as to say that “war is god”; Moore explains:  
“War is god” not only because it is the father of all and because it divines one’s worth. War, 
the judge…indicates, also divinizes. It makes the warrior like the “godfire,” all in one and 
one in all (252; cf. 255, 147).42  
 
This background helps us to see the possibility of a very different reading of the judge’s 
actions. Absent this context, the judge’s act looks like a senseless, malicious act; in context, though, 
                                                 
39 Moore, “Heraclitus and the Metaphysics of War in Blood Meridian,” p. 94. Moore’s parenthetical references are to the 
edition of Blood Meridian cited in my bibliography. 
40 Ibid., p. 104. 
41 Ibid., p. 99. 
42 Ibid., p. 99. 
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we can see it for what it presumably is: an attempt at realizing human virtue and awakening others to 
its true nature. More importantly for our purposes, this background discloses the possibility of a 
very different kind of question about the moral status of the judge’s act. In asking whether or not it 
was really wrong of the judge to publicly accuse the preacher of fraud and pedophilia, we can now 
see, a person might be wondering whether or not there is something to the judge’s disturbing vision. 
Perhaps the judge is right after all. Perhaps he alone understands the true nature of virtue. And if so, 
can he be blamed for exemplifying it and thereby helping to show others the way?  
Mulling this suggestion over, I might notice that the judge’s view rests to a significant extent 
on what are just empirical claims about how people react in certain circumstances. Among other 
things, he seems to think that a person cannot find true fulfillment other than by engaging in 
warfare. Or again, he seems to take for granted that the violent, cutthroat conditions that serve as 
the setting for the novel are ineliminable. It is presumably at least in part for this reason that he 
thinks an unmitigated embrace of violence and chaotic disruption is the only rational response to the 
world. But—I might realize—neither of these views is obviously correct. In fact it seems that people 
flourish in many other ways—as artists, innovators, thinkers, and statesmen; as mothers and fathers, 
brothers, sisters, and friends; etc. Moreover it’s hardly obvious that people really do flourish in war; 
at the very least, the prevalence and debilitating effects of PTSD suggest that, even if some do, 
many—perhaps most—do not. Nor is it obvious that the Hobbesian conditions in which the novel 
takes place are a permanent feature of human life. Without a doubt human beings have yet to realize 
a perfectly just, peaceful society among the majority of the world’s population and for a significant 
length of time. Nevertheless, conditions in much of the world and for many people are far, far better 
than those that form the setting of Blood Meridian, and it is not at all obvious that it is reasonable to 
respond to such conditions as though they were not, much less that this sort of response is 
compulsory for those who would display human excellence. 
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Whatever the results of such reflection, the important thing for our purposes is that, were we 
to second-guess ourselves for this reason, we would be asking a much deeper sort of question than in 
the first case. There we took for granted the principles on which our reasoning was based, asking 
only whether or not we had applied them correctly in the case at hand; here, the principles 
themselves come in for scrutiny. 
 
2.4.2. Evolutionary Gulfs 
Of course, when she deploys her argument against the possibility of knowledge of objective ethical 
facts in the context of her evolutionary debunking argument, Street means to motivate the 
suggestion that we might be mistaken by appealing to evolutionary considerations: given their 
provenance, she means to invite us to ask ourselves, mightn’t our beliefs be false? More to the point, 
then, are the ways such considerations might lead us to second-guess our initial impression of the 
judge. As before, we can make out both more superficial cases in which our concerns revolve 
around the possibility that some salient defeating condition threatens the applicability of the 
principle we have invoked and deeper ones in which we reconsider our principles. 
For a case of the first type, consider a variant of the Blood Meridian case in which the judge is 
my brother-in-law, and in the past, the preacher caused a mutual family member of ours great and 
unjustifiable suffering. Perhaps he was once married to the judge’s wife and my sister and, during 
that time, violently abused her. In this variant of the case, the question whether or not it was really 
wrong of the judge to say what he did gets a grip. For even here, I suppose, I can imagine finding 
myself inclined to treat the fact that the preacher hurt someone the judge and I love as reason to 
think an act—the judge’s—of a sort that would otherwise be wrong is not wrong in this case—that 
is, as what I am calling a defeating condition. At this point, though, certain evolutionary 
considerations might well give me pause. After all, it seems plausible that part of the explanation for 
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the fact that the question here finds purchase has to do with our evolutionary past. In particular, it 
seems plausible that there is some reproductive advantage to strongly resenting or even being 
inclined to act violently toward or cause harm to those who harm your kin, regardless of whether or 
not one in fact ought to act on such feelings.43 So although it is clear that the alleged defeating 
condition—that the preacher hurt someone the judge and I love—obtains, these evolutionary 
reflections lead me to wonder whether or not it really does have the significance I initially took it to 
have.  
In thinking about this possibility, the natural strategy seems to me to try to find some way to 
lessen the distorting influence of my personal relationships and thereby get a clearer sense of the 
significance of the various facts of the case. Most obviously, I might consider similar cases to which 
I do not have a personal connection. Or I might reflect on the case in more general terms, perhaps 
considering what life would be like were all citizens to take matters into their own hands rather than 
relying on the state to administer justice. Or again, I might think about the purposes of 
punishment—do we punish criminals to deter crime or as a form of retribution?—and whether or 
not the judge’s actions effectively serve that purpose. Even more generally, I might wonder whether 
or not it is ever the case that a person deserves to suffer. Having reflected on the case in these ways, 
I might then conclude that I had in fact been misled by the inclinations with which natural selection 
endowed me and change my mind about the moral status of the judge’s act. In fact, I might then 
conclude, he did act wrongly. And, assuming I have ruled out other potential defeating conditions 
for my belief, it would at that point be reasonable of me to consider the gulf between my beliefs and 
the facts closed.44 
                                                 
43 This is just speculation. Should evolutionary biologists find evidence that natural selection would not in fact have 
favored (and so as a matter of fact did not favor) this tendency, the possibility that the influence of natural selection 
might have caused us to go astray here would not be salient, at least not in the way I’m discussing here. More generally, 
reflection about these matters is (of course) always be beholden to the best available science. 
44 Some readers may disagree with the specific ethical conclusions I have reached in the last few paragraphs, but for my 
purposes it makes no difference whether or not I am right in these particular cases. All that matters for my argument is 
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Evolutionary considerations might also lead us to reconsider our principles in something like 
the same way as did the possibility that it is in fact the judge’s own dark vision that it is closer to the 
truth. In fact, it is plausible that our evolutionary inheritance might have led us to overlook precisely 
this possibility. After all, it seems likely that natural selection would favor the pro-social impulses 
that find expression in the conclusion that the judge ought not to have acted as he did over the 
destructive, anti-social impulses that would seem to find expression in the opposite conclusion, since 
the former seem far more likely to promote cooperation and, thereby, success for one’s group than 
do the latter. What is not clear, though, is that their being motivated in this way entails that these 
concerns cannot be dealt with in the same way as before—by considering the effects warfare seems 
to have on people, other ways people seem to be able to flourish, etc. 
 
2.4.3. Lessons and Distinctions 
These considerations suggest a couple of potentially surprising conclusions. 
In each of these cases, the possibility becomes salient that there is a gulf of sorts between 
our beliefs about the moral status of the judge’s act and the corresponding facts. Notice, though, 
that all of these gulfs seem to be akin, not to the super-gulf that exercises the rule-following skeptic, 
but instead to that which opens up for the American tourist between the Roman police officer’s 
order and its meaning: like that word-meaning gulf, these belief-fact gulfs are such that, though not 
necessarily easy to bridge, it at least more-or-less clear what it would take to bridge them. And like 
the interpretive process that enables the tourist to discern the meaning of the police officer’s words, 
the processes I mentioned whereby we might bridge these belief-fact gulfs—ruling out any salient 
defeating conditions and reflectively examining the principles on which we have relied—are familiar 
and straightforward, at least in principle if not always in practice. Here, we might say, we know our 
                                                                                                                                                             




Interestingly, this seems no less true in the latter two cases, in which reconsideration of some 
judgment regarding the moral status of the judge’s act is prompted by evolutionary considerations, 
than in the former two, in which this was not the case. For my part I am inclined to think this 
conclusion generalizes: in general, closing the kinds of gulfs evolutionary considerations might 
reasonably lead us to worry yawn between our ethical beliefs and the facts is neither more nor less 
difficult than closing gulfs that, like the one that figures in the first case, have nothing whatsoever to 
do with evolution.  
None of this is to say that Street and like-minded skeptics are wrong to think evolutionary 
considerations give us reason to be on our guard against the possibility that our ethical beliefs are 
mistaken. In fact I think they are quite right about that. Assuming, as I am happy to, that the 
evolutionary influences on our thinking are unrelated to the truth of our beliefs, I agree that realists 
have reason to be concerned about the possibility that there is a gulf of sorts between any ethical or 
epistemic beliefs we might form and the facts. For, as Street says, if those influences were not truth-
tracking, it is hard to see how we might escape the conclusions that our evolutionary past has left us 
with myriad misleading unreflective evaluative tendencies and that we are accordingly liable to go 
astray. But I differ from these skeptics on just how our evolutionary heritage might lead us astray. 
Street is committed to saying that the errors the possibility that we might have fallen into which one 
might appeal to evolutionary considerations to motivate are so deep, so pervasive, that nothing we 
could possibly do could be enough to rule them out. I, on the other hand, think that the kinds of 
mistakes we are liable to make in virtue of the evolutionary influences on our thought are not 
basically different from any other mistakes we might make in our ethical thinking and are, 
accordingly, no less reflectively tractable.  





2.4.4. The Skeptic’s Super-Gulf 
Earlier we saw that the rule-following skeptic wants to suggest that the possibility of interpreting 
expressions of rules in different ways reveals a super-gulf between orders and their meanings, one 
that is deeper and harder to bridge than the run-of-the-mill gulf the tourist encounters. Just so, I 
think Street wants to say, we can appeal to the evolutionary considerations she adduces to motivate 
the possibility that there is a super-gulf between our beliefs and the facts that is deeper and harder to 
bridge than the run-of-the-mill gulfs of the kind I have been discussing. For given that the ways in 
which natural selection has shaped our ethical thinking are, at least as far as their reliability is 
concerned, practically random, there is just no reason to think that what seems to us to be true in 
fact is. Thus, she wants to say, even after we have surveyed the facts of—say—the original Blood 
Meridian case, ruled out any defeating conditions we or anyone else of whom we are aware can think 
of, and considered carefully the truth and relevance of any principles on which we are relying in our 
reasoning, even then we might be mistaken in thinking it was wrong of the judge to say what he did. 
Just as the rule-following skeptic insists that nothing the teacher might say in an attempt to explain 
to his student what it would take to follow the order “+2” could enable the student to discern that 
order’s meaning, Street wants to say that, assuming realism, no amount of what appears to be 
evidence we might amass for this claim about the judge might license us to conclude that it was, in 
fact, wrong of him to say what he did. However much evidence there might appear to be for a claim, 
however inconceivable it might seem that, given the apparent evidence available to us, the belief that 
evidence appears to support is nevertheless false—somehow, she wants to say, our belief might still be 
false.  
Once we have become concerned about this alleged super-gulf and taken ourselves to need 
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to find some way to bridge it, the kind of evidence a person might normally use to justify her 
adoption of the belief that it was wrong of the judge to say what he did cannot but look impotent, 
just as the interpretive process the American tourist in Rome goes through to make sense of the 
policeman’s order is supposed to be powerless to bridge the rule-following skeptic’s super-gulf. In 
the original Blood Meridian case, for example, it might seem that I could justify my adoption of the 
belief that it was wrong of the judge to say what he did by saying that the judge did not know any of 
the claims he made to be true, that he knew or anyway should have known that saying what he did 
was liable to result in people getting hurt, and that—defeasibly, anyway—it is wrong both to 
knowingly make false claims about someone else (especially in a public forum) and knowingly to put 
someone in harm’s way. These considerations might seem to do the trick. But, we have seen, while 
these sorts of considerations might suffice to close mundane belief-fact gulfs akin to the gulf 
between the Roman policeman’s order and its content, they are not supposed to be enough to close 
Street’s super-gulf. No matter how much putative evidence I adduce to indict the judge, anyone in 
the grip of the kinds of considerations that drive Street’s argument will still want to ask: of course it 
seems like it was wrong of the judge to say what he did, but was it really wrong of him to do so? 
In view of the considerations I rehearsed in §§2.4.1-2.4.3, we might be inclined to doubt 
there is any more sense to be made of this question than there is of the rule-following skeptic’s. As 
I’ve said, I think that’s the right reaction. But perhaps I’m mistaken. Perhaps Street and like-minded 
skeptics really have noticed the possibility of a kind of error the possibility of which realists must 
admit but that I have so far failed to notice. So let us ask: were an evolutionary skeptic to ask, 
regarding the case as described by McCarthy, whether or not it was really wrong of the judge to say 
what he did, what might he mean?  
Clearly, the skeptic intends his question as a profound challenge to received ways of thinking 
about ethical questions, so it seems it would have to be about our principles rather than about 
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whether or not we have ruled out some alleged defeating condition. And we know, too, that his 
question is supposed to be motivated by the fact that natural selection has had a tremendous, non-
truth-tracking influence on ethical thought and discourse. Of the questions I have mentioned, the 
one that comes closest to satisfying this description is the question about whether or not our 
evolutionary inheritance might have led us to overlook something like the possibility that it is in fact 
the judge’s own dark vision that it is closer to the truth. But, notice, the evolutionary skeptic has to 
reject the suggestion that her question might be so understood. For as we have seen, the skeptic’s 
question must differ from that about the correctness of judge’s dark vision insofar as, according to 
the skeptic herself, the kinds of things I said we might do to answer that question are here supposed 
to be beside the point. If we are not to understand the skeptic’s question in such a way that it admits 
of the normal sort of answer, though, how are we to understand it? It is not clear. 
That we have reached this point in our conversation with the imaginary skeptic might 
understandably make us impatient, and we might be tempted to remind him of Wittgenstein’s 
observation that “[w]here you can’t look for an answer, you can’t ask either, and that means: Where 
there’s no logical method for finding a solution, the question doesn’t make sense either.”45 Even so, 
none of this should not surprise us. As we have seen, the gulf supposedly made salient by the 
skeptic’s question is supposed to be like ordinary belief-fact gulfs insofar as it is supposed to 
preclude our doing something that we are typically perfectly happy to call knowing the facts and is 
supposed to be motivated by considerations of a familiar enough sort. But it is also radically unlike 
the gulfs concern about the presence of which we elsewhere take to be motivated by such 
considerations, not just insofar as it is supposed to keep us from knowing facts that, under ordinary 
circumstances, we are perfectly content to take ourselves to know, such as that it was wrong of the 
judge to say what he did, but also insofar as the justifications we would normally take to amount to a 
                                                 
45 Philosophical Remarks, p. 172. 
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perfectly adequate defense of our claim to know the ethical facts—even in light of the possibility 
that, given our evolutionary history, our evaluative tendencies are likely mostly misleading—are here 
supposed to be utterly impotent. That nothing could satisfy this description should have been 
obvious from the start. After all, it is not as though it were just a matter of personal preference that 
this is what we call knowing the facts, these what we call sufficient grounds holding some belief, these 
the kinds of challenges to our claims to knowledge we take to be relevant, and these the ways we take 
ourselves to be able to deal with such challenges. This is just what it is to know facts of the relevant 
sort, to be justified in believing that some such fact obtains, etc. And yet, we are being told, here is a 
possible doubt such that it both must be laid to rest if our claim to know is to be defensible but 
cannot be laid to rest using the only methods we know of for doing something we are prepared to 
call laying doubts to rest, a doubt that is supposed to be raised by certain evolutionary considerations 
even after we have done all that we take to be necessary to lay to rest doubts motivated in this way. 
How something so much as could satisfy these desiderata is, at best, unclear. 
All of these considerations suggest that we should not be in quite such a hurry to answer the 
kinds of questions on which Street’s argument turns; perhaps, as with those of the rule-following 
skeptic, we should instead begin by trying to make sense of them. When asked whether, though of 
course it seems like it was wrong of the judge to say what he did, it really was wrong of him to do so, 
perhaps the right response is not to say “yes, and here’s why…” (followed by some elaborate 
account of how we have access to the objective ethical facts), but instead simply to ask: what is 
“really” even supposed to mean in this context? For before we can even make sense of the skeptic’s 
questions, we need to know: given the facts of the case, just how could it be the case that it was not 
wrong of the judge to say what he did? Is it supposed to be false that, defeasibly, it is wrong 
knowingly to put someone in harm’s way? Are we supposed to be wrong about some of the relevant 
facts of the case? Is there some potential defeating condition we are supposed to have failed to rule 
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out? Just what, exactly, is it that we are supposed to have failed to do? To even make so much as 
intelligible her suggestion that evolutionary considerations give us reason to think we might be 
mistaken in thinking it wrong of the judge to say what he did—to help us to understand what kind 
of gulf the super-gulf that is here supposed to yawn between our belief and the facts is supposed to 
be in the first place—Street and like-minded skeptics need to give us answers to these sorts of 
questions. The considerations I have laid out here lead me to doubt they can manage it, not just in 
this particular case, but in general. 
Ironically, the problem here might be put by saying that it is not the realist but Street and 
like-minded philosophers who face an unpalatable dilemma. On the one hand, they might cave to 
the concerns I have raised, conceding that the questions they are pressing are after all not so 
different as they have claimed, that the gulf they are worried about can indeed be closed in the usual 
ways and so is not significantly different from others concern about which is motivated by 
evolutionary considerations. On the other, they might hold their ground, continuing to insist that this 
gulf is radically different from other such gulfs and that the ordinary ways of bridging belief-fact 
gulfs are here useless. In the first case, Street’s whole problematic loses its bite and its interest, since 
it is neither especially worrisome nor especially newsworthy that we might be wrong in some cases 
and should be on guard against that possibility: we already know that and know what to do about 
it.46 In the second, as I have said, it’s not clear why we should take Street’s “gulf” to be a gulf at all. 
For if I am right, she and her allies would in this case have failed to do the work necessary to make 
their doubts intelligible as such, i.e. qua doubts, and so while we might of course grant that there is 
some sense to be made of their words, it is not clear why we should view them as calling into 
question our claims to ethical knowledge. So: either the evolutionary challenge to the possibility of 
knowledge of objective ethical facts is uninteresting and easily dealt with, or it does not even amount 
                                                 
46 Cf. Investigations §85. 
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to such a challenge. Either way, it lacks the devastating force its proponents take it to have.47 
 
2.4.5. The Skeptic’s Mistake: Ignoring the Rags 
What explains the fact that evolutionary skeptics attribute so much importance to questions about 
fantastic super-gulfs? What leads them so far astray? 
Wittgenstein thought that our tendency to pay too little attention to the ways we actually 
think and talk was the root of many of our difficulties in philosophy. For, he thought, it leads us to 
look in the wrong places for solutions and miss the answers to our questions that are staring us right 
in the face. At times he talks about this in a general way, as in the parable of the mouse and the rags 
at Investigations §52: 
52. If I am inclined to suppose that a mouse comes into being by spontaneous generation 
out of grey rags and dust, it’s a good idea to examine those rags very closely to see how a 
mouse could have hidden in them, how it could have got there, and so on. But if I am 
convinced that a mouse cannot come into being from these things, then this investigation 
will perhaps be superfluous. 
But what it is in philosophy that resists such an examination of details, we have yet to 
understand.48  
 
More often, though, he is content to point out the ways this tendency leads us astray in particular 
cases. We have seen already how he does this in his remarks on rule-following. We see the same 
thing in the following passage, where he comments on a remark made by an imaginary interlocutor 
concerned with the so-called “problem of other minds”: 
One says: How can these gestures, this way of holding the hand, this picture, be the wish 
that such and such were the case? It is nothing more than a hand over a table and stands 
there alone and without a sense! Like a single piece of scenery from the production of a play, 
which has been left by itself in a room. It had life only in the play.49 
 
As I read this passage, the point is that the other minds skeptic’s questions only come up, indeed can 
only even seem to make sense, once we have divorced ourselves in our thinking from the contexts in 
                                                 
47 Dworkin directs similar remarks at Rorty at “Objectivity and Truth,” p. 96. 
48 Cf. Investigations §51 and Zettel §314. 
49 Zettel §238 (translation modified). 
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which questions about the significance of others’ expressions and gestures ordinarily come up. Just 
as a piece of scenery does not have the same significance outside of the context of the play, 
expressions and gestures only appear as meaningful, only show themselves as words and gestures, in 
what we might call the play of human life.50   
The way Street and others sympathetic to her underdetermination-based challenge to the 
possibility of knowledge of objective ethical facts think about reflection suggests that, for whatever 
reason, they have failed to attend to the play in the way Wittgenstein recommends. I know of no 
other way to explain the fact that they insist, with apparently not the slightest reservation, that 
realists must answer questions of, to put it mildly, questionable intelligibility. My suggestion is that, 
had these philosophers made it a point to keep their heads in the game of giving and asking for 
ethical reasons—had they taken more time to ponder the rags, to pay more attention to the kinds of 
errors to which we take our evolutionary inheritance to make us liable, when and how we worry that 
we might have fallen into error, and what steps we take to rule out the possibility that we have—
they might have noticed that we have available to us in ordinary language a set of perfectly familiar 
linguistic techniques and strategies for dealing with the belief-fact gulfs evolutionary considerations 
make salient. That is, they might have noticed that mice can indeed come from these rags. They 
might then have come to think it suspicious that, in contrast to the sorts of evolutionary doubts with 
which we deal all the time as a matter of course, it is wholly mysterious how theirs are to be laid to 
rest. And, had they done that, they might have taken pause before attributing so much importance 
to their questions and pressing the rest of us to take them so seriously. 
 
                                                 
50 Compare Heidegger’s discussion of readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) and presence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit) in division 
one, part III of Being and Time, especially his discussion of Descartes on external world skepticism. I see my claims that 
words only show themselves as meaningful and that reasons only show themselves as such in the play of human life as 
not differing significantly from Heidegger’s claim that a hammer, e.g., shows itself as such only in use. (In the above-
mentioned lectures, James Conant appeals to this distinction of Heidegger’s in explaining what Wittgenstein means when 
at Investigations §219 he talks about following a rule “blindly” [blind].) 
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2.5. Strategy 2: Exposing a Logical Chimera 
Here someone might object that I am just being dense—that it is in fact perfectly obvious what the 
skeptic wants. What is being asked for, I will be told, is that we should set aside all of our ethical and 
related epistemic beliefs and compare the whole system to the facts from, so to speak, “sideways 
on.”51 Unless we can rule out the alleged possibility that they are not, the skeptic thinks, our beliefs 
cannot amount to knowledge (unless, of course, we abandon realism.) This objection brings us to 
the second strategy for exposing the evolutionary skeptic’s fantasy that I want to discuss, namely, 
demonstrating the ways our language sends us in pursuit of chimeras. Before explaining where I 
think the objection goes wrong, I want to introduce an analogy it will prove useful to refer back to 
later on.  
 
2.5.1. Hagiography 
The objector’s thought is, I think, well captured by an ingenious comparison I take from Cora 
Diamond.52 There used to be a genre of writing called hagiography comprised of biographies of 
saints, and in hagiographical writings, it was apparently standard practice to say certain things about 
saints, regardless of whether or not they were true. (There even appear to have been guides that 
specified as much.53) We see an example of this when, in a biography of St. Francis called The Little 
Flowers of St. Francis, we are told that he “did all in his power” to hide his stigmata from the other 
                                                 
51 I take the phrase “sideways on” from John McDowell. McDowell only uses this phrase in Mind and World (see pp]. 34-
36, 41-42) and “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity” (see p. 214), but he articulates what seems to be basically the same 
thought I spell out here in many places. See, for instance, his “Critical Notice,” §3 (esp. p. 380); “Two Sorts of 
Naturalism,” §§9-12 (esp. pp. 187, 189, 191, 194, 197); and “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics,” §§5-6 (esp. 
pp. 35, 37). Though McDowell’s thought is distinct, the Wittgensteinian provenance of McDowell’s thinking about the 
unattainability of the view from sideways on (and about our “Neurathian predicament”) is apparent from passages as 
early as this pregnant pronouncement from the preface to the Tractatus (my translation): “the aim of the book is to draw 
a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to draw a limit to thought, 
we should have to be able to think both sides of the limit (so we should have to be able to think what cannot be 
thought). It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will 
simply be nonsense.” 
52 See “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” pp. 51-55 
53 See the sources cited at Diamond, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” p. 71, note 31. 
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monks.54 The others manage to find out anyway, and as Diamond observes, “[t]he methods of 
discovery were not very ingenious, and anyone who was so easily found out as St. Francis appears to 
have been cannot very well be described as having tried his utmost to conceal his wound.”55 Or 
again, immediately before it is made clear to us that St. Francis was unwilling to show the stigmata to 
another monk, Brother Ruffino, we are told that St. Francis granted to Brother Ruffino “all that he 
desired.”56 And yet hagiographies were not thought of as fictitious works. 
What on earth is going on here? Diamond helpfully explains as follows:  
The writing of saints’ lives, it has often been said, aims not so much at history as at 
edification. I have been suggesting that that is reflected in a characteristic use of language, 
distinct from that of ordinary historiography, or indeed of ordinary descriptions of things 
around us. The language of description is used, but without some of its normal ties: to 
consequences on the one hand, to evidence on the other. Hippolyte Delehaye compares 
hagiographers to poets, and more interestingly to painters. He asks us to think of 
 
an old edition of the Aeneid; in accordance with the custom of his time the printer has 
prefaced it with an engraving representing Virgil. You do not hesitate for a moment, do 
you, to say that it is not a portrait? And nobody will take you to task for so lightly 
deciding a question of likeness, which calls for a comparison between the original and 
the representation. You for your part will not say that the man who wrote Virgil’s name 
under a fanciful picture is a swindler. The artist was following the fashion of his time, 
which allowed conventional portraits. 
 
In the writing of saints' lives we have just such portraits, constructions of objects for 
contemplation; and if we think of words and phrases detached from their normal ties to 
evidence and consequences as linguistic ‘surfaces’, we may say that these writings are 
constructions from such surfaces: words without the body of their connections to the 
world.57 
 
Notice now that there are two distinct postures we can adopt when critically evaluating 
hagiographical writings. On the one hand we might leave unquestioned the conventions of 
hagiography. In this case the only way the descriptions of the saints can be correct or incorrect is by 
being or failing to be in accord with those conventions. On the other hand, we might take up the 
                                                 
54 The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assissi, p. 163. 
55 Diamond, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” p. 51. 
56 The Little Flowers of St. Francis of Assisi, pp. 163-164. 
57 Diamond, “Realism and the Realistic Spirit,” pp. 51-52. 
84 
 
stance of a contemporary historian, bracketing those conventions and treating the descriptions used 
in hagiographical accounts as carrying with them the same ties to evidence and consequences that 
they carry into other contexts. Having adopted this latter posture, we might ask questions like the 
following: of course it is appropriate according to the conventions of hagiography to describe 
Francis as having “tried his utmost” to hide his wounds from his fellow monks, but did he really try 
his utmost? And, it seems, we would have to conclude that he did not. 
I think we do well to understand the objection as insisting that, when she invites us to 
explain how we can bridge super-gulfs, the underdetermination skeptic means to be inviting us to 
undertake an investigation analogous to that I have said a contemporary historian might take up with 
respect to the claims made by hagiographers: having suspended belief in the validity of all our 
inferential practices and in the truth of the beliefs to which they lead us, she wants us to consider the 
game of giving and asking for ethical reasons from sideways on, asking whether or not it is such 
that, if we play by the rules, we can expect to arrive at the truth.  
Now: is that a compelling objection to what I have said? Is this enough to make intelligible 
the questions about super-gulfs on which the evolutionary skeptic’s argument turns? 
 
2.5.2. An Evolutionary Chimera 
I don’t think so. This is of course a correct description of the sort of thing underdetermination 
skeptics will say they want. The trouble is just that it’s not clear whether or not there is in fact any 
such thing to want—whether we can actually make out the possibility of interrogating the rules of 
the game of giving and asking for ethical reasons in a way analogous to the historian’s critical 
examination of the claims about saints made in hagiographies. I suspect that, like that “last 
interpretation” the platonist about rules takes it we need in order to stop the regress of 
interpretations, the investigation the evolutionary skeptic here invites us to undertake is nothing 
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more than a logical chimera. 
As in the rule-following case, the evolutionary skeptic’s confusion stems from a misguided 
attempt at combining two thoughts that, on their own, are perfectly innocuous. On the one hand, 
we have the idea of checking to see whether or not a measuring instrument is reliable. For instance, 
we might check the accuracy of a watch by comparing it against an atomic clock. On the other, we 
observe that, from time to time, we hold up for critical examination certain of our assumptions or 
certain aspects of our investigative practices that have previously been taken for granted. For 
instance, Einstein challenged the assumption that the length of an object is the same no matter how 
fast it moves, and Copernicus challenged the assumption that the sun revolves around the earth. In 
ethics, abolitionists challenged the assumption that the fact that a person has relatively dark skin 
entails that it is acceptable to treat them in ways that would otherwise not be appropriate—in 
particular, whether or not it is acceptable to enslave them.58 The trouble arises when we start to 
think of our investigative practices as themselves measuring instruments of a sort. As soon as we do 
this, the possibility of checking to make sure a measuring instrument is reliable suggests to us the 
possibility of a sort of generalized version of the kinds of critical interrogation of our practices 
carried out by Einstein, Copernicus, and the abolitionists. It comes to seem to us that, just as we 
cannot take a take our watch’s readings at face value if we do not know whether or not it accurately 
measures the passage of time, we cannot take our judgments for true unless we can ensure, via some 
such interrogation, that the investigative practice of which they are a part is, as a whole, reliable. 
The trouble with this idea is that it fails to take into account a crucial feature of what we do 
when we check to see if a measuring device is accurate or critically examine our practices, namely 
                                                 
58 In fact this common narrative of the abolitionist movement paints too rosy a picture. As Edward Baptist shows in his 
The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism, most abolitionist sentiment was motivated by a 
desire on the part of northerners to free themselves of political domination by southern slaveholders. In reality, though 




that, when we do this, there is inevitably much that we leave unquestioned. When for example we 
check to see whether or not a particular watch or clock is accurate, we typically do so by checking it 
against another whose accuracy is not in doubt. And when the abolitionists raised the question 
whether or not it was acceptable to enslave dark-skinned people, they did not suspend belief as to 
whether or not it was permissible to enslave white people. Instead, they asked themselves why they 
thought it unacceptable to enslave white people and whether or not there was any reason to think 
this same set of considerations was not equally applicable to non-white people. In each case, the 
relevant question would have been impossible to answer otherwise. If it is not possible, even in 
principle, to accurately measure the passing of time, what am I supposed to compare my watch to in 
order to determine whether or not it accurately measures the passing of time? And if we do not take 
for granted that it would be wrong to enslave people in at least some circumstances, how am I 
supposed to decide whether or not it is wrong in any case? The things we take for granted tell us 
what it would take answer our questions, guidance about which is a sine qua non for any 
investigation. 
When we attempt to treat our investigative practices as a whole as measuring devices, then, 
we attempt to carry out an investigation without any guidance as to how we are to carry it out. By 
design, this investigation is not supposed to take for granted any part of the practice being held up 
for examination. We are supposed to bracket all of that, asking not whether or not some particular 
conclusion is acceptable in light of some set of assumptions, but whether or not practice as a whole is 
such as to lead us to the truth. But if we have bracketed all of the assumptions and inferential 
practices we are wont to deploy in our efforts to discern the truth, how else are we supposed to do it? 
How are we to know what to call the truth? And how are we to decide whether or not our practices 
are reliable? How, more generally, are we supposed to carry out an investigation if we have 
effectively decided in advance that there is nothing that might count as evidence for or against any 
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particular conclusion? Can we even call we are doing an “an investigation” in that case? Or are we 
not rather simply considering one thing after another in an earnest way, perhaps with furrowed 
brows? 
These considerations suggest that the very idea of vindicating or undermining our practices 
from sideways on is nothing more than a logical chimera, a realization that should lead us to wonder, 
in turn, whether or not we really are able to make sense of the possibility of the kind of error that 
exercises the skeptic. After all, if we cannot make sense of the investigation we allegedly need to but 
have so far failed to make, what sense is there to be made of the claim that we might be mistaken? 
Given how close she comes to seeing it for what it is, it is notable that Street in particular got 
caught up in this fantasy at all. As we saw in chapter one, Street herself does not just grant but in 
fact emphasizes that reflection necessarily takes some things for granted as it holds others up for 
examination. Here I take it the point is exactly the one I have been making, that reflection cannot 
take place from sideways on or—less metaphorically—that there is just no such thing as reflection 
that does not take for granted the truth of at least some beliefs or the validity of at least some 
inferential practices. Of course, in the context of her argument, the point of Street’s remark is a bit 
more restricted than this way of putting things suggests: she means to say that one cannot justify 
specific ethical claims from sideways on. But if reflection cannot help us answer skeptical challenges 
from sideways on, why think it enables us to raise them from there? If we cannot justify our claims 
without taking others for granted, why not conclude that you cannot challenge a claim’s justificatory 
bona fides without doing so either, that, as Wittgenstein once put the point, “if you tried to doubt 
everything you would not get as far as doubting anything”?59 That is to say: had Street followed 
through her own insight to its logical conclusion, she might have seen that her argument contains 
the mistake I have sought to bring out. For if the only questions we can even so much as make sense 
                                                 
59 On Certainty, §115; cf. §450: “A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt.” 
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of are those relatively local questions that invite us to bridge gulfs analogous to that confronted by 
the American tourist in Rome—questions that leave much of our practices in place while calling at 
most some of them into question—then there just is no undermining the legitimacy of our game by 
raising challenges to it from sideways on, as she hopes to. 
 
2.5.3. Science and the View from Sideways On 
There is an understandable tendency to think this cannot possibly be right, that we must be able to 
investigate our practices in this way, or—failing that—at least make sense of the idea. Part of what 
leads us to think this way, it seems to me, is a confused picture of scientific or, more generally, 
empirical inquiry, one that suggests it must be possible to take the view from sideways on in ethics 
because we do so elsewhere. For, the thought goes, is this not precisely what scientists do when, 
having developed some theory about how things work, they set out to test the theory, to determine 
whether or not things are in fact as it says they are? Do they not there set aside their preconceptions 
about the way things are and, holding them up to a neutral standard, see how they measure up, just 
as the evolutionary skeptic invites us to do when she in effect asks us whether or not it was really 
wrong of the judge to say what he did?  
But as John McDowell has long emphasized, this understanding of the way verification by 
experience works is utterly confused.60 For even when comparing their theories to the world, 
scientists do not suspend belief in all empirical claims and about the appropriateness of all inferential 
practices and justificatory standards. Were they to do that, no observations they made during the 
testing process could count as evidence for or against the theory in question, since to take certain facts 
as evidence for others would be to fail to bracket at least one aspect of the relevant epistemic practice. 
Indeed, for precisely that reason, they could not in that case even call what they are doing testing the 
                                                 
60 See the passages from McDowell’s “Critical Notice” and “Two Sorts of Naturalism” cited in note 52 above. It may 
also be fair to say that this is, in a way, the point of Mind and World. 
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theory: if no new discovery could possibly count either for or against the theory, it makes no sense 
to call whatever these “researchers”61 are doing administering a test! If the results of experiments are 
to amount to evidence one way or the other, researchers must assume the validity of certain 
inferences—that, for example, the fact that a clock slowed by some amount while moving at such 
and such a speed relative to some other clock shows that we got the equations right. Researchers 
may also need to take for granted the truth of at least some empirical claims, such as that their 
eyesight is okay, or that their microscopes are in fine working order. It is for this reason that 
McDowell says that “the role of causation, in scientific thought’s well-grounded conception of itself, 
does not rescue scientific thought from Neurath’s boat.”62 Just like all inquiry, scientific inquiry is in 
this sense inescapably Neurathian. 
To be clear, I do not mean to be espousing the view—attributed to Wittgenstein in some 
bad readings of On Certainty—that certain propositions are for some reason beyond question, as 
though certain questions were, so to speak, out of bounds, disallowed by the rules of the language 
game.63 Under suitable circumstances, any proposition can come into question, though in some cases 
we may struggle to think of circumstances that would be suitable. And no intelligible question is off 
limits. That is to say: I do not here mean to be declaring, by fiat, that we just mustn’t ask certain 
questions or entertain certain doubts. I only mean to be making observations about what it does and 
does not make sense to say. The whole problem with evolutionary skepticism is that it takes for 
granted that there is something we would need to be able to do if knowledge of objective ethical 
facts were possible but can’t in fact do—namely, to climb outside our heads and vindicate our 
practices from sideways on.64 I am not reiterating this line. I am suggesting, instead, that the skeptic 
has failed to give us any reason to agree with him that he has uncovered some question we have 
                                                 
61 I put the term in quotation marks because its appropriateness here is questionable for the same reasons. 
62 “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” p. 187. 
63 Alice Crary has ably criticized such interpretations of On Certainty in Beyond Moral Judgment, ch. 3. 
64 Cf. Investigations §374: “The great difficulty here is not to present the matter as if there were something one couldn’t do.” 
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failed to answer, a question to which the objectivity of ethical facts and the nature of reflection 
precludes an answer. For all he has said, we have so far not been given any reason to think we have 
failed in our duties: no such question has been uncovered. 
 
2.6. The Upshot 
In chapter one, we saw that according to Street, realists cannot make room for the possibility of 
moral knowledge and so cannot appeal to the corrective potential of reflection to explain their moral 
beliefs unless they can find a way to bridge the super-gulf that threatens their grip on the facts. But, I 
have just argued, there is reason to doubt that this claim of Street’s even so much as makes sense. 
Now, what is the upshot of all this?  
Because the implications are different for each of the two rejoinders that, I said in §§1.2.2-
1.2.3, debunkers might deploy in defense of their arguments, I’ll discuss each of those separately, 
beginning with the second. 
 
2.6.1. Implications Regarding the Second Rejoinder 
In short, the foregoing considerations suggest that Street’s challenge to the possibility of knowledge 
of objective ethical facts is not well motivated. For, as we saw, the problem with the idea that 
reflection enables us to correct for the distorting influence of natural selection was supposed to be 
that, because the evidence available to us in reflection necessarily underdetermines the truth of the 
beliefs to which it lends support, any true beliefs to which reflection might lead us could not amount 
to knowledge, and as we are now in a position to see, it is just not clear how we are to understand 
this charge. Allow me to explain.   
It’s not hard to think of examples of the kind of thing Street has in mind, cases in which 
some epistemic agent’s belief fails to amount to knowledge because the evidence on which his belief 
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is based underdetermines the truth of his belief with respect to some state of affairs that is 
incompatible with that he takes to obtain. We can see this, for example, in Alvin Goldman’s famous 
false barn case, wherein Henry, while driving through a part of the countryside that, unbeknownst to 
him, is rife with papier-mâché facsimiles of barns, points to what as a matter of fact is a real barn 
and tells his young son “That’s a barn.”65 The two relevant states of affairs in this case are (1) that 
there is a barn on the side of the road and (2) that the structure that looks like a barn is in fact a 
papier-mâché barn façade. Henry believes (1) obtains, but for all he knows, (2) might instead. Hence 
his belief does not amount to knowledge. 
The trouble with Street’s suggestion that, if realism is true, the truth of any beliefs at which 
we might arrive via reflection is underdetermined by our evidence is that it is just not clear what the 
relevant alternative states of affairs are that we are supposed to be incapable of ruling out. Again we 
can use the case from Blood Meridian to illustrate the point. Earlier we saw that it is possible to make 
sense of the suggestion that evolutionary influences might have misled us about the moral status of 
the judge’s actions in the tent. Perhaps it is in fact the judge’s own dark vision of the world that is 
correct, but because a different, less anti-social view better promotes cooperation among groups, 
evolutionary influences have pushed us to think otherwise. But as I said, this is not a suggestion 
reflection cannot touch. In fact I brought forward several considerations that seem to vindicate a 
kind of moral common sense as against the judge’s view. If Street’s point were just that evolutionary 
considerations sometimes give us reason to concern ourselves with the possibility that we have fallen 
into error, I would of course agree. But recall that it is precisely because it seems to be possible to 
lay to rest this and other, similar concerns that Street and like-minded skeptics want to say that this 
is not the kind of possibility in virtue of which reflection cannot help us to acquire knowledge of 
objective ethical facts. Just what kinds of possibilities they do have in mind, I have argued, remains 
                                                 
65 Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” pp. 772-773. 
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unclear. Moreover, I have suggested, that is no accident, for the alleged possibilities on which they 
focus are a product of philosophical fantasy. 
If I am right about this, Street has not in fact managed to identify an obstacle to the 
reflective acquisition of knowledge of objective ethical facts. Nor, consequently, can she be said to 
have given us any reason to doubt that realists might appeal to the potentially corrective influence of 
reflection on the content of our beliefs to explain why we form the beliefs we do. 
This response may remind some readers of the so-called “Dogmatist” response to external 
world skepticism outlined by Jim Pryor.66 According to this view, we are prima facie justified in taking 
things to be as they seem (a principle known as “phenomenal conservatism”). Importantly, the point 
is not that we are always justified in taking things to be as they seem; rather, Pryor says, 
This prima facie justification can be undermined or threatened if you gain positive empirical 
evidence that you really are in a skeptical scenario. (For instance, if a ticker tape appears at the 
bottom of your visual field with the words “You are a brain in a vat...”) If you acquire 
evidence of that sort, then you’d have to find some non-question-begging way of ruling the 
skeptical hypothesis out, before you’d be all things considered justified in believing that things are 
as your experiences present them. In the standard case, though, when the prima facie 
justification you get from your experiences is not defeated or undermined, then it counts as 
all things considered justification, without your having to do this.67 
 
The dogmatist claims that, fortunately, we have no positive evidence that any relevant skeptical 
scenario obtains. Similarly, it might be thought, my claim is that we are prima facie justified in taking 
things to be as we are wont to take them to be (ethically speaking), and since we have no reason to 
think any relevant skeptical scenario obtains, we are also all things considered justified in doing so. 
 Importantly, however, this is not my claim. For one thing, my emphasis on our ordinary ways 
of investigating and assessing ethical claims should not be taken as a commitment to an ethical 
analogue of phenomenal conservatism. My claim is that it makes no sense to wonder whether the 
investigative practices that partly constitute the game of giving and asking for reasons might lead us 
                                                 
66 See Pryor, “The Skeptic and the Dogmatist.” 
67 Ibid., pp. 537-538. 
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astray, not that we are prima facie justified in holding whichever ethical beliefs strike us as true. 
However things may stand with respect to the latter claim, nothing in my argument requires it. More 
importantly, though, where the dogmatist sees a possibility we have no reason to take to obtain, I do 
not see any possibility at all. My claim is not that we lack evidence that skeptical scenarios obtain, but 
that these alleged possibilities are not even so much as intelligible. 
 
2.6.2. Implications Regarding the First Rejoinder 
This brings us to the implications of the foregoing for the first rejoinder I canvassed for debunkers 
(see §1.2.2). 
To begin with, it may be helpful to remind readers where that earlier discussion left off. 
Faced with the debunkers’ claim that the best, complete explanation of why we make the ethical 
judgments we do does not presuppose their truth, I said, it might be suggested that it is not at all 
obvious that this is the best explanation on offer. Rather, I said, the best explanation would seem to 
be one that does presuppose the truth of our beliefs, at least in some cases. According to this 
alternative explanation, we form the beliefs we do, not simply because they follow from whatever 
beliefs we started with or because of the influences on our thinking of natural selection, our 
upbringing, or whatever, but because, having reflected on the issue, we have come to realize that 
these rather than any other beliefs we could form are true.  
In response, we saw, debunkers might reply that this explanation is redundant. Inspired by 
Gilbert Harman, they might contend that, in fact, “[a]ll we need assume is that you have certain 
more or less well articulated moral principles that are reflected in the judgments you make, based on 
you moral sensibility.”68 In reply, non-skeptics might draw on Nicholas Sturgeon’s well-known reply 
to Harman, suggesting that, when evaluated in the most straightforward way, the counterfactual 
                                                 
68 Harman, The Nature of Morality, p. 7. 
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implied by Harman’s argument—namely 
HARMAN’S COUNTERFACTUAL: we would hold the same ethical beliefs even if they were 
false— 
 
is itself false, since there is good reason to think that the nearest possible worlds in which our 
present ethical beliefs are false are worlds in which we fail to hold them. However, I noted, there is 
room for those sympathetic to Harman’s argument here to take issue with this response. For, they 
might note, Sturgeon’s response works only if it is permissible for us to take for granted various 
basic ethical principles in evaluating the relevant counterfactual, since it is only by doing so that we 
can determine which is the closest possible world in which its antecedent is false. However, 
debunkers might say, it is the point of Harman’s argument to rule that sort of thing out; that is, 
Harman’s point is in effect that, even if we were radically mistaken about ethical matters—if in fact 
every single one of the fundamental ethical principles we are wont to rely one were false—we would 
still hold the very same ethical beliefs.  
This is where we left the dialectic in chapter one. At that time, I noted that anti-skeptics have 
tried various strategies to respond to this line of thought but suggested that there is a deeper 
problem with this Harman-inspired defense of debunking arguments no one seems to have noticed. 
The argument of this chapter has put us in position to appreciate this deeper problem.  
In effect, the problems here mirror those we saw in the under-determination case. There, the 
skeptic’s “really” questions admit of a variety of interpretations on which they are perfectly 
intelligible and familiar sorts of questions. Yet the skeptic denies that any of these interpretations is 
correct. He insists, instead, that he is asking a deeper, more difficult question, one that can’t be 
answered in the same way as these more familiar kinds of questions. In other words, I have said, the 
skeptic means to ask whether there is a super-gulf between our beliefs and the facts. The problem 
with this, I’ve argued, is just that there is no sense to be made of this suggestion. The appearance to 
the contrary can only be explained as a product of philosophical fantasy.  
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Similarly, I want to say, in the present case. Thus, as Sturgeon makes clear, there are various 
straightforward ways of taking the antecedent of HARMAN’S COUNTERFACTUAL and its more 
specific variants. If for example I want to know whether I would still believe it wrong of the boys in 
Harman’s example acted wrongly even if they hadn’t, it’s not too hard to come up with examples of 
relatively similar actions they might have taken that wouldn’t have been wrong. Supposing we hold 
fixed that what they did was set a cat on fire for fun, one way this might not have been wrong might 
be if cats were very different animals that were somehow immune to the harmful effects of fire. 
Perhaps they only regard it as a slight nuisance, akin to a mosquito bite, and respond to finding 
themselves on fire by doing some sort of amusing dance. Or if we’re allowed to imagine them 
having performed a different act entirely—perhaps one that, though mischievous and perhaps 
bothersome to the victim, is not especially harmful—we might imagine them doing some prank 
calls. Obviously these are just two of many ways we might interpret the antecedent of the relevant 
counterfactual. What’s important for our purposes is just that none of these interpretive possibilities 
is going to satisfy the skeptic or strike him as an accurate reflection of his intent. Instead, he will say, 
the scenario he has in mind is one in which the boys do exactly as they do, and cats are as they are, 
yet their act is not wrong. In that scenario, they want to say, we would still believe the boys acted 
wrongly. 
My question is whether we can make any sense of this. I’ve mentioned a couple ways of 
taking the antecedent of the skeptic’s conditional, just as before I canvassed a variety of ways we 
might take the question whether it was really wrong of the judge to act as he does in the Blood 
Meridian case. Here as there, though, the skeptic rejects these interpretations, claiming that they fail 
to get at what’s really at issue. Asked for clarification, however, skeptics seem to have nothing 
helpful to say. They might say, for instance, that they are asking a “deeper” or “more fundamental” 
question, or that they inviting us to imagine that we are “radically” mistaken. But asked, for example, 
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how exactly we are to imagine that, not something similar, but the very act Harman mentions—setting 
a cat on fire for fun!—is not in fact wrong, they offer no guidance. It is thus left entirely unclear how 
we are to understand the alleged possibility the Harman-inspired defender of debunking arguments 
invites us to consider, and in which, he maintains, we would hold the same beliefs we do now. 
In both cases, then, the debunkers’ arguments ultimately rely on the same confused 
conception of ethical thought and talk—the same philosophical fantasy. They take themselves to be 
able to make sense of an allegedly deep kind of error possibility, one that is relevant to our thinking 
about the adequacy of the evidence available to us in ethical reflection and about the extent to which 
reflection is sensitive to the facts. But, I’m suggesting, there’s no there there. When we take the time 
to look at the rags, to really interrogate the alleged possibilities that exercise the skeptic in the ways 
we would take to be necessary were they to come up in ordinary conversation, we find that all our 
attempts to get clear about what is being suggested come up short. To be sure, we can come up with 
some possibilities, but over and over again, we find that those are rejected by the skeptic as not 
really getting to the heart of the matter. As for what would—well, that remains a mystery. And so, 
we are forced to conclude, it is just not clear what sense there is to be made of the skeptics words, 
either of the under-determination skeptic’s really questions or of HARMAN’S COUNTERFACTUAL and 
its variants. 
 
2.6.3. The Role of Simple Realism 
By now, some readers will have wondered about the role that is supposed to be played in this 
chapter’s argument by simple realism, which I have hardly mentioned. In particular, they might 
wonder whether this part of my response to debunkers is simply supposed to be a consequence of 
simple realism. In fact it is not, and so very briefly, I want to explain why. 
 Certainly this response is consistent with simple realism. Moreover, given that the form of 
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simple realism I have endorsed holds that the game of giving and asking for ethical reasons is 
governed by constitutive rules that fix the meanings of our terms and the extensions of our 
concepts, I do think this is the sort of response simple realism suggests. Put in terms that make the 
implication more explicit, the trouble with questions that ask after super-gulfs, on the simple realist’s 
view, is that they ask whether or not some term applies even when the conditions specified in the 
rules that govern that term’s use are satisfied. For that reason, there can simply be no question 
whether the term applies; given that the term means what it does, it must apply, so for someone to ask 
whether it does suggests, if anything, that they do not understand how to use the relevant word.  
Even so, my argument that super-gulfs are unintelligible should not be thought to rest on my 
commitment to simple realism—I am not saying that, since simple realism is true, super-gulfs are 
unintelligible. Since I have not really argued for simple realism at all, that would make the argument 
of this chapter exceptionally weak. If anything, the relationship goes the other way around. That is, I 
think of the ordinary language argument of this chapter as lending support to the version of simple 
realism I endorsed in the previous chapter, in particular to its claim that moral discourse is governed 
by constitutive semantic-conceptual rules. If sound, my arguments in this chapter support that claim 
by showing how we can run up against the bounds of sense in exactly the way simple realism would 
predict. 
 
2.7. Two Objections 
This completes my response to the first two ways of defending debunking arguments canvassed in 
chapter one. Before moving on to discuss the third rejoinder I discussed there, I want to take up two 





2.7.1. Super-gulfs and Radical Skeptical Scenarios 
The first objection appeals to certain radical skeptical scenarios that make problems for our 
knowledge of empirical facts. As I explained in §2.5.2, I agree with John McDowell that it is a 
mistake to think of the process of confirming and disconfirming scientific hypotheses through 
experiments and observation as one of bridging super-gulfs between our beliefs and the facts. But 
even someone willing to grant me that much might protest that it does not follow that we cannot 
make sense of the suggestion that super-gulfs might open up between our beliefs and the empirical 
facts. If I want to argue for that claim, it will be said, I also need to discuss how my view about the 
intelligibility of super-gulfs bears on questions about radical skeptical scenarios, since it might be 
thought that such scenarios, if intelligible, help us to make sense of the possibility that super-gulfs 
might open up between our empirical beliefs and the facts.  
Consider, for example the possibility that, unbeknownst to me, I am but a brain in a vat 
being controlled by clever scientists who want me to think I am writing about moral epistemology. 
Though certainly worrisome, this scenario does not seem to be unintelligible. (If it were, it’s hard to 
see how The Matrix could have been so popular!) If that’s right, we can easily make sense of the 
suggestion that I might not be writing about moral epistemology right now even though there is 
every indication that I am: I might just be an envatted brain being manipulated by scientists to think 
I’m doing that! But, the worry goes, isn’t that just to say that there might be a super-gulf between my 
empirical beliefs and the facts?   
In fact it’s not, for there is a crucial difference between the suggestion that I might be a brain 
in a vat and that on which the challenge to the possibility of ethical knowledge I take up depends. In 
both the ethical and the empirical case, the trouble is supposed to be that the truth of my beliefs is 
under-determined, in the sense that the evidence available to me does not rule out the possibility 
that some radical skeptical scenario obtains. But the reason this is supposed to be so is importantly 
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different in the ethical case than in the empirical case. In the ethical case, the under-determination is 
not supposed to stem from any contingent epistemic misfortune we’ve suffered but from the nature 
of reflection itself. Given that reflection cannot but take some things for granted as it calls others 
into question, the thought goes, we cannot possibly hold up for examination reflection’s own 
credentials; nor, a fortiori, can we rule out the possibility that we’re wildly mistaken. By contrast, the 
difficulty in the empirical case does stem from contingent epistemic misfortune. For suppose that it 
were written into all of the simulation software that envatted brains be told they are envatted, or 
that, out of generosity or because it was the law, all the scientists doing the envatting informed the 
envatted of their plight. In that case it would be easy to tell if you were a normal person going about 
in the world or an envatted brain being made to think you are. 
Now, if what we care about is answering the skeptic about the external world, it of course 
makes no difference that some brain-in-a-vat scenarios don’t preclude the possibility that envatted 
brains might come to know that they are envatted; what matters, rather, is that some do. But it is not 
with a view to answering such skeptics that I have highlighted possibilities such as that benevolent 
scientists might inform us that we’re envatted. Rather, I have done so in order to bring out a crucial 
difference between the threat these scenarios pose to our knowledge of the external world and the 
alleged threat to the possibility of knowledge of objective ethical facts with which I am concerned. 
That threat depends on the thought that our entire investigative practice might be wildly unreliable. 
The trouble is not that we lack some evidence the standards of our practice dictate that we need; it’s 
that, even if we had all the evidence those standards deem necessary, it wouldn’t be enough. In the 
brain-in-a-vat case, however, it is precisely the first possibility that’s relevant. Sure, we may not be 
able to know whether or not we’re brains in vats, but only because the scientists won’t tell us or 
whatever—only, that is, because for contingent reasons we lack evidence that we all take to be and 
routinely treat as relevant to the question. My point in denying the intelligibility of super-gulfs is that 
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there is no sense to be made of the suggestion at issue in the ethical case. That claim neither depends 
on nor entails that there is anything similarly amiss in the kinds of worries that motivate external 
world skepticism. 
Here is another way of putting the point. The idea of a super-gulf is that of a gulf between 
our beliefs and the facts that might yawn even after we’ve done everything our practice demands in 
terms of gathering relevant evidence, checking for biases on our part, etc. It is a possibility of error 
that cannot be eliminated by the normal methods—i.e., by playing the game of giving and asking for 
reasons. Run-of-the-mill belief-fact gulfs, by contrast, can be eliminated in the normal ways. Though 
it is certainly unusual in some ways, I have been urging, the belief-fact gulf made salient by the 
possibility that we are envatted is of the latter, run-of-the-mill sort. If we cannot bridge the gulf that 
possibility makes salient, that is only because limitations to which we are contingently subject 
prevent us from gathering the evidence our practice demands. 
 
2.7.2. Metaphysics and Super-gulfs 
Another source of resistance to my suggestion that we cannot make sense of claims and questions 
about super-gulfs stems from metaphysical considerations. I have surveyed a variety of ways of 
taking the “really?” questions on which, I said, the underdetermination-based challenge for realism 
turns, namely: sure, all of what we are wont to treat as evidence appears to suggest that P, and 
nothing appears to speak against P, but is it really the case that P? I have suggested that, while there 
are various ways of making sense of this or similar questions, none of them manages to say what 
Street and like-minded skeptics want—or think they want—them to say. Now, obviously, this sort of 
argument can only be as compelling as its inventory of possible versions of the relevant question or 
claim is complete, since it will be inappropriate to conclude that there is no suitable way of taking 
the relevant words before we have surveyed all the relevant ways of taking them. Trouble is, some 
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readers might think that I have jumped the gun in exactly this way. For, they will say, there is a kind 
of “really” question I have so far failed to consider but need to, one that means to ask about 
metaphysics. That is, it wants to ask: sure, it seems that P, but P has such and such metaphysical 
presuppositions, and you haven’t yet considered whether or not the relevant metaphysical states of 
affairs obtain. If we can indeed make sense of such questions, then it would seem that we can make 
sense of the skeptic’s appeal to super-gulfs and invocation of the view from sideways on after all.69 
This way of thinking is, I think, obligatory for explanatory realists, who maintain that it is the 
fact that, metaphysically speaking, things are thus and so that explains why our ethical claims are true 
and admit of objective truth. Similarly for error theorists, who maintain that we ought not to believe 
any moral propositions because they all have false metaphysical presuppositions (since, according to 
them, there are no moral properties, relations, or facts). Proponents of these positions are 
committed to thinking it possible that we might somehow step outside the language-game to check 
whether metaphysical reality truly is as our language represents it; according to them, it is on the 
basis of such an investigation that we are licensed to conclude, in the realist’s case, that things are as 
they seem or, in the error theorist’s case, that they are not.  
As a simple realist, I reject this metaphysics first approach, suggesting instead that the only 
way to learn about the metaphysics of morals is to start by checking to see which moves are and 
which aren’t allowed by the rules of giving and asking for ethical reasons, basing any conclusions we 
draw about the metaphysics on the results of that investigation. So understood, no claims the 
metaphysics of morals could support the radically revisionary claims made by explanatory realists, 
according to whom we might be profoundly mistaken about the character of moral reality in spite of 
our best efforts, and despite the fact that all of our evidence seems to suggest otherwise; similarly for 
claims made by error theorists, according to whom we are so mistaken. For on the simple realist’s 
                                                 
69 I thank Steven Gross and Richard Bett for pressing me to think more about this objection. 
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view, the metaphysics of morals are beholden to the rules of the game rather than the other way 
around. 
Still, the fact that this objection is at odds with simple realism does nothing to show that the 
objection is mistaken. To do that, I need to explain why I doubt any appeal to the metaphysics of 
morals can underwrite the intelligibility of super-gulfs and the view from sideways on. 
Certainly it is true that, if we can make sense of explanatory realism and error theory, we can 
make sense of super-gulfs after all. I think that has to be right. But though I accept the conditional, I 
would tollens the objector’s ponens. That is, I believe the right conclusion to draw from this 
conditional is, not that, since explanatory realism and error theory are intelligible, so is the 
suggestion that super-gulfs might yawn between our beliefs and the facts, but that, since we can’t 
make sense of that suggestion, we can’t make sense of explanatory realism or error theory either. 
These views are thus only apparently incompatible with my own. In fact, they are not even so much as 
intelligible, since they entail that we are liable to a kind of error in ethical thinking of which, I have 
argued, there is simply no sense to be made. 
Many will find this implausible. Indeed, in the case of error theory in particular, several 
philosophers have recently taken the fact that it has similar implications to count decisively against 
Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s moral fixed points view.70 I would urge these readers to think a bit more 
about how exactly the appeal to metaphysical considerations is supposed to underwrite the 
intelligibility of claims and questions about super-gulfs. I take it the thought here is motivated by the 
idea that ethical inquiry is something like scientific inquiry—that ethics is what McDowell once 
called a “para-science.”71 For as in scientific inquiry, the thought goes, in ethics we are concerned to 
learn how things stand regarding properties or relations that are there anyway, regardless of what we 
                                                 
70 See Evers and Streumer, “Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?”; Ingram, “The Moral Fixed Points: Reply 
to Cuneo and Shafer-Landau”; Kyriacou, “Moral Fixed Points and Conceptual Deficiency: Reply to Ingram (2015)”; and 
Ingram, “Are Moral Error Theorists Intellectually Vicious?” 
71 McDowell characterizes Mackie’s stalking horse this way at “Two Sorts of Naturalism,” p. 186 
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think or do. But I doubt this comparison can help the defender of super-gulfs. For as I argued in 
§2.5.2, the fact that, in science, we hold entire theories up for examination does not entail that we 
there consider whether or not there is a super-gulf between our beliefs and the facts. And as I 
argued in §2.7.1, the same is true regarding radical skeptical scenarios that make problems for our 
knowledge of empirical facts. While I have been willing to grant that at least some such scenarios are 
perfectly intelligible, I argued that this fact does not entail that we can make sense of the possibility 
that there is a super-gulf between our empirical beliefs and the facts because these skeptical 
scenarios are relevantly different from those invoked by the underdetermination skeptic in ethics 
(such as MORAL INVERSION). If I’m right on these points, then it’s not clear how the view of ethics 
as para-science is supposed to underwrite the intelligibility of claims and questions about super-gulfs. 
Of course, not everyone will find these considerations persuasive. At this point, I am not 
sure there is anything more I can say here to convince readers like this. Even so, I want to 
emphasize, my arguments have something to offer them. For even then, my arguments suggest that 
there is a way of endorsing the realist’s characteristic claim about the objectivity of ethics without 
making it impossible to respond to Harman-inspired and underdetermination-based defenses of 
evolutionary debunking arguments. They thereby invite the question why we should care about the 
more radical kind of mind-independence endorsed by the explanatory realist and the error theorist. 
If we can respond to debunkers by denying the possibility that super-gulfs might open up between 
our beliefs and the facts without denying objectivity of ethics, why should we even so much as want 




                                                 
72 Thanks to Steven Gross for suggesting I consider a response along these lines. 
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2.8. Conclusion: The Beginning 
Such, then, are the essentials of my response to the underdetermination-based argument I attributed 
to Street. As we saw, the rule-following skeptic’s argument that a regress of interpretations threatens 
our attempts to suss out the meanings of words rests on the confused thought that, in order to 
understand each other, we would need to bridge super-gulfs between words and their meanings. Just 
so, I’ve argued in this chapter, Street’s argument that realism precludes the possibility that we might 
come to know the facts in ethics via reflection and thereby sort the wheat from the evolutionary 
chaff rests on the confused, pseudo-questions about how we might bridge super-gulfs between our 
beliefs and the ethical facts. Moreover, I said, basically the same is true of the alternative, Harman-
inspired defense of debunking arguments. In all of these cases, once we see our way through the 
fantasy by carefully attending to the rags and noting the ways our words send us in pursuit of 
chimeras, the arguments fall apart like houses of cards.73  
There is a perfectly understandable temptation, when thinking about these issues, to think 
that this cannot be right, to think that the skeptic’s words are obviously intelligible. Indeed, not only 
is it easy to be taken in by philosophical fantasy, it can also be hard to free oneself. It was presumably 
to make this point that, shortly before his death, and after he had been wrestling with Moore’s 
attempt to demonstrate the existence of the external world for several weeks, Wittgenstein penned 
the following short remark: 
It is so hard to find the beginning. Or better: it is hard to begin at the beginning. And not try 
to go further back.74 
 
Wittgenstein is here thinking about what it looks like to come to know some empirical fact, or to 
justify an empirical claim—issues very close to those with which I have been concerned in this 
chapter. Here too, he thinks, we are liable to be misled in the same way as are Street and others who 
                                                 
73 Cf. Investigations §118. 
74 On Certainty, §471 (translation modified).  
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have taken up these issues. We are liable to get caught up in fantasy and go off in pursuit of 
chimeras, thinking that there is some crucial question yet to be answered when, in fact, all that needs 
to be said has already been said.75 As Samuel L. Jackson’s character, Jules, says in Pulp Fiction, the 
path of the righteous is beset on all sides by iniquities.  
Yet, I have urged, we do well not to give in to temptation. For in this case, uncritically 
accepting that things are as they seem can only deepen our philosophical difficulties. Instead we 
must carefully attend to the language game—inspecting the rags to get clearer about what we should 
say when, all the while keeping our heads in the game of giving and asking for ethical reasons so as 
to bring ourselves around, over and over again, as many times as necessary, to the simple but 
remarkably difficult realization that, try as we might to trace the chains of justification further back, 
we are stuck right where we are.76 Only by doing that can we come to be content to conclude our 
inquiry at the beginning, wondering at the fact that we ever thought there was any further to go.
                                                 
75 Cf. Zettel §314. 













In chapter one, I outlined three rejoinders debunkers might offer to the reflection-centered 
response to debunking arguments I favor. According to the first, an explanation of our moral beliefs 
that appeals to our capacity to know moral reality by way of reflection is redundant, since we can 
explain our beliefs just as well if we instead appeal only to our antecedent views and moral 
sensibilities. According to the second, if realism is true, we lack the capacity to acquire moral 
knowledge through reflection, since in that case, the evidence available to us in ethical reflection 
necessarily underdetermines the truth of our beliefs. The third rejoinder, I said, is in fact better 
understood as two distinct objections, Benacerraf’s Challenge and Field’s Challenge. Benacerraf’s 
Challenge contends that there is a causal or explanatory condition on knowledge that our beliefs 
cannot satisfy if realism is true; Field’s Challenge contends that realists cannot adequately explain 
how we could be reliable about ethical matters. Both have the effect of problematizing my appeal to 
our capacity to acquire moral knowledge through reflection.  
In the previous chapter, I responded to these first two rejoinders, drawing on Wittgenstein’s 
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rule-following considerations to suggest that that each of them rests on a mistaken view about the 
kinds of errors to which we can intelligibly take ourselves to be liable in ethical reflection. In this 
chapter, I respond to Benacerraf’s Challenge and Field’s Challenge. I begin, in §§3.1-2, with a general 
discussion of what it means for a belief to be accidentally true. Here I in effect agree with 
Benacerraf; in particular, I argue that we do well to follow Masahiro Yamada, Kieran Setiya, and 
David Faraci in understanding the no accident condition on knowledge in explanatory rather than 
modal terms. However, I also argue, not all explanatory connection between our beliefs and the 
facts are such as to rule out the possibility of non-accidentally true beliefs, including those 
explanatory connections discussed or endorsed by Yamada, Setiya, and proponents of so-called 
third-factor responses to debunking arguments. In §3.3, I accordingly propose and defend a novel, 
teleological account that both remedies the shortcomings of these proposals and, thereby, answers 
Benacerraf’s Challenge. According this account, which I call GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE, it will 
be no accident that my ethical beliefs are true, when they are, so long as I judge that P only if, and 
because, (it is true that) P. Finally, in §3.4, I take up Field’s Challenge, drawing on Amie 
Thomasson’s work in modal epistemology to suggest that, in contrast to explanatory realists, about 
whom Field may well be correct, simple realists can easily explain our reliability in ethics. 
 
3.1. Against Modal Accounts 
Since Edmund Gettier pointed out that accidentally true belief is not knowledge, many writers have 
attempted to say what it would take for it to be no accident that a belief is true. Some such writers, 
such as Peter Unger, have been content to treat the notion of accidental truth as primitive and not 
requiring further explication.1 Others have noted that the notion of accidental truth itself admits of a 
variety of different interpretations. Moreover, these philosophers have noted, these differences 
                                                 
1 See Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.” 
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matter, since different interpretations of accidental truth have different implications for our 
understanding of when someone deserves to be credited with knowledge. 
I believe this latter group of authors is correct: the first step in thinking about when it is an 
accident that some belief is true and why such beliefs cannot count as knowledge is to consider what 
accidental truth amounts to in the first place. In this first section, I consider two popular modal 
accounts. Despite having garnered a good deal of support in the literature, I will argue, both are 
problematic, and for similar reasons. 
 
3.1.1. Sensitivity or Tracking 
According to one widely held view, we should understand the no accident condition on knowledge 
in terms of sensitivity or tracking. That is,  
SENSITIVITY: it is no accident that S’s belief that P is true iff S would not believe that P if it 
were not the case that P. 
 
It’s not hard to see why many have found this account of accidental truth appealing. After all, there 
certainly are some cases of accidentally true belief regarding which SENSITIVITY not only gives the 
right result but offers a plausible explanation of the fact that the truth of the belief in question is a 
mere accident. Suppose, for example, that I’m trying to decide whether or not it is likely to rain this 
afternoon. (Perhaps I am about to go out and need to decide whether or not to bring my galoshes.) I 
might do that by rolling dice (odd numbers indicate rain, evens no rain). Going about things that 
way, it’s possible that I’ll get lucky and end up believing truly that rain is unlikely. If I were to do so, 
however, I wouldn’t know that rain is unlikely. For given that rolling dice is an insensitive belief-
forming process, it would be an accident that my belief about the likelihood of rain is true.  
Nevertheless, SENSITIVITY is subject to a variety of counterexamples. Consider, for example, 
the following case: 
JIM: Jim’s cognitive faculties and methods are such that, under normal conditions, they 
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would be wildly unreliable. Jim knows this and has no reason to think that conditions are 
abnormal, yet he persists in forming beliefs in his usual way. Despite all this, Jim’s belief that 
P is sensitive solely because some powerful demon is prepared to intervene to ensure that he 
does not believe that P when P is false.2 
 
Jim’s belief-forming methods are sensitive, and in an important sense their sensitivity is not just a 
matter of luck, since it is the consequence of deliberate actions on the part of a demon. 
Nevertheless, given that Jim himself is not responsible for the sensitivity of his methods or the truth of 
his beliefs, it seems right to say it is an accident that his beliefs are true.  
JIM thus suggests that sensitivity does not suffice for non-accidentally true belief. Other cases 
show that sensitivity is not necessary either. Consider, for example, the following case from 
Jonathan Vogel:  
URANIUM: Roger places a piece of uranium on a photographic plate, and discovers that the 
plate has become fogged. He repeats the experiment many times. Before he inspects it, 
Roger concludes, by induction, that the newly exposed plate is now fogged. It is.3 
 
Roger’s belief that the plate is fogged is not sensitive: he would believe it was fogged even if it 
weren’t. Nor, quite generally, is induction a sensitive belief-forming method. Nevertheless, it is 
hardly an accident that Roger’s belief about the plate is true. Sensitivity, then, is not just insufficient 
but unnecessary for non-accidental truth. 
There is another lesson we can draw from URANIUM. Few philosophers have thought non-
accidentally true belief sufficient for knowledge,4 but it is almost universally thought necessary. If, 
then, the no accident condition on knowledge is to be understood in terms of sensitivity, sensitivity 
would itself have to be a necessary condition of knowledge: S knows that P only if S would not 
believe that P were it not the case that P. But as URANIUM shows, it is not plausible that sensitivity is 
necessary for knowledge, since if it were, there could be no knowledge by induction. 
                                                 
2 Adapted from Schafer, “Knowledge and Two Forms of Non-Accidental Truth,” p. 381. 
3 Adapted from Vogel, “The Enduring Trouble with Tracking,” p. 131. Vogel’s article also contains copious other 
counterexamples to SENSITIVITY. 
4 See again Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge” and Yamada, “Getting it Right by Accident.” 
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It would seem, then, that there is ample reason to reject SENSITIVITY as an account of the no 




Indeed there is. Recently, several philosophers, most prominently Duncan Pritchard and Timothy 
Williamson,5 have suggested that the no accident condition on knowledge is best understood in 
terms of safety: it is no accident that my belief that P is true if I could not easily have been wrong 
about P. In other words: 
SAFETY: it is no accident that S’s belief that P is true iff, in most nearby worlds in which S 
believes that P, it is the case that P.6 
 
SAFETY is not without its attractions. For as with SENSITIVITY, there are cases of accidentally true 
belief regarding which SAFETY both gives the right result and offers a plausible explanation of the 
fact that the truth of the belief in question is a mere accident. Suppose, for instance, that having read 
Pascal, I become convinced that belief in God and the afterlife has a much higher expected utility 
than atheism and so become a Christian. Suppose too that God and the afterlife in fact exist. My 
beliefs would then be true, but only accidentally so. Why? Plausibly, the explanation has to do with 
safety: forming beliefs with a view to maximizing expected utility is not a reliable belief-forming 
method, so beliefs formed in that way are unsafe. Nevertheless, I will argue, safety is neither 
sufficient nor necessary for non-accidental truth. Nor, moreover, is it plausibly necessary for 
knowledge. 
Cases abound in which safety is insufficient for non-accidentally true belief. Consider, for 
                                                 
5 See Pritchard, Epistemic Luck and Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits. 
6 This formulation is closer to Pritchard’s than to Williamson’s. The latter formulates the condition in terms of a 
method: when S knows that P, she knows it on the basis of a method, M, whose output could not easily have been false. 
Except where noted below, this difference is not relevant for my purposes. 
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example, the case of Etienne: 
ETIENNE: The crown prince, Etienne—purely out of a deep sense of arrogance—believes 
that he is the strongest boy of his age in Paris. As a matter of fact, his belief is correct, but 
solely because his father has decreed that no stronger boy should be allowed to live in the 
city—a decree that the king’s secret police are extremely efficient at carrying out.7 
 
His father’s secret police force makes sure that Etienne’s belief about his relative strength is safe: so 
long as they remain vigilant, the young prince could not easily be mistaken on that point. Still, it’s an 
accident that Etienne’s belief is true. The method he uses—arrogantly believing oneself to be the 
best, whether or not one has any evidence for that assessment—is typically not going to be reliable. 
Moreover, its reliability in Etienne’s case in particular is not due to anything he did. He does not 
choose this method for the sake of its reliability. Nor is he himself responsible for the actions of the 
secret police, actions without which Etienne’s method would presumably be wildly unreliable. Nor, 
we can suppose, is he even aware of their actions. In a real and important sense, then, both the 
reliability of Etienne’s method and, consequently, the truth of the beliefs he forms thereby, are 
purely a matter of luck. 
Two further cases suggest the same conclusion. Consider first the case of Elsa: 
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: Although Elsa’s ethical beliefs are reliably true, her 
reliability is irrelevant to her choice of belief-forming method. Instead, Elsa simply believes 
whatever it feels good to believe, refusing to believe undesirable states of affairs obtain 
regardless of the evidence presented to her. Moreover, she does so because everyone in her 
family and community does the same, and because they criticized her as a child whenever 
she tried to do things differently. Using this method, Elsa comes to believe, truly, that it is 
permissible to lie to ICE agents when they come asking after your undocumented neighbor, 
who would be tortured were he forced to return to his home country. For as it happens, she 
was taught from a young age that all immigration enforcement officials should be thwarted 
where possible; as a result, she is inclined to lie and would feel bad if she were to tell the 
truth.8 
 
Given that her method is reliable and that she could not easily have used a different one, Elsa’s 
belief would seem to be safe. Yet as with Etienne, neither the reliability of her method nor the truth 
                                                 
7 This case is taken from Karl Schafer, “Knowledge and Two Faces of Non-accidental Truth,” p. 384. 
8 Inspired by Dan Korman and Dustin Locke’s example with Jack and the Martians in their forthcoming, §7. 
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of the belief to which it leads her are the result of anything Elsa herself does, since she adopts and 
uses the method she does for reasons utterly unrelated to its reliability. Consequently, the fact that 
she ends up forming a true belief is no more than a piece of good epistemic luck. 
Consider next COIN FLIP: 
COIN FLIP: Let P be some necessarily true proposition, and suppose that I decide whether or 
not to believe that P on the basis of a coin flip: I will believe that P if it comes up heads but 
remain agnostic otherwise. Suppose, moreover, that I chose to use this method on a whim: I 
like flipping coins and prefer it to reasoning about what to believe. The coin comes up 
heads, so I believe that P.9 
 
Since P is necessarily true, this method could not easily lead me to form a false belief, so my belief is 
safe. And yet it’s an accident that my belief is true. My choice of this method has nothing to do with 
its reliability. Nor can I claim responsibility for the truth of my belief: for all I know, P is necessarily 
false! As in the other cases mentioned, then, it’s just an accident that I wind up with a true belief.  
Safety, then, is not sufficient for non-accidental truth. Is it necessary? The following case 
suggests not: 
COUNTERFACTUAL DECEPTION: Unbeknownst to me, you have planned an elaborate 
illusion in which it will look to me as though I am wearing my watch when in fact you have 
secretly swiped it away. You are prevented at the final moment, by some bizarre piece of bad 
luck. Just then it occurs to me that I might have forgotten to put on my watch that morning. 
I pull back my sleeve and am pleased to find that I haven’t.10 
 
My belief here is unsafe, since there are nearby worlds in which your plan succeeds and I form a 
false belief. But is it an accident that I am right about whether or not I forgot to put on my watch 
this morning? Well, why should it be? After all, you did not succeed in deceiving me, and I have no 
reason to suspect you might have. Nor, we can suppose, do I have any more general reason to 
suspect my vision unreliable. The right conclusion to draw is, not that my belief is accidentally true, 
                                                 
9 Adapted from Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, pp. 90-91 (cf. Yamada, “Getting It Right By Accident,” p. 88). As Setiya 
notes, though Pritchard’s seems to be, Williamson’s version of the safety condition is not vulnerable to this particular 
counterexample. 
10 Slightly modified from Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, p. 90. 
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but that safety is not necessary for non-accidentally true belief.11 
As with URANIUM in §1.1 above, COUNTERFACTUAL DECEPTION gives us another reason to 
doubt SAFETY. Non-accidentally true belief is necessary for knowledge, so if SAFETY were true, I 
could know that P only if my belief that P were safe. But in COUNTERFACTUAL DECEPTION, I know 
that I didn’t forget my watch despite the fact that this belief is unsafe. Like SENSITIVITY, SAFETY is 
false. 
 
3.2. The Explanatory Approach 
The failure of these modal accounts of non-accidental truth suggests we would do well to take a 
different tack. The aim of this section is to motivate and defend a version of what is in my view the 
most promising alternative on offer in the literature. Very roughly, the ideas is that, when S knows 
that P, there is an explanatory connection between S’s belief that P and the fact that P;12 as we will see, 
however, this rough characterization is inadequate as stated and will need to be refined in several 
ways. 
I begin, in §4.2.1, by laying out several types of explanatory connection between our beliefs 
and the facts that have been explored in the literature and go on, in §4.2.2, to suggest that all of 
these are consistent with the possibility that our beliefs are only accidentally true. Finally, in §4.2.3, I 
defend a novel explanatory account of the no-accident condition on knowledge that explicitly rules 
out accounts that are problematic in the ways I bring out in §4.2.2. 
  
                                                 
11 Cf. the story of Garrett and Lucy discussed by Yamada at “Getting It Right by Accident,” p. 80. 
12 Versions of this view have been defended by Masahiro Yamada, Kieran Setiya, Matt Lutz, and David Faraci. See 
Yamada, “Getting It Right by Accident”; Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, chs. 3-4; Lutz, “The Reliability Challenge in 
Moral Epistemology”; and Faraci, “Groundwork for an Explanationist Account of Epistemic Coincidence.” 
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3.2.1. Varieties of Explanatory Connections 
The version of the explanatory approach that has been most widely-discussed in connection with 
debunking arguments holds that there is some so-called “third factor” that explains both why we 
hold the beliefs we do and why they are true. On David Enoch’s view, for instance, this third factor 
is the fact that survival is good; he explains: 
 Assume that survival or reproductive success (or whatever else evolution “aims” at) 
is at least somewhat good. […] 
Selective forces have shaped our normative judgments and beliefs, with the “aim” of 
survival or reproductive success in mind (so to speak). But given that these are by and large 
good aims – aims that normative truths recommend – our normative beliefs have developed 
to be at least somewhat in line with the normative truths. Perhaps somewhat ironically – 
because Street thinks evolutionary considerations serve to ground the epistemological 
challenge to realism – evolutionary considerations can help the realist cope with the 
challenge. Given that the evolutionary “aim” is good, the fact that our normative beliefs 
have been shaped by selective forces renders it far less mysterious that our normative beliefs 
are somewhat in line with the normative truths. This is so, then, neither because the 
normative truths are a function of our normative beliefs, nor because our normative beliefs 
causally track the normative truths, but because our normative beliefs have been shaped by 
selective pressures towards ends that are in fact – and quite independently – of value. The 
connection between evolutionary forces and value – the fact that survival is good – is what 
explains the correlation between the response-independent normative truths and our 
selected-for normative beliefs. The fact that (roughly speaking) survival is good pre-
establishes the harmony between the normative truths and our normative beliefs.13 
 
To my knowledge, no one who favors an account like this has put it forward as an account of the 
possibility of non-accidentally true belief. Instead, they are typically put forward in an attempt to 
answer Field’s Challenge by explaining our reliability in ethics. Still, it’s not hard to see how the 
argument would go. Since, a proponent of some such account might say, some third factor explains 
both why I hold the beliefs I do and why they are true, there is an indirect explanatory connection 
between my beliefs and that facts, and it is therefore no accident that my beliefs are true. 
 Consider next the approach favored by Kieran Setiya. Setiya frames his discussion of the 
possibility of non-accidentally true belief in terms of how our beliefs can satisfy a condition he calls 
K: 
                                                 
13 Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, p. 168. 
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K: When S knows that P, she knows it by a reliable method, and it is no accident that her 
method is reliable,14 
 
where “it is no accident that S’s method, m, is reliable iff there is an explanatory connection between 
the reliability of m and S’s use thereof: either S uses m because m is reliable or that m is reliable because S 
uses m.”15 Theists, Setiya notes, might appeal to God to explain how ethical beliefs satisfy K, 
suggesting that God, who knows the truth, creates at least some of us such that our inferential 
dispositions are reliable.16 However, Setiya argues, non-theists will find themselves unable to show 
that there is an explanatory connection between the relevant conjuncts unless it takes the form of 
what he calls a “constitutive connection” between the facts in ethics and our attitudes,17 where “a 
constitutive account of x is an account of its nature, or what it is to be that thing: in Aristotelian 
terms, its essence or formal cause. A constitutive explanation of p and q is one in which p follows 
from q together with truths of this kind.”18 Consider, for example, BENEFIT: 
BENEFIT: For x to be good for or benefit S is for S to desire to desire x. 
This constitutive account of benefit makes possible a constitutive explanation of the conjunction, I 
desire to desire opportunities to listen to Mozart and listening to Mozart would be good for me. 
Given BENEFIT, the first conjunct explains the second: listening to Mozart would be good for me 
because I desire to desire opportunities to do so. 
Setiya considers several candidate constitutive accounts, concluding that some, like  
EXTERNALISM: part of what it is to have the concept of ethical virtue is to be such that one’s 
method for identifying traits as virtues is sufficiently reliable,19 
 
predict more convergence in ethical beliefs than we observe,20 while others, like  
                                                 
14 Knowing Right from Wrong, p. 96. 
15 Ibid., pp. 97-9. 
16 Ibid., p. 114. In fact it’s not clear that this suggestion gets us very far, even setting aside the question of God’s 
existence; after all, one might wonder, how does God himself manage to form non-accidentally true beliefs? 
17 Ibid., pp. 111-115. 
18 Ibid., p. 98. 
19 Ibid., p. 118. 
20 Ibid., pp. 120-122. 
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SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: for a trait to be a virtue is for the members of one’s conceptual or 
linguistic community to believe that it is a virtue,21 
 
preclude the possibility that entire communities might go astray.22 In the end, he settles on two 
possibilities between which he declines to choose, NATURAL EXTERNALISM and NATURAL 
CONSTRUCTIVISM: 
NATURAL EXTERNALISM: Part of what it is to have the concept of ethical virtue is to belong 
to a life form whose method for identifying traits as virtues is sufficiently reliable.23 
 
NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: For a trait to be a virtue is for creatures of one’s life form to 
believe that it is a virtue.24 
 
If either NATURAL EXTERNALISM or NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM is true, it is at least 
possible that there is an explanatory connection between my use of some method to form beliefs 
about virtue and its reliability. If NATURAL EXTERNALISM is true, the reference of ethical concepts is 
fixed by the method, m, that human beings by nature use in such a way that m is guaranteed to be 
reliable. If NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM is true, facts about human virtue are fixed by the method 
human beings use to identify virtues, so the fact that human beings use some method, m, for that 
purpose entails that m is reliable. Either way, there is an explanatory connection between the fact 
that human beings use m to form beliefs about virtue and its reliability: m is a reliable method for 
identifying virtues because human beings use it to do that. Moreover, if I use m because human beings 
do so by nature, and if either NATURAL EXTERNALISM or NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM is true, there 
is an (indirect) explanatory connection between my use of that method and its reliability: the 
reliability of my method follows from the explanation of my use thereof. (Structurally speaking, this 
                                                 
21 Setiya, Knowing Right From Wrong, p. 126. 
22 Ibid., p. 126. 
23 Ibid., p. 132. All of these views are formulated in terms of virtue, but Setiya does this only for the sake of simplicity; in 
principle, variants could be constructed for any ethical term. Consider, for instance, NATURAL EXTERNALISM ABOUT 
WRONGNESS: 
 
NATURAL EXTERNALISM ABOUT WRONGNESS: Part of what it is to have the concept of moral wrongness is to 
belong to a life form whose method for identifying acts as wrong is sufficiently reliable. 
 
24 Ibid., p. 133. 
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account is similar to Enoch’s third-factor account. The difference is that, whereas for Enoch, the 
“third factor” is the fact that survival is good, for Setiya it is that human beings use m to form beliefs 
about virtue.) 
Consider, finally, the approach favored by Masahiro Yamada. Though Yamada’s approach is 
very close to Setiya’s, a couple of things distinguish the former from the latter. For one thing, where 
Setiya is happy to allow that the no accident condition on knowledge is satisfied if the explanatory 
connection runs from my use of some reliable method to its reliability, Yamada seems to think the 
condition can be satisfied only if the connection runs the other way. On his account, the relevant 
clause of the no-accident condition is as follows: “the truth-conduciveness of [S’s method,] 
M…explains why S is using the method M.”25 Second, instead of the metaphysical and semantic 
views Setiya favors, Yamada plumps for an evolutionary-cum-conceptual account of the explanatory 
connection between our basic belief-forming methods and our use of them. 
The evolutionary component of Yamada’s account is one that will be familiar to those who 
follow the literature on genealogical debunking arguments, if only because stories like the one 
Yamada favors are there thought to be hopeless, at least in ethics.26 The idea is simply that natural 
selection favored those of our ancestors who tended to get things right. As a result, the methods we 
use are truth-conducive, and that very fact at least partly explains our use of them.27 The conceptual 
story holds that use of sufficiently reliable methods to form beliefs involving concept X is partly 
constitutive of understanding or having mastered X. The reliability of these methods thus explains 
why we use them rather than others to form beliefs about X: if these methods weren’t reliable, we 
couldn’t be said to be forming beliefs about X at all!28 
Yamada’s story about how non-accidental truth is possible combines both possibilities as 
                                                 
25 Yamada, “Getting It Right by Accident,” p. 102. 
26 See, for instance, Street’s discussion at “Darwinian Dilemma,” §6. 
27 Yamada, “Getting It Right by Accident.” p. 100. 




A theory of the ability to think constrains what kinds of thinking creatures are possible at all: 
thought is only possible when the basic methods of judgment used are truth-conducive. But 
the actual existence of thinking creatures like us must be explained causally. The theory of 
thought places constraints on what evolution can produce. Without this constraint, it is not 
at all clear that an evolutionary story can explain why we use truth-conducive belief forming 
methods. After all, what matters is that appropriate kinds of behavior are produced and 
appropriate behavior can very well be produced by beliefs, or even entire belief systems, that 
are widely off the mark…. But given the constraint that thought is only possible through the 
use of truth-conducive methods, evolution can only produce thinking creatures, if it 
produces any, who use truth-conducive methods of judgments because thought is only 
possible through the use of truth-conducive methods.29  
 
The thought here is that use of a sufficiently reliable method for forming beliefs involving a concept, 
C, is partly constitutive of competence with C, a fact that constrains the space of possibilities with 
which natural selection can work; in particular, if natural selection is to produce creatures that form 
judgments involving C, they must do so using sufficiently reliable methods. The explanation of my 
use of some sufficiently reliable method to form beliefs involving C is thus partly conceptual and 
partly evolutionary. I am as I am because natural selection shaped me as it did, but given the nature 
of conceptual competence, selective processes could not have produced a being that forms the sorts 
of beliefs I form were it not for the fact that that being does so by means of a sufficiently reliable 
method. In that sense, its reliability explains my belief-forming method. 
 
3.2.2. Trouble in Paradise 
Creative as these attempts to establish the possibility of non-accidentally true belief are, they all run 
afoul of observations recently made by Karl Schafer.  
Schafer argues convincingly that there are 
two senses in which knowledge cannot be accidentally true: 
 
1. If a belief is to count as knowledge, it must be reasonable to attribute the truth of 
that belief, as well as the positive epistemic features that are relevant to condition 2, 
                                                 
29 Yamada, “Getting It Right by Accident,” pp. 101-102. 
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to the believer. 
2. If a belief is to count as knowledge, that belief must satisfy some sort of intuitive 
“reliability” condition—be that a matter of safety or reliability or something else less 
reductive.30 
 
In other words, he says,  
knowledge requires both a non-accidental connection between a belief’s truth and the 
knower and a non-accidental connection between its truth and the objects or facts that are 
known. In this way, knowledge requires both what we might call “subject-directed” non-
accidental truth and “object-directed” non-accidental truth.31 
 
The point of Schafer’s object-directed condition (2) is, I take it, straightforward: if I form 
beliefs at random or using a method with no connection to the truth, my beliefs cannot be better 
than accidentally true. But the point of Schafer’s subject-directed condition (1) may be less obvious. 
That condition is designed to deal with cases like the following:  
suppose that John accepts some highly complex but ultimately truth-conducive method M, 
but does so on obviously irrational grounds—such as a recommendation of M by the 
National Inquirer. Intuitively the beliefs that John forms via M do not count as knowledge. 
And this seems to be a the [sic] product of the fact that it would be unreasonable to attribute 
the truth-conduciveness of this method to John.32 
 
Suppose that John successfully uses the method he learned from the Inquirer to predict who is going 
to win an open city council seat. To be sure, since his method is truth-conducive, and since John 
uses it to form this belief, there is a sense in which it is no accident that John’s prediction turns out 
to have been accurate. This is the sense captured by Schafer’s condition (2). Condition (1) explains 
why it is nevertheless an accident that John manages to predict the winner of the council race. 
Though the truth of his belief is certainly a result of something John does—namely, use a reliable 
belief-forming method—it’s truth is not attributable to him. For the fact that his belief about who will 
win the council seat is true does not explain why he holds it. Nor does the reliability of his method 
explain why he uses it. He does not form the belief he does because it’s true; nor does he use the 
                                                 
30 Schafer, “Knowledge and Two Forms of Non-Accidental Truth,” p. 389. 
31 Ibid., p. 374. 
32 Ibid., p. 390. 
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method he does because it’s reliable. Or, to put the point another way, while both the truth of his 
belief and the reliability of his method are results of actions John takes, they are not the intended 
results. That his belief is true and his method reliable is nothing more than a good piece of epistemic 
luck. (Similarly in JIM, ETIENNE, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, and COIN FLIP.) 
In my view, it’s more accurate to call Schafer’s view a refinement of the explanatory 
approach rather than one of its competitors. For rather than abandoning the demand for an 
explanatory connection, Schafer insists that such connections take a particular form: some 
intentional act of the relevant epistemic agent must figure in the explanation of both the reliability of 
her method and the truth of her belief. Even so, Schafer’s observations make considerable trouble 
for the proposals considered in §4.2.1.  
To see why, consider first the indirect explanatory connections suggested by third factor 
accounts. Suppose that Enoch, for example, is right: the pro tanto goodness of survival explains both 
why we hold the beliefs we do and why they are true. In that case, Schafer’s object-directed 
condition (2) would seem to be satisfied, since the explanation of my beliefs entails their truth. Even 
so, the fact that my methods are reliable and my beliefs true might well have nothing to do with why 
I go on forming beliefs in the way I do. For all the third factor accounts say, I might be like Elsa in 
DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, simply doing what feels right for beings like me in communities 
like mine. If I am, the truth of my beliefs and the reliability of my methods is not attributable to me 
in the way Schafer’s subject-directed condition (1) requires, and my beliefs are only accidentally 
true.33  
Things are similar with Setiya’s NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: 
NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM: For a trait to be a virtue is for creatures of one’s life form to 
believe that it is a virtue. 
 
                                                 




As we saw, so long as I form beliefs about virtue using the belief-forming method, m, that human 
beings use by nature and do so because that’s what human beings do, NATURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
ensures that there is an explanatory connection between my method and its reliability: the reliability 
of my method follows from the explanation of my use thereof. But are the reliability of my method 
and the truth of the beliefs to which it leads me attributable to me in the relevant sense? Not 
necessarily. For suppose that the sense in which I use m because human beings do is just that I 
copied what I saw other people around me doing: I picked it up on the street, so to speak. In that 
case m’s reliability might well have nothing to do with my use of it: rather than trying to form true 
beliefs, I might have just been trying to fit in. If that’s so, it’s hard to see how either the reliability of 
my belief-forming method or the truth of the beliefs I form thereby could be attributable to me. Pace 
Setiya, then, my beliefs are, at best, accidentally true. 
Consider next Setiya’s NATURAL EXTERNALISM: 
NATURAL EXTERNALISM: Part of what it is to have the concept of ethical virtue is to belong 
to a life form whose method for identifying traits as virtues is sufficiently reliable. 
 
If NATURAL EXTERNALISM is true, the reference of ethical concepts is fixed by the method, m, that 
human beings by nature use in such a way that m is guaranteed to be reliable. If, then, I form beliefs 
about virtue using m because that’s what beings like me do by nature, it follows, again, that there is an 
explanatory connection between my method and its reliability: the reliability of my method follows 
from the explanation of my use thereof. As before, though, the reliability of my method and the 
truth of the beliefs to which it leads me may not be attributable to me in the relevant sense. For 
suppose that the sense in which I use m because human beings do is just that I am just acting on my 
natural inclinations, just as I am when, for example, I socialize with other human beings or use tools. 
In that case m’s reliability might well have nothing to do with my use of it: rather than trying to form 
true beliefs, I might have just been following the path of least resistance. If that’s so, it’s hard to see 
how either the reliability of my belief-forming method or the truth of the beliefs I form thereby 
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could be attributable to me. Once again, then, and again pace Setiya, my beliefs are, at best, 
accidentally true. 
Consider, finally, Yamada’s hybrid evolutionary-conceptual view, according to which 
evolution can only produce thinking beings by producing beings whose judgments are more-or-less 
reliable. The trouble here is similar to that we encountered in Schafer’s National Inquirer case. 
Suppose that Yamada’s story is right, and suppose that I form true beliefs about which character 
traits are virtues using the reliable method, V, use of which is partly constitutive of competence with 
the concept of virtue. Since V is reliable, there is of course a sense in which it is no accident when 
the beliefs I form using V turn out true. Even so, in another sense it very much is an accident that 
my beliefs are true. For though the truth of his belief is certainly a result of something I do—
namely, use a reliable belief-forming method—its truth is not attributable to me if its reliability played 
no role in my decision to use that method rather than some other. Rather, while both the truth of 
my belief and the reliability of my method are results of my actions, they are not the intended results. 
Pace Yamada, then, the fact that my belief is true and my method reliable is just a good piece of 
epistemic luck. 
 
3.2.3. NO ACCIDENT 
I take it the shortcomings these proposals make clear that, if it is to be plausible, an explanatory 
account of the no-accident condition on knowledge is going to have to be more sophisticated than 
the rough gloss with which I began. But what, specifically, do the shortcomings I’ve noted here 
suggest about the shape of a better account of non-accidental truth? Plausibly, the lesson is that we 
cannot be too ecumenical about the kinds of explanatory connections we treat as relevant. In 
particular, we must take heed of the good point Schafer makes: if it is to be no accident that that my 
beliefs are true, their truth must be attributable to me, in the sense that their truth is to be explained, 
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at least in part, by some action I take or choice I make qua responsible epistemic agent. Likewise 
regarding the reliability of my method. So far as non-accidental truth is concerned, it is neither here 
nor there that there might be an explanatory story about connection between the reliability of my 
method and my use of it in which my epistemic agency plays no significant role. All of which is to 
say we should understand the no-accident condition roughly as follows:  
NO ACCIDENT: When S knows that P, 
 
1. S’s belief that P is true  
2. S formed the belief that P using a reliable method M, where a belief-forming method 
is reliable iff and to the degree that it produces or sustains mostly true judgments 
throughout nearby worlds 
3. Both the truth of S’s belief that P and the reliability of the method whereby she 
forms the belief that P are attributable to her, in the sense that S’s belief that P is true, 
and her method reliable, because of something S did. In other words, S deserves credit for or 
is responsible for the truth of her belief that P and the reliability of her method. 
 
This account can easily handle the cases that made trouble for SENSITIVITY and SAFETY. 
Consider, for instance, the case of Jim, discussed in §1.1 above. Jim’s belief-forming methods are 
reliable, to be sure, but their reliability is no part of the explanation of his use of them. After all, how 
could it be? Not only does he not know his methods are reliable, he knows that, in normal 
conditions, they’re not reliable! Moreover, since he has no reason to believe conditions are not 
normal, he has no reason to think they are reliable now. There is accordingly no explanatory 
connection between the reliability of Jim’s methods and his use of them; according to NO 
ACCIDENT, this is why it is an accident that Jim’s beliefs are true despite the fact that he forms them 
using a reliable method. 
NO ACCIDENT also allows us to explain what goes wrong in ETIENNE. Etienne reasons as he 
does, not because he believes his method reliable, but because he is arrogant. So while his method is 
indeed reliable (due to the actions of his father’s secret police force), there is no explanatory 
connection between the reliability of his method and his use of it. It is therefore an accident that the 
belief he forms thereby are true. 
124 
 
Similarly in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY. Here Elsa forms ethical beliefs as she does, 
not because she recognizes that hers is a reliable method, but because it feels good to do things this 
way. Since, then, neither is attributable to her, both the reliability of her method and the truth of the 
beliefs to which it leads her are accidental.  
Finally, consider what the account has to say about COIN FLIP. My method cannot help but 
be reliable: since I use it to decide whether or not to believe a necessary truth, if I form a belief at all, 
it will be true. Even so, since I decide to use this method on a whim, I do not deserve credit for its 
reliability. Any belief I form by flipping coins is thus only accidentally true.  
Together, I take it the facts that it remedies the shortcomings of Yamada’s and Setiya’s 
proposals and can handle the cases that made trouble for SENSITIVITY and SAFETY amount to a 
fairly compelling case for NO ACCIDENT. Still, it can’t hurt to bolster my case here by explaining 
how this account allows us to identify what goes wrong in a couple of famous cases of non-
accidental truth. 
So consider the following case from Gettier’s famous paper: 
Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has 
strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition: 
 
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket. 
 
Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that 
Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's 
pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails: 
 
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. 
 
Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the 
grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in 
believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, 
will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. 
Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false.34 
 
Here it is an accident that Smith comes to hold a true belief. But why? Though odd, his method 
                                                 
34 Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” p. 122. 
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seems to be reliable. After all, as Gettier notes, (e) is a logical consequence of (d), so coming to 
believe the former by inferring it from the latter could not easily result in the formation of a false 
belief. Nevertheless, as the case illustrates, (e) might be true for reasons that have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the basis on which it was formed. This observation suggests a diagnosis: the 
trouble, it would seem, is with my condition (3): the truth of Smith’s belief is not a result of anything 
Smith himself did. Rather than earning a true belief through honest epistemic work, Smith just gets 
lucky—the world just so happens to fall into line with his belief. 
Consider next Goldman’s false barn case, discussed briefly in chapter 2 (see §2.6.1). The 
diagnosis here depends on how we describe Henry’s method.35 Is it HENRY1 or HENRY2? 
HENRY1: If you see a barn, judge that there is a barn. 
 
HENRY2: If it looks to you as if there is a barn, and you have no reason to think the 
appearance misleading, judge that there is a barn. 
 
Either way Henry’s belief is only accidentally true, but the reasons are different in each case.  
Suppose we say it’s HENRY1. In that case, Henry’s method is necessarily reliable, since seeing 
is factive: if I see a barn, there is a barn. But the truth of Henry’s belief is nevertheless not 
attributable to him. He does not check to see whether or not the thing he’s looking at is a barn 
facade rather than a barn, so he cannot be said to have taken the care he would need to have taken 
in order to be sure that he did indeed see a barn. The trouble, in other words, is with condition (3). 
Things are a bit simpler if we suppose his method is HENRY2. While HENRY2 is typically 
perfectly reliable, Henry’s situation is not typical. Unbeknownst to Henry, he is in false barn country, 
where judging that there’s a barn whenever it looks to you as if there is a barn is liable to leave you 
with a false belief a good deal of the time. On this reading of Goldman’s case, then, the trouble is 
with my condition (2). 
So much, then, for the no accident condition on knowledge. In the next section, I turn my 
                                                 
35 A point made by Yamada at “Getting It Right by Accident,” pp. 93-97. 
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attention to how our ethical beliefs might satisfy NO ACCIDENT. 
 
3.3. Getting It Right on Purpose 
In each of the cases just considered, the trouble stems from the fact that neither the reliability of the 
relevant agent’s method nor the truth of their beliefs play any part in their decision to reason as they 
do. If the reliability of the agent’s method and the truth of their beliefs did play some part in his or 
her decision to use that method and adopt that belief, or at least if they played the right part, it would 
clearly not be an accident were their beliefs to come out true.  
This line of thought suggests the following, teleological account of how my ethical beliefs 
might satisfy NO ACCIDENT: 
GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE: for any ethical proposition P, I judge that P only if, and 
because, (it is true that) P. 
 
Here the reliability of my method follows from its nature: since it requires that I believe that P only 
if P, the method is necessarily reliable. Moreover, when I use it, my beliefs are true, and since I hold 
them for the sake of their truth, their truth is obviously attributable to me. (In Aristotelian terms, 
their truth is the final cause of my beliefs.) But is the reliability of my method attributable to me? It 
seems so. After all, since my aim is to form true rather than false beliefs, I make a concerted effort 
to ensure that I do, an effort that explains why I am reliable. If that’s right, GETTING IT RIGHT ON 
PURPOSE entails that my beliefs satisfy NO ACCIDENT. 
It might be worried that this account commits me to an implausible form of doxastic 
voluntarism, according to which I have the same kind of direct, voluntary control over what I 
believe as I do over, for instance, what I imagine, or what I say (at least in English). (Call this direct 
doxastic voluntarism.) The thought here would be that, if I in fact lack this kind of control over 
what I believe, talk of the final causes of my beliefs is inappropriate, since in that case I can neither 
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choose what I believe nor, a fortiori, believe as I do for some particular reason, such as that the 
beliefs I hold are true.  
In fact, however, my embrace of GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE does not commit me to 
direct doxastic voluntarism. Rather, though this account does commit me to some form of doxastic 
voluntarism, the control it requires I have over my beliefs need not be direct, as direct voluntarism 
maintains. Rather, GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE requires only that I have at least the same kind 
of indirect control over my beliefs that I have over, say, whether or not I can play a particular song on 
the guitar.36 As things stand, Leo Kottke’s “Vaseline Machine Gun” is far beyond my abilities as a 
guitarist. However, were I to practice intelligently and diligently, I might be able to play it after a few 
months. Just so, indirect doxastic voluntarism maintains, there are things I can do to cause myself to 
hold some beliefs rather than others. For instance, I might seek out the advice of experts and 
deliberately avoid what I know to be pernicious or irrelevant influences on the content of my beliefs 
(e.g., propaganda, or people in the habit of making claims they do not know to be true). 
My suggestion is that their truth can be the final cause of my beliefs, not because I exercise 
direct voluntary control over my beliefs and deliberately form only true ones, but rather in the sense 
that I form beliefs by way of critical reflection precisely because I know that, properly carried out, it 
will lead me to form only true beliefs. Think about it like this. I want to form only true beliefs. Why? 
Because they’re true! So what do I do? I cannot directly choose which beliefs to hold, but I can 
choose to use a belief-forming method—reflection—that is liable to lead me to form only true 
beliefs. So I choose that method, for the sake of its reliability. I thereby bring it about that I hold 
only true beliefs, with a view to doing just that. In that sense, their truth is the final cause of my 
beliefs. 
Another natural worry about this account is that it might seem to me as though I’m using 
                                                 
36 The idea for this example comes from Rico Vitz’s IEP article, “Doxastic Voluntarism.”  
128 
 
this method even though I’m not, as when some false proposition strikes me as true and I believe it 
for that reason. But isn’t this just a fancy way of saying that I might make a mistake? And why 
should the mere possibility that I might make a mistake make trouble for this account of how my 
beliefs can satisfy NO ACCIDENT? Certainly it would be a problem if for some reason or other it 
were impossible for me to know whether or not it was true that P (for any ethical claim P), since in 
that case I obviously could not believe that P because P. But I have already considered at length and 
found wanting the best argument I know for anything like this position—namely, Street’s argument 
that, if realism is true, the evidence available to us for ethical claims necessarily under-determines 
their truth.  
Of course, this is not to say that it will be easy to use the relevant method. It won’t be. 
Indeed, it isn’t: I often try and fail to use it. In this sense the account is aspirational. Yet I see no 
reason why this should entail that it is an accident that I get it right, when I do, so long as the 
explanation for my doing so in those cases is that I did everything in my power to ensure that 
outcome, as GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE maintains. 
Yamada would disagree with me here. He takes it that it is a necessary condition of non-
accidentally true belief that the method whereby one forms that belief not be too easy to misapply. 
However his arguments for this claim are not convincing. For instance, regarding the method he 
calls “speech,” 
SPEECH: if you see Saddam Hussein give a speech, conclude that he is alive! 
he writes that though the method is clearly truth-conducive, it might yet be too easy to misapply. 
For suppose that, to confuse his enemies in precisely this way, Saddam has made sure that he has 
many doubles. In that case, he says, “it is too easy to misapply the rule by seeing a double giving a 
speech. And we would thus not consider it knowledge even if one came to the correct conclusion by 
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in fact seeing him give a speech.”37 But this is bizarre. The mere fact that someone might take herself 
to see Saddam when she is in fact looking at a double and form false beliefs about him on that basis 
is supposed to show that, if she does in fact see Saddam and comes to believe that he is alive on that 
basis, her belief is at best accidentally true. But why should that be right? Suppose I seem to see 
Saddam, take the time to check to make sure it is indeed him rather than one of his doubles, and on 
that basis infer that Saddam is alive. Why should that fact that someone sloppier than I am might 
have reached the same conclusion even if it were a double entail that the truth of my belief is a mere 
accident?38 
I think what is going on here is that, without realizing it, Yamada is assuming that there is no 
way of distinguishing Saddam from one of his doubles, or at least no way of doing so on the basis of 
their appearances. If that is so, then it may well be impossible to know whether or not I am indeed 
seeing Saddam in a given instance. If it is, then obviously it would be an accident were I to come to 
believe, truly, that Saddam is alive on the basis of the fact that I seem to see him before me. Still, it 
does not follow that it would be an accident were I do so in a possible world in which it is possible 
to distinguish Saddam from his doubles. More importantly for our purposes, nor does it follow that 
the difficulty of using the method specified in GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE entails the 
impossibility of ethical knowledge. For as I have argued at length, Street is wrong: in ethics, we are 
not in the position of being unable to distinguish the true from the false. 
To be clear, none of this is to say it is impossible to form an accidentally true belief using 
SPEECH or a similar method. Supposing that we take Henry to be using HENRY1, Goldman’s false 
barn case is a case of just that: Henry sees a barn and believes, on that basis, that there’s a barn 
before him. But as we saw in §3.2.3, the trouble here is not with Henry’s method but with the 
                                                 
37 Yamada, “Getting It Right By Accident,” pp. 88-89. 




connection between his belief and its truth—in particular, it stems from the fact that the truth of his 
belief here is not attributable to him. However, this sort of thing is explicitly ruled out by GETTING IT 
RIGHT ON PURPOSE, which stipulates that, when I believe that P, I do so because it is true that P. The 
truth of beliefs formed for the sake of their truth is always going to be attributable to the agent who 
holds them. 
 
3.4. Field’s Challenge 
This concludes my response to Benacerraf’s Challenge. Some readers may find this response 
adequate so far as it goes but worry that it is in a way incomplete. For, they will note, I have yet to 
explain how reflection could enable us to sort true from false beliefs in the first place. This is, in 
effect, Field’s Challenge, and my aim in this final section is to answer it. My answer is inspired by 
and modelled on Amie Thomasson’s account of how we can come to know metaphysical modal 
truths, so I’ll begin by saying what that is. 
 Thomasson endorses a kind of simple realism about modality that she calls “Modal 
Normativism.”39 “On the normativist view,” she explains: 
basic metaphysical modal claims do not have the function of tracking or describing special 
modal features of this world—or of describing other possible worlds. Instead, on this view, 
metaphysical modal language serves the function of expressing, teaching, conveying, or  
(re-)negotiating semantic rules (or their consequences) in particularly advantageous ways. 
[…] 
On this view, metaphysical modal language follows certain inferential rules. For 
example, where we have an object-language statement of a semantic rule (or what follows 
from it, perhaps by plugging empirical facts into place-holders), we are entitled to add 
‘necessarily’. So, for example, given the semantic rule that one may only apply ‘bachelor’ 
where ‘unmarried’ may be applied, we can express that in the object language, and add 
‘necessarily’ (in a way that makes that normative status explicit). Thereby, we can arrive at 
the object-language modal indicative: “Necessarily, all bachelors are unmarried”.40 
 
                                                 
39 See Thomasson, “Modal Normativism and the Methods of Metaphysics,” “Norms and Necessity,” “Non-
Descriptivism about Modality: A Brief History and Revival,” and “How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal 
Truths.” 
40 Thomasson, “How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths,” pp. 11-12.  
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The semantic rules Thomasson has in mind here are rules that specify the conditions under which 
some term or concept applies (what she calls “introduction rules”). Generally speaking, 
Normativism holds that the introduction rule for “necessarily” is just that we have before us some 
introduction rule. If we do, we may tack on “necessarily,” thereby making explicit its status as a 
constitutive semantic-conceptual rule. 
Normativism makes possible a straightforward explanation of the possibility of modal 
knowledge, one that has nothing to do with gaining access to Plato’s heaven. In Thomasson’s words:  
The normativist demystifies modal knowledge by considering the move from using language 
to knowing basic metaphysical modal facts expressible in one’s home language to be a matter 
of moving from mastering the rules for properly applying and refusing expressions (as a 
competent speaker), to being able to explicitly convey these constitutive rules in the object 
language and indicative mood, and to generalize and reason from them. While this may often 
be challenging, the move from mastering rules to being able to convey them explicitly in this 
way is not deeply mysterious—something similar must be done in working out grammatical 
rules, cultural behavioral rules, and, in general, in moving from competence to explicit 
instruction.41 
 
In the following passage, she explains the point in a bit more detail: 
 
what explains the ‘broad match’ between our most basic (metaphysical) modal beliefs and 
the basic (metaphysical) modal facts…? Where do our basic metaphysical modal beliefs 
come from? On the whole, when all goes well, they come from our linguistic mastery: first, 
from our mastery of the rules of use for ordinary terms (‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’); and 
second, from our mastery of the introduction rules for modal terms like ‘necessity’, which 
entitle us to stick ‘necessarily’ on to an object language expression of a rule of use, and so 
can bring us to reject a statement that there is a married bachelor, and to believe that it’s 
necessary that bachelors are unmarried. Why do these beliefs tend to ‘match’ the modal 
facts? Talk of modal facts just involves hypostatization out of modal truths. On the 
normativist view, we can legitimately introduce a claim of metaphysical necessity by adding 
“Necessarily” on to any statement P that is an object-language expression of an actual 
semantic rule. And, employing a deflationary theory of truth, we are entitled to infer from 
“Necessarily P” to “it is true that [Necessarily P]”. Where we have a true claim of the form 
“Necessarily P”, we can also engage in trivial truth-preserving inferences that entitle us to 
infer from the true claim, “Necessarily P” to “It is a fact that P is necessary”. Talk of modal 
facts just involves hypostatization out of necessary truths, and necessary truths just are 
object-language expressions of rules of use. The question of why our metaphysical modal 
beliefs tend to be true can just be reduced to the question of why we tend to be able to 
accurately express rules of use in object-language indicatives, and that can be explained by 
                                                 
41 Thomasson, “Norms and Necessity,” p. 152 
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our linguistic competence (including competence with the term ‘necessity’).42 
 
In short, normativists hold that, to come by modal knowledge, we need only draw on our mastery of 
the semantic-conceptual rules that govern our language. Moreover, to explain how we can be reliable 
about modal matters, or how it can be that our modal beliefs tend to match the facts, the 
normativist draws on a deflationary theory of truth and facts to suggest the question is equivalent to 
the question how it is that our modal beliefs tend to be true. The answer to that question, 
normativists in effect say, is just that we understand the rules of the language of which we are 
competent speakers.  
I want to tell a similar story about how reflection enables us to sort true from false ethical 
beliefs. In chapter 1, I suggested that the rules of the game of giving and asking for ethical reasons 
take the form of what Mark Lance and Margaret Little call “defeasible generalizations.” These are 
claims like the following: 
• Ceteris paribus, lying is wrong. 
• Other things being equal, the fact that some activity would cause someone pain is a reason 
not to engage in it. 
• Defeasibly, it would be wrong not to help someone in need if one could easily do so. 
• Generally speaking, it is wrong to keep more than enough of some essential resource for 
oneself if others are struggling to meet their basic needs. 
• Typically, one ought to comply with others’ expressed wishes. 
 
As with other semantic-conceptual rules, I suggested there, we learn these when we learn language; 
we must, since mastery of these rules is required for linguistic competence. 
 This basic picture suggests a straightforward response to Field’s Challenge. Ethical reflection 
is a way of acquiring ethical knowledge because “reflection” is just what we call the process of 
drawing on our understanding of the linguistic-conceptual rules that govern our language to 
determine whether or not some term or concept applies in a given circumstance.  
                                                 
42 Thomasson, “How Can We Come to Know Metaphysical Modal Truths?” p. 26. 
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In what Lance and Little call “privileged” contexts—those picked out by defeasible 
generalizations—the relevant thought process might go something like this. Suppose I come to find 
out that I’ve been misled. Perhaps, for instance, I learn that some shirt I was told was “ethically 
sourced” was in fact manufactured in one of the many Bangladeshi textile factories that abuse and 
mistreat workers in a variety of ways, among them by discouraging workers from taking bathroom 
breaks, forcing them to work overtime to meet unrealistic targets, and requiring them to work in 
unsafe working conditions. (To give just one example: in 2013, workers were forced to return to 
work at Rana Plaza the day after its owners were warned the building was not structurally sound, a 
decision that resulted in more than 1,100 deaths and more than 2,500 injuries when the building 
collapsed.43) Noting that no relevant defeating conditions obtain that would exonerate the seller’s lie, 
I may infer, and thereby come to know, that the seller acted wrongly. 
In a non-standard context, by contrast, the process might look something like this. Suppose 
I learn that my friend Sam lied to an ICE officer about the whereabouts of a refugee who, if caught, 
would be deported to his home country and tortured. Suppose I wonder whether or not Sam was 
wrong to do so. So I ask myself: do any defeating conditions obtain? That is, is there anything non-
standard about the circumstances in which Sam lied? Drawing on my command of the relevant 
defeasible generalization, I might notice that there is. I might note that, had he told the truth, Sam 
would have caused the refugee a good deal of harm and done no good, whereas by lying, he did no 
real harm but greatly benefitted the refugee. Or, having just been reading political philosophy,44 I 
might think that in attempting to deport refugees like the one Sam protected, the United States 
government and its agents are claiming for themselves a kind of authority no state can legitimately 
claim for itself. If I am persuaded that this is right, I will see Sam’s act not just as permissible but as 
                                                 
43 Reece Jones, Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move, pp. 119-120, 134-135. 
44 I’m thinking, for example, of Chris Bertram’s Do States Have the Right to Exclude Immigrants? 
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compulsory, a way of throwing sand in the gears of an unjust institution. In any case, though, so 
long as I judge that relevant defeating conditions obtain, I’ll conclude that Sam did not act wrongly. 
So far I’ve been explaining how reflection can be a means to knowledge of particular moral 
truths, but readers will wonder how it can help us come to know defeasible generalizations 
themselves. It can do so in a couple of ways.  
One is by helping us to understand which contexts are privileged and which exceptional. To 
stick with the example of lying, it can do so by helping us to figure out when a verdict about the 
moral status of a lie calls for explanation. Thinking about the first case, where I was misled as to the 
provenance of my shirt, we may notice that wrongness of the lie is in no way noteworthy or 
surprising and so doesn’t call for explanation. Thinking about cases like the second, where Sam does 
not act wrongly when he lies, we might notice that this is surprising and calls for explanation. In that 
way, we might come to see that contexts in which lying is wrong are privileged. 
Another way reflection can help us come to know defeasible generalizations is by helping us 
to appreciate which conditions are defeating and why. Suppose I know that lying is defeasibly wrong 
and, in particular, that I know lying is not wrong when, by telling the truth, I would be perpetuating 
or supporting an unjust institution. But suppose I have never considered arguments purporting to 
show that the US immigration system or the prevailing border regime more generally are unjust. In 
that case, I might well judge that Sam did act wrongly when he lied to the ICE agent. But suppose I 
reflect on the justice of US immigration policy and become convinced that it is massively unjust and 
that cooperating with ICE agents amounts to perpetuating that injustice. Then, I would judge that 
Sam did not act wrongly, as I do in the example described above. In this way, reflection can help me 
not just to see defeating conditions where I didn’t before, but also to understand them. 
The foregoing account is only available to simple realists. As with the redundancy- and 
under-determination-based defenses of debunking arguments, I doubt explanatory realists have a 
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satisfactory answer to Benacerraf’s Challenge and Field’s Challenge; in this sense, I agree with 
Benacerraf and Field. In part this is because I regard explanatory realism as unintelligible in virtue of 
its commitment to the pseudo-possibility that super-gulfs might open up between our beliefs and 
the facts, as I explained in the last chapter. Even if this were not the case, though, Benacerraf and 
Field are right to say that explanatory realists have a hard row to hoe. Some have tried, of course,45 
but in my view, none have succeeded.46 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
Such, then, is my response to the third defense of debunking arguments I canvassed in chapter one.  
In response to Benacerraf’s Challenge, I agreed that there is an explanatory constraint on 
knowledge, namely the claim I’m calling NO ACCIDENT. However, I argued, Benacerraf is wrong to 
think our beliefs cannot satisfy this constraint if realism is true; in particular, I said, our beliefs will 
satisfy this constraint if we form beliefs only if, and because, they are true. I do not at all mean to say 
that GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE is the only way NO ACCIDENT could be satisfied. There may 
well be others. All that matters for purposes is that, if GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE is indeed 
true for some epistemic agent, her beliefs satisfy NO ACCIDENT.  
In response to Field’s Challenge, I drew on Amie Thomasson’s normativist view of 
metaphysical modal claims to argue that there need be nothing mysterious in a simple realist’s appeal 
to the potential of reflection to help us sort true beliefs. For, I said, reflection may serve that 
purpose even if we lack some nebulous faculty of intuition that allows us to access Plato’s heaven. 
Instead, simple realists can say, reflection is simply the process of drawing on our linguistic 
competence to determine when terms do and do not apply. 
                                                 
45 Probably the most prominent recent attempt is John Bengson’s “Grasping the Third Realm.”  
46 For criticism of Bengson, see Daniel Crow, “Causal Impotence and Evolutionary Influence,” §2.4; for development 
and criticism of another proposal, see Ralf Bader, “The Grounding Argument against Non-Reductive Moral Realism” 
and Elliot and Faraci, “Non-Naturalism and the Third Factor Gambit,” §4. 
136 
 
Together with the previous chapter, these arguments complete my response to debunkers. If 
sound, these arguments show that the strategies I mentioned in chapter one cannot help debunkers 
to block attempts by realists to invoke our capacity for critical reflection as part of an explanation of 













In this final chapter, I round out the picture presented in chapters two and three by taking 
up a variety of objections to my response to debunkers. As a whole, this chapter serves to deepen 
and clarify my remarks in the previous chapters and to further situate my views within the broader 
literature. 
 
4.1. Compatibility with Realism 
I want to begin with three worries about my claim to have offered a realist-friendly response to 
debunking arguments. The first has to do with my suggestion that one can affirm the objectivity of 
ethics while denying the intelligibility of super-gulfs; the second with whether I can countenance the 
possibility of unknowable moral truths; and the third with whether the view I’ve called “simple 





4.1.1. Super-Gulfs and Objectivity 
The notion of objectivity is often understood in such a way as to preclude the possibility that one 
might affirm the objectivity of ethics but deny the intelligibility of super-gulfs. Of course, I am 
committed to regarding such conceptions as confused products of philosophical fantasy. Many 
readers will understandably find this puzzling. They will wonder whether one can coherently affirm 
the objectivity of ethics while denying that it is even so much as intelligible that there might yawn 
between our ethical beliefs and the facts the kinds of gulfs I’ve called super-gulfs. For, they will ask, 
is that not just what it means to say that our ethical beliefs may be objectively true? If it is, then my 
claim that we cannot make sense of the suggestion that there may be a super-gulf between our 
beliefs and the facts commits me to denying the possibility of objectivity itself. 
Fortunately for me, there are other ways of thinking about objectivity. Recall the truth-
conditional conception of objectivity I articulated in chapter one, the conception I said simple 
realists regard as fundamental: 
TRUTH-CONDITIONAL OBJECTIVITY: The moral proposition MP that x is m admits of 
objective truth in the sense that its truth does not depend only on any actual or hypothetical 
agent’s (i) belief or non-cognitive attitude about x’s being m or (ii) non-cognitive attitude 
about x. 
 
So understood, the question we need to answer if we want to know if the truth of some class of 
propositions admits of objective truth is just whether or not their truth depends only on the relevant 
sorts of facts about people’s beliefs and attitudes. Or, what comes to the same thing, we might 
inquire after the truth of the following counterfactual:  
for any actual or hypothetical agent, any belief or non-cognitive attitude about x’s being m, 
and any non-cognitive attitude about x, there is some possible circumstance in which it 
would be false that x is m even if that agent had those beliefs or attitudes.  
 
That is, we might ask whether or not there is any combination of actual or hypothetical agents, 
beliefs or non-cognitive attitudes about x’s being m, and non-cognitive attitudes about x, such that, 
necessarily, if that agent had those beliefs or attitudes, it would be true that x is m. To determine 
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that, we need to think about the truth conditions for the claim in question. If, for example, we want 
to know if the fact that a particular speaker believes that P is among the truth conditions for P, we 
need to consider whether or not P could be true if the speaker did not believe as much. Or, if we are 
interested the relevance of facts about whether or not there is open to some agent a a deliberative 
route to the conclusion that P given a’s subjective motivational set, we need to consider whether or 
not P could be true if there were no such route open to a.1 And so on.  
Now as a matter of fact I doubt that these or any other facts that would prevent ethical 
judgments from being such as to admit of objective truth are among their truth conditions. If I am 
told that someone believes that P, that the belief that P would be among her ethical beliefs were her 
all her beliefs in reflective equilibrium, that there is a deliberative route to P from her subjective 
motivational set, that she plans to act in accordance with P, or some such, I take it not just that there 
has not yet been adduced sufficient evidence for the claim that P but that nothing whatsoever that might 
reasonably be called evidence for P has so far been put forward: facts of these sorts just seem 
irrelevant if what we care about is whether or not some normative claim is true!  
However, nothing in my argument hangs on whether or not I am right about this, since the 
crucial point for my purposes is, not that realism is true (though I believe it is), but that the response 
to debunkers I outlined in §1.2.1 is open to at least some realists (namely simple realists). For my 
purposes, then, what matters is just that there does not seem to be any reason I would need to avail 
myself of the possibility of a super-gulf opening up between my beliefs and the facts in order to 
defend the objectivity of ethics in the way I just described. For suppose that I am right: there is just 
no making sense of the (alleged) possibility that a super-gulf yawns between our ethical and related 
epistemic beliefs and the corresponding facts. Why should that entail that the answers to the kinds 
of counterfactual questions I canvassed at the end of the previous paragraph cannot turn out to be 
                                                 
1 I take the ideas of a “deliberative route” and a “subjective motivational set” from Bernard Williams. See his “Internal 




Indeed, if anything the fact that we need not worry that super-gulfs might open up between 
our ethical beliefs and the facts makes that much easier the evaluation of the relevant 
counterfactuals. For in that case, it is not open to debunkers to appeal to the (alleged) possibility 
that, while I think some class of facts is irrelevant to the question whether or not our ethical 
judgments are true, and while, by the lights of all competent practical reasoners, they are, it is not 
clear that such facts really are irrelevant. For this would just be to suggest that a super-gulf might in 
fact yawn between my beliefs and the facts. 
 
4.1.2. Recognition-Transcendence and Unknowable Moral Truths 
 
Next I want to consider an objection inspired by Michael Dummett. Dummett thought the defining 
commitment of realism had to do with recognition-transcendence: according to realism, as 
Dummett saw things, there are or anyway can be facts that are unrecognizable in principle.2 This is 
not universally accepted; for example, Crispin Wright denies as much in the following passage: 
There are, no doubt, kinds of moral realism which do have the consequence that moral 
reality may transcend all possibility of detection. But it is surely not essential to any view 
worth regarding as realist about morals that it incorporate a commitment to that idea.3  
 
Still, Dummett’s view has been influential enough that some philosophers would think my response 
inconsistent with realism were it to depend on denying (in Wright’s terms) “that moral reality may 
transcend all possibility of detection.” Moreover, it might seem that I do deny recognition-
transcendence; in particular, my claims about super-gulfs might be thought tantamount to a denial of 
recognition-transcendence across the board. Is that right?4 
In fact it’s not. To illustrate the point, I’ll discuss three different claims that might plausibly 
                                                 
2 Dummett, “Realism.” 
3 Wright, Truth and Objectivity, p. 9. 
4 Thanks to Steven Gross and Richard Bett for pushing me to think about this. 
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be taken to have recognition-transcendent truth-conditions, explaining how I can allow for that 
possibility even as I deny that we can make sense of super-gulfs.  
Consider first Goldbach’s conjecture, according to which every even, positive integer greater 
than or equal to 4 can be expressed as the sum of two primes.5 Goldbach first made the conjecture 
in a letter to Euler in 1742, and mathematicians have been trying to prove it ever since. As of 2012, 
it has been proven for integers less than 4x1018, but so far as I can tell, it’s anyone’s guess whether or 
not anyone will ever find a fully general proof. Plausibly, then, the truth or falsity of Goldbach’s 
conjecture is recognition-transcendent. Does that mean that there might be a super-gulf between my 
belief in the Goldbach conjecture and the facts? 
It might seem that it does. For even though we have a fair amount of evidence that the 
conjecture is true, there is still room to ask whether it really is. But this line of thought confuses run-
of-the-mill belief-fact gulfs with super-gulfs. Nothing I have said is intended to deny that we can 
make sense of the possibility of error in cases where we lack some relevant evidence or have yet to 
consider some relevant possibility, and this is precisely what is going on in this case. That the 
conjecture has been proven for integers less than 4x1018 certainly gives us some reason to think it’s 
true, but we cannot yet rule out the possibility that there is some even integer greater than 4x1018 for 
which the conjecture does not hold. Until we can, we will lack some relevant evidence, and it will be 
easy to make sense of the suggestion that the conjecture might not really be true. Moreover, the 
suggestion will remain intelligible even if we never rule out that possibility. 
Suppose, however, that we did have before us a proof of the conjecture, one that was by all 
accounts impeccable. If, in that case, someone were to ask whether the conjecture was really true, 
that question would ask after a super-gulf, and we would rightly be puzzled by it. But to deny the 
intelligibility of this question is not to deny that of the suggestion that, since we do not know 
                                                 
5 Eric Weisstein, “Goldbach Conjecture.” 
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whether or not it holds for even integers greater than 4x1018, the conjecture might not really be true. 
Nor, accordingly, is it to deny that the truth or falsity of Goldbach’s conjecture might be 
recognition-transcendent. 
Consider next an empirical claim discussed in this connection by Hilary Putnam: there are no 
intelligent extraterrestrials.6 Like that of Goldbach’s conjecture, the truth of this claim is plausibly 
unknowable. There might be—in fact, probably are—parts of the universe we will never be able to 
investigate simply because they’re too far away. If there are, then we will never be able to rule out 
the possibility that there is intelligent life there. Suppose I nevertheless form the belief that there are 
no intelligent extraterrestrials and that, having expressed that belief to a friend in conversation, she 
expresses doubt as to its truth. Is she entertaining the pseudo-possibility that there is a super-gulf 
between my belief and the facts? She certainly needn’t be. Her reservations might stem from 
precisely the possibility just mentioned: there are parts of the universe we haven’t yet investigated 
yet, and there might be intelligent life there. This possibility is clearly relevant to the truth of my 
claim. To be sure, that we haven’t yet ruled it out entails that there might be a gulf between my belief 
and the facts, but this is a garden-variety belief-fact gulf, not a super-gulf.  
Consider, finally, two ethical claims, the truth of which is plausibly recognition transcendent. 
Plausibly, those who can afford to ought to give some of their money to charity, but how much 
exactly? As has recently been pointed out by Sarah McGrath, it may be impossible to know: 
Let’s assume that (1) I am morally required to give at least one dollar of my annual income 
to charity (if I failed to do this, I would be violating a moral obligation that I have) but that 
(2) I am not morally required to give all of my annual income to charity. Consider then the 
series of claims “I am morally required to give at least $1 of my income to charity”; “I am 
morally required to give at least $2 of my income to charity”;…“I am morally required to 
give at least $z of my income to charity” (where z represents my total annual income). If 
classical logic applies to moral propositions, then there is guaranteed to be some highest 
number n such that (i) I am morally required to give n dollars to charity, but (ii) I am not 
morally required to give n+1 dollars to charity. However, even if I’m thinking rationally and 
am knowledgeable about the nonmoral facts, it doesn’t follow that I’m in a position to know 
                                                 
6 Putnam, “Are Values Made or Discovered,” p. 107. 
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what that dollar amount is.7 
 
Another, similar case has been proposed by Clayton Littlejohn: 
consider a series of increasingly dangerous neighborhoods and consider the plight of a 
parent who has to determine whether to let the kids out to play unsupervised or to keep the 
kids indoors where it is safer.”8  
 
Where exactly is the cut-off point beyond which it would be reckless to let the kids play 
unsupervised? Again, it may be impossible to know. 
The trouble in these cases is a bit different from that in the other two cases we’ve 
considered. In each of those cases, it was clear what evidence we needed but lacked. We cannot say 
whether Goldbach’s conjecture is true because we lack a proof, and we cannot say whether there are 
intelligent extraterrestrials because there are places in the universe we haven’t been and may never be 
able to go. In these cases, by contrast, it is less clear what evidence we need. In the first case, we 
obviously need some consideration that would distinguish the minimum permissible amount of 
money we are obligated to give from an amount that is close but insufficient. In the second, we need 
some reason to think some neighborhood is too dangerous for the kids even though a slightly less 
dangerous one is not. The trouble, in each case, is that it’s just not clear what kinds of considerations 
might help us decide where exactly to draw the line. 
Does it follow that there might be a super-gulf between my beliefs and the facts about how 
much I’m obligated to give to charity or where it’s safe for my kids to play? Again, no. Certainly it’s 
the case that, were I to assert that I’m obligated to give $300 and not a penny more this year, 
someone might intelligibly ask whether that’s really all I’m obligated to give. But this needn’t be an 
attempt to ask about a super-gulf. Instead, a question like this might be motivated by the 
                                                 
7 McGrath, “Moral Realism without Convergence,” p. 72. McGrath is picking up on ideas previously discussed by Jussi 
Suikkannen and Ralph Wedgwood. See Suikkanen, “Williamson and (Moral) Realism” and Wedgwood, “There Are 
Unknowable Moral Truths.” 




straightforward observation that $300 is not really so different from $301 or $297. How, the 
question would then ask, can I be so sure that the right amount is $300 rather than a bit less or a bit 
more? It is hard to see how I might come up with an answer; nevertheless, the gulf is ordinary: it 
stems from my lack of evidence required by the rules of the game of giving and asking for ethical 
reasons rather than from the essential inadequacy of the game itself. 
I take these considerations to show that my claims about super-gulfs do not commit me to 
denying that ethical or any other types of facts may be recognition-transcendent. In addition, they 
help to further clarify the nature of super-gulfs. A super-gulf, I hope it will now be clear, is a gulf 
between our beliefs and the facts that might yawn even if, having considered all of the relevant 
possibilities and gathered all relevant evidence, there is every indication that we are correct and none 
that we are wrong, where which possibilities and evidence are relevant is itself a question to be 
settled through substantive debate. In other words, questions about super-gulfs are supposed to 
express concerns about the reliability of our investigative practice as a whole. Questions about run-
of-the-mill belief-fact gulfs, by contrast, ask whether we have satisfied the standards constitutive of 
that practice. 
 
4.1.3. “So, we just make it all up…?” 
Finally, I want to consider an objection stemming from my suggestion, in chapter one, that ethics is 
just a sort of language-game—the game of giving and asking for ethical reasons, I’ve called it. If 
that’s so, critics will wonder, doesn’t it follow that we do just make it all up after all? And isn’t a view 
like that at odds with realism? 
 I take it the worry here is that, if we make up the game of giving and asking for reasons, we 
make up the ethical facts. For if we get to decide the rules of the game, the thought goes, we could 
just easily have played a radically different game, one where—for example—garments count as 
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ethically sourced only if and because they are made in conditions comparable to those in Bangladeshi 
textile factories. And if the facts are in that way up to us, they can’t be objective. 
 Thomasson confronts a similar objection to her normativist view of modal discourse. In 
response, she insists that 
we must rid ourselves of the mistaken idea that the normativist view entails that if the rules 
were different, different things would have been necessary or possible…. That is simply not 
so. If the constitutive rules governing the letters in ‘building’ for example, were different, 
enabling us to apply ‘same building as’ where a structure is destroyed and replaced with one 
on the same site following a similar architectural plan, then it is not the case that in that 
world a building (now using our term) could survive demolition (whereas in the actual world 
they cannot). Instead, it would be that a building* (their homophonic term) could survive 
demolition. That is a modal truth that is not expressible in our language, but that is not to 
say that it is false at our world; it is just that we do not have the word ‘building*’ and so 
cannot express it. In short, where semantic rules differ, there are differences in what modal 
truths may be expressed, quite simply because the languages differ—but that should be no 
surprise. But that is not to say that which modal claims (if they were to be uttered) would be 
true differs where the languages differ. We need not let the critic worry us on that score.9 
 
In a more recent essay, she puts the point this way:  
Modal normativists can and do accept…independence counterfactuals [i.e., counterfactuals 
like the following: seals would be mammals even in worlds in which there were no speakers 
or thinkers (and so in which we don’t use the relevant terms) at all]: for while the existence 
of a claim (or the meaningfulness of the relevant piece of language) ‘Necessarily, seals are 
mammals’ may depend on human language, its truth, on the normativist view, does not so 
depend. We evaluate the truth of counterfactuals (whatever they are) in ways that hold the 
meaning of the claim intact while we conduct the evaluation. So, in this case as with others, 
when we ask whether ‘Necessarily, seals are mammals’ would be true in other circumstances, 
we do so without changing the meaning of ‘seal’, ‘mammal’, or the other terms in the 
sentence.10 
 
The crucial point here is that the semantic-conceptual rules in question are constitutive, in the sense 
that they determine the meanings of our words and the extensions of our concepts. Given that that 
is so, it cannot be right that, if we had adopted different rules, different modal facts would obtain. 
Rather, if we had adopted different rules, we would be using different words. We would in that case 
be able to express different modal truths, but we wouldn’t have thereby made it the case that different 
                                                 
9 Thomasson, “Norms and Necessity” pp. 153-154. 




truths obtain. The truths we can express now would still hold, just as those we would then be able to 
express hold now. 
I want to make similar claims about the game of giving and asking for ethical reasons. 
Consider a defeasible generalization that plausibly functions as a constitutive rule of our game: 
defeasibly, it would be wrong not to help someone in need if one could easily do so. The objector 
worries that, had we instead played a game governed by the opposite rule, according to which it 
would be defeasibly wrong to help someone in need if one could easily do so, then that would be 
true. Note that, in this alternative game, it is not just that it would sometimes be wrong to help 
someone if one could easily do so, as it would be in ours if helping them involved becoming a 
collaborator in the commission of some injustice (for example). This alternative game is supposed to 
differ much more radically from ours. In it, the default situation is that it would be wrong to help 
someone if one could do so easily; only in exceptional circumstances would it not be wrong to do 
that. My suggestion here is that, provided we hold fixed the meanings of “help,” “easily,” and all the 
other words in the generalization, we must regard their word “wrong” as having a different meaning 
than does our word “wrong.” In the mouths of participants in this fictional game, “wrong” stands to 
our “wrong” in the same position as “building*” does to our “building” in Thomasson’s example: 
though homophonic, the words, and their meanings, are distinct. 
To be sure, the point needs to be stated carefully so as not to rule out the possibility of 
substantive disagreement about ethical matters; a full treatment of the issue is beyond the scope of 
my project, but I say a bit more about this in the subsequent sections. In any case, if this general 
picture is correct, I can reply to the objection in basically the same way as does Thomasson. Even if 
we played this alternative game, it would not then be the case that it would be wrong to help those 
in need if one could do so easily, or at least that does not follow in any sense that I need worry 
about. For though it would in that case be true that (mentioning this different word) it would be 
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wrong to help in that circumstance, it would not be true that (now using our word) it would be 
wrong to help in that circumstance. Things would be otherwise, of course, if facts about what sort 
of game we play or words we use were among the truth conditions for our word “wrong,” but that 
is not the kind of game we have. Our game is such that an act is wrong, when it is, regardless of what 
game we play, what words we use, and, for that matter, whether or not we play any games or even 
exist. We therefore do not get to decide how things stand, ethically speaking. Given that our words 
mean what they do, that is not up to us. 
 
4.2. Schmeasons and Easy Pluralism 
Next I want to take up an objection closely related to this last, one that has been made, in different 
ways, by several people, including David Enoch, Tristram McPherson, Daan Evers, and Bart 
Streumer.11 The thought that animates these philosophers is, in effect, that one has to countenance 
the possibility that super-gulfs might open up between our beliefs and the facts in order to explain 
why we ought to prefer the conclusions supported by good practical reasoning over those supported 
by various apparently similar alternatives. Those alternatives might be embodied in the practices of 
significantly different cultures, of people within our own culture with radically different views, of 
other intelligent life forms, or even of eccentric individuals, but for the sake of simplicity, I will 
mostly just focus on the activity Tristram McPherson calls “schmeasoning.12” In schmeasoning, the 
ethical significance of non-normative facts is exactly the opposite of that they are taken to have in 
good practical reasoning: for instance, the fact that it would cause someone to suffer is a schmeason 
to perform an act. Enoch et al. in effect ask: how can we explain the fact that we ought to endorse 
and act in accordance with those conclusions supported by good reasoning rather than those 
                                                 
11 See Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, pp. 122-128; McPherson, “Against Quietist Normative Realism,” pp. 232-238; and 
Evers and Streumer, “Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?” 
12 “Against Quietist Normative Realism,” §4. Enoch talks in this connection about “counter-reasoning,” which seems to 
be the same thing. 
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supported by good schmeasoning? In other words, they ask 
THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION: How can we explain the fact that, if we want to know what 
we ought to do, we should we reason instead of schmeason? Or in other words, why should 
we accept those claims about what we ought to do for which we have good reasons rather 
than those for which we have good (schmood?) schmeasons? 
 
If we entertain the (alleged) possibility that a super-gulf might open up between our beliefs and the 
facts, it can seem clear what form the requisite explanation would have to take. Regarding some 
claim, P, such that good schmeasoning entails we ought to endorse P but good reasoning entails we 
ought to reject P, we can ask: given that the standards recognized by these two different discourses 
suggest divergent conclusions, what ought we in fact to do? Here the suggestion is that there is a 
super-gulf between the conclusion recommended by one of these practices and the facts, and we are 
being asked to compare each of the relevant conclusions to reality from sideways on so as to 
vindicate the one practice and undermine the other. The idea is that, if only we could do so, we 
could explain why we ought to reject P by noting that, as a matter of fact, P. If, though, we think 
super-gulfs are unintelligible, this option is not open to us. In that case, it can easily seem unclear 
how else we might explain the fact that we ought reject P.   
Fortunately for me, though, the objection is confused. To see why, note first that it leaves 
ambiguous the precise nature of schmeasoning. Suppose that we are in the position of radical 
interpreters,13 observing a person or people engaged in schmeasoning, and suppose that they do 
something that resembles what we call reaching a conclusion they take to be supported by good 
schmeasons. In particular, they appear to take themselves to have good schmeasons to believe a 
claim they express using the sounds we would make were we to say following words: “given that 
they are disproportionately responsible for the climate-related harms people in poor countries are 
liable to suffer, it would be wrong for residents of wealthy countries to go out of their way to 
prevent those harms.” I take it that there are extremely compelling reasons to think their historical 
                                                 
13 On this notion, see Davidson, “Radical Interpretation” and “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” 
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responsibility for climate change obligates residents of wealthy countries to work to mitigate climate 
change and the climate-related harms it will inflict on residents of poor countries, so suppose that 
we, in our role as radical interpreters, believe as much. Now: how should we understand the 
relationship between the conclusion reached by these schmeasoners and our own view here? 
Two very different views seem possible: on the one hand, we might conclude that 
schmeasoning is a completely different discourse or practice from the one we call practical 
reasoning, one that only superficially appears to have the same subject matter (namely, what we ought 
to do); on the other, we might conclude that, though schmeasoning is unusual, it is not a different 
practice or discourse but just a highly eccentric form of practical reasoning.14 In the first case, the 
conclusions of schmeasoning do not contradict those of reasoning any more than, say, the claims of 
fashion critics contradict those of climate scientists; in the second, they do. In each case, I will argue, 
we can ask a version of what I have called THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION, but, in neither do we need 
to brook the possibility of super-gulfs in order to answer it.  
Take the second case first. Suppose that we find someone schmeasoning and determine that 
her practice is nevertheless enough like ours that we are willing to call what she does practical 
reasoning by another name—that is, what she calls “schmeasoning” is actually just really bad 
reasoning. If her views are perfectly coherent, she is just an ideally coherent eccentric. In this case, 
THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION amounts to how we can explain to her—and to ourselves—why we 
ought not to reason as she does—how, that is, we can explain why we ought to believe that their 
historical responsibility for climate change obligates residents of wealthy countries to work to 
mitigate climate change and the climate-related harms it will inflict on residents of poor countries. 
As far as I can see, there’s nothing especially mysterious about how to do this: we ought to believe 
                                                 
14 Enoch’s talk in Taking Morality Seriously of a disagreement arising “between a follower of morality and a follower of 
morality*” (p. 112) and of “translating” counter-reasons talk into reasons talk suggests (p. 125) that he might plump for 
this option, but other things he goes on to say in his discussion of Scanlon muddy the waters somewhat. 
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as we do because our belief is true and the ideally coherent eccentric’s false. Similarly, if we instead 
want to explain, not why some particular belief of hers is the wrong one to hold and ours the right 
one, but why hers is the wrong and ours the right way to form ethical beliefs, it is enough to point 
out that she is consistently and systematically mistaken. Here there need be no attempt to climb 
outside our heads,15 look at the two beliefs or ways of thinking in question from sideways on, and 
verify that the one rather than the other corresponds to or reliably leads us to beliefs that 
correspond to the world: since this person is ex hypoethesi engaged in the same practice we are, truth 
needn’t be anything more than disquotability.16 
Consider now the first precisification of THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION I mentioned, the one 
on which reasoning and schmeasoning are understood as distinct discourses or practices. Here it is 
helpful to consider an analogy with two different games. In particular, consider a variant of chess 
McPherson calls “schmess.”17 Schmess is the same as chess except that in schmess, knights may 
move diagonally only, like bishops. Now suppose I and a friend are playing chess and, after I have 
moved my knight in the normal way, my friend objects on the grounds that this violates the rules of 
schmess. Quite reasonably, I might respond by saying that, while true enough, this observation is 
irrelevant: we are playing chess, not schmess. Similarly in the case of reasons and schmeasons, at 
least if these are understood to be distinct discourses or practices. That is, if I am trying to figure out 
whether or not the pain it would cause my niece is sufficient reason not to swat away the stinging 
insect that has just landed on her arm, I will not find it helpful to be told that the fact that it will 
cause her pain is a schmeason to swat the insect. Be that as it may, I might respond, that is 
irrelevant: what I care about is whether or not I have sufficient reason to swat the bug!  
These considerations suggest that THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION is not particularly difficult 
                                                 
15 For the phrase “trying to climb outside our own minds,” see Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 9. 
16 I am thinking here of deflationary conceptions of truth like that defended in Horwich, Truth. For a similar suggestion, 
see McDowell, Mind and World, lecture II, §5 and “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity,” §5. 
17 McPherson, “Against Quietist Normative Realism,” p. 232. 
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to answer on this precisification either. Since THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION assumes we are trying to 
figure out what we ought to do, and since schmeasoning cannot but reasoning can help us to do that, 
it seems obvious that we ought to reason rather than schmeason.18  
This line of thought will seem to miss the point so long as the question whether we ought to 
decide what we ought to do by schmeasoning rather than by reasoning (THE SCHMEASONS 
QUESTION) is thought to be analogous to the question whether we should play chess or schmess. 
But—crucially—that cannot be right. When we ask whether we ought to reason or schmeason to 
figure out what we ought to do, we have already in effect presupposed that the activity we are 
engaged in is reasoning rather than schmeasoning: we want to know how to decide what we ought to 
do, not what we schmought to do. The relevant analogue in the chess/schmess case is accordingly not 
whether we ought to play chess or schmess but, rather, something like this: if I want to know 
whether or not a particular move is allowed in chess, should I consult the rules of chess or schmess? 
Here, it seems, the answer is obviously that we should consult the rules of chess. Similarly, I am 
suggesting, if we want to know what we ought to do, we had better do some reasoning rather than 
waste our time schmeasoning.  
I expect that Enoch et al. will find all of this utterly unsatisfactory for reasons best captured 
using a distinction introduced by McPherson.19 A practice exhibits what McPherson calls “formal 
normativity” just in case it is possible to fail to act in accordance with the standards constitutive of 
that practice. So in contrast to, say, free association or deciding which flavor of ice cream to eat, 
schmess exhibits formal normativity no less than does chess, since it is possible to make an illegal 
move in schmess just as it is in chess. Similarly for reasoning and schmeasoning if these are 
understood as distinct practices: just as one can make mistakes about what reasons one has, one can 
                                                 
18 This argument bears considerable similarity to what Aaron James calls “the Intelligibility Argument” in §5 of his 
“Constructing Protagorean Objectivity.” 
19 “Against Quietist Normative Realism,” pp. 232-233. 
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draw incorrect conclusions about what schmeasons one has. But McPherson thinks—and Enoch, 
Evers, and Streumer in effect concur—the practice of reasoning itself is often thought to be 
superior to that of schmeasoning in a sense that cannot be captured in terms of formal normativity. 
To capture the kind of superiority at issue here, McPherson introduces what he calls “robust 
normativity,” claiming that reasoning is but schmeasoning is not robustly normative. Because I have 
not explained why reasoning is but schmeasoning is not robustly normative, I expect Enoch et al. 
would say, I have not adequately explained how we can answer THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION 
without admitting the intelligibility of super-gulfs. 
I disagree. I think we should be deeply suspicious of the claim that we need to demonstrate 
that one practice or the other is “robustly” normative in order to answer THE SCHMEASONS 
QUESTION, since in my view, it is not even clear what it would mean to do that. McPherson’s appeal 
to chess and schmess in explaining his concern suggests that the relevant precisification of THE 
SCHMEASONS QUESTION here is the first, on which reasoning and schmeasoning are understood as 
distinct practices rather than simply as divergent ethical views. If that’s right, though, there is no 
sense to be made of the question which of the two practices we ought to go in for. The comparison 
with chess and schmess is liable to mislead us here, as it apparently does McPherson. Since in that 
case the question whether we ought to play chess or schmess is perfectly intelligible, it can seem as 
though there were some analogous question to ask in the case of reasoning and schmeasoning. But, 
we should ask, what might that be? The trouble is that, unlike playing chess or schmess, playing the 
game of giving and asking for ethical reasons is in an important sense not optional. Whenever we 
come to consider whether or not we ought to do something, we are always already playing, whether 
we want to or not: in that sense, it’s the only game in town. Hence the oddness of questions like 
“Why ought I to be moral?” and, even stranger, “Ought I to do what I have most reason to do?” We 
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might as well ask whether green things are green!20  
Of course, we might instead ask whether, in order to decide what we schmought to do, we 
ought to reason or schmeason. We could even ask whether, in order to do that, we schmought to 
reason instead of schmeason. But, Enoch et al. would say, none of these questions capture the 
intended force of the question whether reasoning or schmeasoning is robustly normative. That 
question is supposed to invite us to engage in some further practice, independent of and somehow 
more fundamental than either of these, by engaging in which we might determine whether reasoning 
or schmeasoning is in some sense the right practice. But what might that practice be? Indeed, how 
could we even formulate the question that is supposed to invite us to do that? In what sense of 
“right” are we wondering which practice is the right one? 
I hope it will be clear that this suggestion is of a piece with what I have been emphasizing all 
along. When someone wonders whether or not our practice is “robustly” normative, she means to 
be asking a question analogous to the contemporary historian’s question about the accuracy of 
claims made in hagiographies. She is happy to grant me that my practice is formally normative and 
that my conclusions accord with the standards that make it so, but she wants to know: is your belief 
also robustly normative? But this is just a new way of articulating the same philosophical fantasy I 
have been attacking for some time now. Whether we choose to speak in terms of super-gulfs or in 
terms of robust normativity, the issues are the same. 
One upshot might be obvious but is nevertheless worth making explicit. For the most part, I 
have discussed the problem suggested by Enoch, et al. in highly abstract terms, but the point at issue 
throughout has been nothing less than the very possibility of radical social critique of the sort 
exemplified by the abolitionists, critics of institutions like coverture, segregation, and monarchy, and 
various kinds of civil rights activists. For example, instead of schmeasoning and reasoning, I might 
                                                 




have spoken instead of the dispute between proponents and opponents of segregation or slavery 
whose ethical outlooks differed radically. Seen in this light, THE SCHMEASONS QUESTION acquires 
an importance it might not have otherwise seemed to have, and inability to answer it looks like a far 
more significant theoretical shortcoming. Fortunately, nothing in my view precludes an answer.  
It is also worth noting that this same argument allows me to reject the view Jared Warren has 
called “easy pluralism”: 
EASY PLURALISM: in nearby scenarios where we adopt an alternative theory of X 
incompatible with our actual theory of X, that alternative theory is true in the language 
spoken in that nearby scenario.21 
 
Let the claims that constitute some alternative ethical theory—of rightness, say—be P1-Pn. Given 
that what we are talking about is an alternative theory of rightness—as opposed to schmightness or 
whatever—the case in which we adopt this alternative theory is analogous to the case, described 
above, in which we encounter an ideally coherent eccentric. And here as there, we can say that P1-Pn 
are true just in case P1-Pn. That by itself does not rule out the possibility that the truth of P1-Pn 
depends on whether or not we believe P1-Pn; as I emphasized in §§1.5.2 and 4.1.1 above, whether 
that is so is itself a substantive ethical question to be settled be evaluating relevant counterfactuals. 
Importantly, however, my appeal here to minimalism about truth does not commit me to any view 
about the answers to these substantive questions. It follows that I am not committed to EASY 
PLURALISM. This is an important result, since as Warren notes, that it can reject EASY PLURALISM is 




Next I want to consider a worry about disagreement, one that is easiest to bring out using an 
example. Suppose that A and B disagree about the permissibility of abortion: A thinks it is 
                                                 
21 Warren, “Epistemology versus Non-causal Realism,” p. 1652. 
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permissible in a wide variety of cases, but B thinks it is only permissible in cases of rape, incest, and 
those in which the mother’s life is endangered. Suppose that their disagreement stems, as Ronald 
Dworkin suggests all such disagreements do, from differing views about what makes human life 
valuable.22 So A takes the value of a human life to stem primarily from the extent to which a person 
and others have invested in his life—for example through education, forming and maintaining 
various social bonds and relationships, etc. B, by contrast, takes the value of a human life to stem 
primarily from its miraculous character: B thinks each life is a sacred miracle and so must not be 
destroyed except in extreme cases. Because of these views, A takes it to be obvious that the value of 
the mother’s life vastly outweighs that of the fetus, but B thinks the two lives are equally valuable.  
Now, suppose that A and B get to talking about the permissibility of abortion and figure out 
that their disagreement stems from disagreement about this deeper issue. If they have the time and 
the inclination, each might make an argument or two in favor of their position, but soon enough 
their reasons will run out, and if both parties remain unconvinced of their opponent’s view, neither 
will have much of anything left to say to the other. “But,” B might ask A, “don’t you see? That a 
bunch of unthinking matter can organize and maintain itself as a human being is almost incredible! It 
would be tragic to destroy something so miraculous.” We can imagine A responding with 
incredulity. Perhaps she would say something like this: “Really?! I mean, sure, it’s amazing and all 
that, but even so, how could the life an unborn fetus possibly be so valuable that it would be wrong 
for the mother to end the pregnancy on the grounds that having the baby would completely upend 
her life and force her to abandon many goals and projects she has been working on for years?” 
 This kind of impasse is, I take it, familiar enough. It matters for my purposes because my 
views might be thought to license unduly dismissive responses to these kinds of disagreements. For 
it might seem as though I were committed to saying that the questions I just suggested for A and B 
                                                 
22 See Dworkin, Life’s Dominion. 
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ask after super-gulfs and so are unintelligible. If that’s right, then I am committed to approving of A 
responding to B by accusing B of not making sense, and vice versa. Armed with my dissertation, the 
thought goes, they might simply dismiss each other as loons! 
Fortunately, I’m not committed to endorsing any of this. Attempts to ask after super-gulfs 
are characteristically attempts to call into question the reliability of the entire investigative practice. 
They are supposed to invite us to set aside all of our views about what counts in favor of what, 
which principles we can rely on when, and so on and to ask, from sideways on, whether this way of 
going about things is liable to lead us to the truth. But neither of these questions attempts to do 
anything of the sort. The disagreement between A and B is instead a disagreement about the relative 
weight to give two considerations both take to be relevant to questions about the permissibility of 
abortion and that are typically treated as relevant in ethical inquiry generally, namely that human life 
is valuable and that the mother in question has various projects and goals of her own that the birth 
of her child would disrupt enormously. B takes the former consideration to be of decisive 
importance here, while A takes this to be true of the latter. Who is right is, no doubt, a complicated 
question, but the dispute between them is a garden-variety ethical one, not a radical attempt to 
question the reliability of our investigative practice as a whole. 
To be sure, there are more general concerns about disagreement in the offing here. In my 
view, by far the most compelling worry in this vein is Sarah McGrath’s argument that disagreements 
of precisely this sort represent an obstacle to the possibility of moral knowledge.23 Fortunately for 
me, there is good reason to think she is mistaken.24 
 
                                                 
23 See McGrath, “Moral Disagreement and Moral Expertise.”  
24 See Decker and Groll, “On the (In)Significance of Moral Disagreement for Moral Knowledge.” For additional 
discussion and criticism of McGrath’s argument, see Sherman, “Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages”; King, 
“McGrath on Moral Knowledge”; McGrath, “Reply to King”; and King, “Rejoinder to McGrath”; and Setiya, Knowing 
Right from Wrong, ch. 1. 
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4.4. Undetectable Unreliability 
There is, however, another significant worry suggested by disputes like that between A and B, 
disputes in which our spades get turned before we convince another and we are left with little to do 
beyond appealing to one another to reconsider. It is certainly possible that some party to some such 
dispute might wrongly take the possibility her opponent is arguing for to be unintelligible: she might 
simply find herself unable to make sense of the suggestion being put forward. If she does, she might 
simply dismiss her opponent and go on with her life, confident all the while that there are no 
intelligible challenges to her view. So the question arises: is there anything she can do to recognize 
that she’s mistaken? 
If there’s not, I’m in trouble. For suppose that, despite her best efforts to do so, someone 
might fail to recognize that some ethical claim is true or that some question is in fact intelligible; 
suppose further that she has no way of recognizing that this is her situation. It would seem to follow 
that we might be undetectably unreliable at recognizing certain ethical facts. Moreover, provided the 
class of such facts is sufficiently large, it would follow that we might be undetectably unreliable 
about ethical facts generally. If that’s right, then the evidence available to us in ethics is not such as 
to allow us to rule out the possibility that we are radically mistaken, and any ethical beliefs we form 
could be, at best, accidentally true.  
Fortunately, we can come to recognize these sorts of mistakes. To focus the issues, I’ll use an 
example to explain how. 
Consider a proponent of retributive justice, someone who thinks the justification for 
punishment is that some people deserve to suffer for their transgressions. Imagine, for instance, a 
cowboy who believes that a cattle rustler deserves to be hanged. This kind of view is a recurring 
theme in many Westerns but has particular prominence in Owen Wister’s The Virginian, in which the 
main character—introduced by the narrator simply as “the Virginian”—hangs a friend of his for 
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exactly this crime. (The book dramatizes the so-called Johnson County War in 1880s Wyoming, 
where real-life vigilantes actually did similar things.) Now consider how the Virginian might react to 
the suggestion that he’s mistaken, not just here, but in many other cases: in fact, no one deserves to 
die for their crimes—not even rustlers. He would likely find this utter rejection of retributivism so 
foreign to his world view that he would have a hard time making sense of it. Nevertheless, it’s a 
perfectly intelligible view. How might he come to see as much? 
My thought here is an Aristotelian one that John McDowell has expressed in a number of 
places but perhaps most clearly in his response to Bernard Williams,25 namely that there are cases 
such that, before one can come to see the truth in ethics, there is a need for something like 
conversion. At root, the necessary shift is affective: the would-be convert needs to find a way to 
open themselves up to new possibilities. This sort of thing is an essential component of many 
people’s moral education, especially when it comes to confronting entrenched forms of prejudice 
and oppression.26 Often, it involves quite a bit more than simply being told what sort of inferences 
to draw and which claims to believe. I mean to leave it open exactly what else might be necessary, 
but there are lots of plausible candidates: one might read fiction and poetry; watch TV shows, plays, 
and movies; or spend time with or otherwise learn about people different from those one usually 
encounters, visit unfamiliar places and cultures, and otherwise do things one does not normally do.27 
                                                 
25 See “Might There Be External Reasons?”, esp. §4. 
26 Consider, in this connection, the difficulty of recognizing that some of one’s own behaviors and views are racist or 
misogynistic. For example, Kate Manne has recently argued persuasively that many people’s sense that Hillary Clinton 
was a corrupt or seedy individual was, at least in part, a reflection of misogynistic prejudices. See Manne, Down Girl, ch. 
8. Needless to say, many people not only failed to recognize as much during the 2016 presidential election and after but 
continue to deny that their reactions were misogynistic. 
27 In order that pictures, movies, experiences, etc. might serve this function, they would have to play a role in the 
acquisition of moral knowledge different from that envisioned for them by what Sarah McGrath, in her discussion of 
related issues, has called “The Moderate View.” According to the moderate view, “(i) whenever acquaintance with an 
event plays a role in a rational change of mind about some moral issue, it does so in virtue of improving the non-moral 
information available to the person, and (2) in any such case, that information could in principle have been gained in 
some other way” (McGrath, “Normative Ethics, Conversion, and Pictures as Tools of Moral Persuasion,” p. 275). As 
McGrath herself notes, Mark Johnston has in effect gone some way toward developing an alternative to The Moderate 
View in his “The Authority of Affect.” I do not want to endorse every detail of Johnston’s account here, though I do 
think it goes in the right direction. Cf. Heidegger’s discussion of the disclosive role of moods or attunement 
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In general, moral education can involve whatever it takes to enrich and expand one’s moral 
imagination and bring one to see things aright.28   
For the Virginian in particular, it might be particularly helpful to encounter an example—
perhaps in real life, perhaps in a piece of literature or a film—of someone who demonstrates the 
possibility of a very different approach to the world.29 Perhaps this person shuns talk of good and 
bad people in favor of talk of people who do good and bad things. Perhaps he insists that no one is 
irredeemable, illustrating the point with copious stories of redemption through education, therapy, 
and restorative justice processes. Perhaps this person invokes examples of Christian mercy, which 
seem particularly likely to resonate with the Virginian. In any case, encountering someone like this 
might well open the Virginian’s eyes to a very different way of comporting himself, at least provided 
the Virginian found him or her sufficiently relatable and trustworthy. 
If this sort of thing is indeed possible, then the fact that we can make mistakes about which 
challenges to our view are and which aren’t intelligible need not entail that we are undetectably 
reliable in ethics. For we may strive to open ourselves up to possibilities that strike us as bizarre and 
submit ourselves to others’ tutelage, and provided that we pursue our own edification with sufficient 
tenacity and that, if necessary, we can find teachers who are sufficiently dedicated, we will often be 
able to detect even the most stubborn errors. 
To be clear, I do not mean to say that such methods are necessarily effective means to 
recognizing the intelligibility of radically different ways of thinking. More likely than not, some 
students just will not respond in the usual ways to instruction, no matter how tenacious we are as 
teachers. Some readers might think this concession threatens to undermine my defense of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Befindlichkeit) in Being and Time part one, div. I, sec. V, par. 29. 
28 I think it fair to say that something like this thought animates Aristotle’s ethical thought and much of both 
Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s thinking. More recently, Nigel DeSouza has sketched out one way the idea might be 
fleshed out with regard to ethical thought in a provocative essay called “Pre-Reflective Ethical Know-How.” 
29 Such a person would be a work of art in the sense Heidegger spelled out in “On the Origin of the Work of Art”—as is 
the judge in Blood Meridian. 
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possibility that we might detect errors in our thinking and, eo ipso, my defense of the possibility of 
acquiring ethical knowledge via reflection. For, they might note, this is just to say that, at least for 
some people, the relevant errors are undetectable. But this is a mistake. At most, it follows that not 
everyone is capable of acquiring moral knowledge. The fact that some people will fail in their 
attempts to detect errors in their thinking no matter how hard they try and no matter how good and 
dedicated their teachers are could be a general obstacle to the acquisition of ethical knowledge only if 
knowledge were not possible anywhere. For in no domain—not even mathematics or logic—are 
there educational methods such that we can guarantee they will work on any student whatsoever; 
there are only methods that usually work. Since, however, this phenomenon gives us no reason to 
think knowledge impossible in these other domains, it is not clear why it should in ethics. The fact 
that the educational methods available to us in ethics are not foolproof in this sense is accordingly 
not a problem for my position so long as they are—like the methods in other domains—usually 
effective, at least if pursued with sufficient tenacity by both teacher and student. And to me, at least, 
it seems they are. 
 
4.5. Intelligibility and Nonsense 
 
Next, it might be thought that my claims about the intelligibility of the skeptic’s questions tacitly 
presuppose some theory of meaning or criterion of intelligibility, some antecedent view in light of 
which I am declaring defective the questions the skeptic want to ask. I can think of two ways of 
fleshing out this objection.  
On the one hand, it might be thought that I am taking for granted some general criterion of 
intelligibility akin to that sought by at least some of the logical empiricists. For example, Ayer, or at 
least the Ayer of Language, Truth and Logic, seems to have taken himself to have discovered a kind of 
algorithm for determining, in any given case, whether sentence is meaningful: “a sentence is factually 
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significant to any given person,” he tells us, “if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition 
which it purports to express—that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain 
conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false.”30 
On the other, the concern might stem from certain ideas about the nature of nonsense. Over 
the last twenty years or so, there has been a vigorous debate between proponents of two different 
conceptions of nonsense, the so-called “substantial” and “austere” conceptions.31 The substantial 
conception, James Conant explains,  
distinguishes between two different kinds of nonsense: mere nonsense and substantial 
nonsense. Mere nonsense is simply unintelligible—it expresses no thought. Substantial 
nonsense is composed of intelligible ingredients combined in an illegitimate way—it 
expresses a logically incoherent thought. According to the substantial conception, these two 
kinds of nonsense are logically distinct: the former is mere gibberish, whereas the latter 
involves (what commentators on the Tractatus are fond of calling) a “violation of logical 
syntax” or (what commentators on Wittgenstein’s later work are fond of calling) a “violation 
of grammar.” The substantial conception of nonsense can be contrasted with another 
conception of nonsense, which I will call the austere conception of nonsense. According to the 
latter, mere nonsense is, from a logical point of view, the only kind of nonsense there is.32 
 
Those familiar with this debate will have a variety of questions for me. Which of these two 
conceptions do I endorse? Either way, on what grounds? If I endorse the substantial conception, am 
I suggesting that the underdetermination-based skeptic’s questions are substantial or only mere 
nonsense? And, finally, if they are supposed to be substantial nonsense, which syntactic or 
grammatical rules are they supposed to violate? 
I’ll take the objections in order, beginning with the first. I see the debate between people, 
like Ayer, who think it’s possible to formulate some such criterion and others, like Austin and at 
least the later Wittgenstein, who are more skeptical about that, as analogous to the debate about 
                                                 
30 A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 35. 
31 See, inter alia, James Conant “Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein,” “Two Conceptions of Die 
Überwindung der Metaphysik,” “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” and “Three Ways of Inheriting Austin”; Cora 
Diamond, “On What Nonsense Might Be” and “Ethics and Imagination in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”; Hans-Johann 
Glock, “All Kinds of Nonsense” and “Nonsense Made Intelligible”; Edmund Dain, “Wittgenstein, Contextualism, and 
Nonsense: A Reply to Hans-Johann Glock”; Lars Hertzberg, “The Sense is Where You Find It”; and Silver Bronzo, 
“Context, Compositionality, and Nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.” 
32 Conant, “Two Conceptions of Die Überwindung der Metaphysik,” p. 14. 
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particularism in ethics. Just as ethical particularists regard it as a deeply context-sensitive question 
whether and how various considerations bear on the truth of a given ethical claim, Austin and 
Wittgenstein take it that questions as to whether or not a given sentence or utterance is intelligible 
can only be settled by considering the way in which it is being used on the relevant occasion. (In this 
sense, you could say, they are committed to a radicalized version of Frege’s context principle.) 
Moreover, just as particularists deny the possibility of formulating a principle or set or principles that 
would enable us to eliminate the need for phronesis, Austin and Wittgenstein think that attempts to 
formulate a criterion of intelligibility of the kind Ayer thought he had found are, accordingly, 
hopeless. My sympathies here lie with Austin and Wittgenstein. Hence my appeals to ordinary usage 
and questions about how words are being used in the relevant contexts. Consequently, nothing I 
have said is meant to presuppose a criterion akin to that sought by Ayer. 
Turn now to the second objection. Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, I can 
afford to be neutral as to who is right in the debate between proponents of the substantial and those 
of the austere view of nonsense. Certainly there is such a thing as so-called mere nonsense; on my 
view, the “really” questions on which the epistemological challenge depends are examples. But, I can 
afford to allow, there may also be such a thing as substantial nonsense. In any case, nothing in my 
case against the skeptic depends on any claims about the existence of substantial nonsense; nor, a 
fortiori, am I committed to any particular view about the rules of combination our words have to 
obey if they are to be, as Conant puts it, “logically coherent.” 
To be clear, in saying that these questions are, in this sense, mere nonsense, I don’t mean to 
be endorsing Conant’s suggestion, in the passage above, that they are “mere gibberish.” Like the 
term “nonsense” itself, that way of putting the point has polemical connotations I don’t intend. I am 
claiming no more than that it is not clear how we are supposed to make sense of or understand the 
questions the relevant arguments depend on our being able to understand. To be sure, there are 
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various uses to which the relevant words might be put. But as I argued in the chapter two, none of 
those uses are of any help to the skeptic. 
 
4.6. Isn’t It Rather the Realist Who is Caught Up in Fantasy? 
 
Finally, some will also object that I am being unfair to Street and like-minded skeptics, that it is in 
fact not them but the realist who has lost himself in philosophical fantasy. Micah Lott, for example, 
put the point to me as follows: 
it seems that Street will insist that it is the realist who has opened up the super-gulf, not her. 
The sense of “really wrong” [that I have suggested is confused] is not supplied by Street, but 
borrowed from what the moral realist has already asserted – that there are moral facts that 
are “stance-independent”, such that no matter how things looked or seemed from “within” 
our points of view, the moral truths might still be otherwise. We could all be wrong, just as 
everyone was wrong in thinking that the sun went around the earth, rather than vice-versa. 
And that goes for even claims like “it is wrong knowingly to put someone in harm’s way”.33 
 
As I see it, there are two closely-related points being made here that are worth distinguishing: first, 
that the realist is caught up in philosophical fantasy, and second, that Street and like-minded skeptics 
are not. I will say a bit about each of these claims, beginning with the first. 
I am happy to grant the objector that realism as it is most often understood and 
elaborated—both by its opponents and by its proponents—is indeed a fantastic doctrine that allows 
for the (pseudo-)possibility that super-gulfs might open up between our beliefs and the facts. My 
contention is not that no realist is thus caught up in fantasy, but rather just that they needn’t be: as 
I’ve explained, clear-headed realists might at once refuse to countenance the intelligibility of super-
gulfs and maintain the objectivity—or as Lott, following Russ Shafer-Landau, puts it, the stance-
independence—of ethical facts.34 My criticisms of Street and like-minded skeptics are therefore no 
less applicable to realists of a certain sort (namely those I have called explanatory realists). To that 
                                                 
33 Personal communication. Nandi Theunissen, Mario Brandhorst, and Sharon Street also raised versions of this 
objection. 
34 Shafer-Landau introduces this term at Moral Realism: A Defense, p. 15. 
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extent I agree with the objection. 
As for whether or not Street and like-minded skeptics have themselves gotten caught up in 
the kind of philosophical fantasy that makes questions of this latter sort seem to be of the utmost 
importance, I think it is clear—pace Street, Lott, and others—that there is a sense in which they have. 
Regarding Street in particular, that her thinking about these issues is thoroughly permeated by 
fantasy is clear from the fact that she allows proponents of fantastic forms of realism to set the very 
terms of the debate. Thus her criticism of realists is, not that they have lost themselves in a fantastic 
picture of the relationship between our beliefs and the facts, but that they cannot rule out the 
possibility that super-gulfs yawn between our beliefs and the facts. We also see evidence of Street’s 
embrace of the realist’s fantasy in the way that she thinks about constructivism’s advantages over 
realism. Her thought appears to be that, because it views ethical facts as constructions or functions 
of our attitudes, constructivism can do what realism cannot: it can help us to assure ourselves that 
no super-gulfs yawn between our beliefs and the facts.35 For whereas the fantastic realist is 
nonplussed by the questions obsession with and consternation over which I’ve suggested are the 
hallmark of fantastic thought—sure, everything points to its being the case that P, but is it really?—
the constructivist has an easy answer: yes, if the belief that P would be among your beliefs were they 
in reflective equilibrium, no otherwise. Had she seen how deeply confused are these questions—had 
she seen this philosophical fantasy for what it is—she would neither have leveled against the realist 
the criticism she does nor viewed the fact that it enables us to rule out the pseudo-possibility that a 
super-gulf yawns between one of our beliefs and reality as an advantage of her constructivism. After 
all, it is not exactly an advantage of one’s position that it makes possible a solution to a pseudo-
problem.  
Finally, one more aspect of Lott’s objection calls for comment. In the passage above, he 
                                                 
35 See McDowell’s comments on p. 94 of Mind and World for a general description of this common move in philosophy. 
Street, we could say, wants to build a bridge to the facts using materials available on one side of a super-gulf. 
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writes that realists are committed to the view that, so far as our ethical views go, “we could all be 
wrong, just as everyone was wrong in thinking that the sun went around the earth, rather than vice-
versa.” I think this gets things doubly wrong. It is wrong, first, because as I have said, realists need 
not be committed to the claim that we could all be wrong in the sense Lott intends. But it is also 
wrong because the analogy he invokes here fails to illustrate his point. When Copernicus asked 
whether or not the geocentric model of the universe was correct, he wasn’t asking if there was a 
super-gulf between its proponents’ beliefs and the facts. Its revolutionary potential notwithstanding, 
his question was about a run-of-the-mill belief-fact gulf. He observed that some of the available 
evidence seemed better explained by an alternative hypothesis (the heliocentric model of the 
universe) and asked, in light of that observation, whether that alternative hypothesis might be true 














In chapter one, I argued that the most compelling version of the debunking challenge is best 
understood as follows:  
1. If S believes that her belief that P is not e-connected, then S’s belief that P is not justified, 
and S is rationally committed to withholding belief that P.1 
2. Realists are committed to denying that our moral beliefs explain the moral facts. 
3. Realists might therefore affirm that our moral beliefs are e-connected only by affirming that 
those facts explain our beliefs 
4. However, there is compelling evidence that that is not the case. In particular, the best, 
complete explanation of why we form the moral beliefs we do—namely, a broadly 
Darwinian one—neither presupposes nor entails their truth. 
5. Realists, then, are committed to denying that our moral beliefs are e-connected. 
6. Assuming realism, none of our moral beliefs are justified, and, for every moral proposition 
P, we are rationally committed to withholding belief that P. 
 
I suggested that the mistake lies with premise (4). In fact, I argued, the best, complete explanation of 
our beliefs may and at least sometimes does entail the truth of our beliefs, since we sometimes form 
beliefs by means of critical ethical reflection, carefully examining the various possibilities and 
evidence so as to ensure that we see things aright.  
I outlined three rejoinders debunkers might offer at this point. According to the first, an 
explanation of our moral beliefs that appeals to our capacity to know moral reality by way of 
                                                 
1 This is a slightly modified version of the relevant claim in Korman and Locke, “Against Minimalist Responses,” §8; cf. 
Korman, “Debunking Arguments,” §8. 
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reflection is redundant, since we can explain our beliefs just as well if we instead appeal only to our 
antecedent views and moral sensibilities. According to the second, if realism is true, we lack the 
capacity to acquire moral knowledge through reflection, since in that case, the evidence available to 
us in ethical reflection necessarily underdetermines the truth of our beliefs. The third rejoinder, I 
said, is in fact better understood as two distinct objections, Benacerraf’s Challenge and Field’s 
Challenge. Benacerraf’s Challenge contends that there is a causal or explanatory condition on 
knowledge that our beliefs cannot satisfy if realism is true; Field’s Challenge contends that realists 
cannot adequately explain how we could be reliable about ethical matters. Both have the effect of 
problematizing my appeal to our capacity to acquire moral knowledge through reflection. 
 These first two rejoinders, I argued in chapter two, rely on a confused conception of the 
ways we are liable to go wrong in ethical reflection—on what I called a philosophical fantasy. In 
response to Benacerraf’s Challenge, I defended an explanatory account of the no accident condition 
on knowledge I called NO ACCIDENT; in addition, I argued for a novel, teleological account of how 
our beliefs can satisfy NO ACCIDENT, an account I called GETTING IT RIGHT ON PURPOSE. Finally, 
in response to Field’s Challenge, I appealed to a deflationary form of realism I called simple realism 
to argue that, to explain our capacity to come to know objective ethical facts by way of reflection, we 
need only appeal to our capacity to draw on our understanding of the linguistic-conceptual rules 
mastery of which is required for linguistic competence to determine whether or not some term or 
concept applies in a given circumstance. 
 Taken together, these responses to debunkers have the effect of undercutting premise (4) of 
the debunking argument in two ways. First, they illustrate that, debunkers’ insistence to the contrary 
notwithstanding, we have not been given compelling reasons to doubt that, in at least some cases, 
the best complete explanation of our moral beliefs entails their truth. Second, my responses to 
Benacerraf’s Challenge and to Field’s Challenge explain how it can be the case that our ethical beliefs 
168 
 
are e-connected to ethical facts (where, recall, the belief that P is e-connected iff it is explained by or 
explains some facts in the domain P is about). If I am right, the connection consists in the fact that, 
when things go well, their truth is the final cause of our beliefs. This is a good thing, since in my 
view, premise (1) is correct: that they are e-connected to facts in the relevant domain is a necessary 
condition of justification. 
 This response to debunkers contributes to the literature by substantially developing a 
response that has received surprisingly little attention. In fact, and as I noted in chapter one, it only 
seems to have been endorsed by one other philosopher, William Fitzpatrick, who has not developed 
this thought to anywhere near the extent I have here. In addition, I have drawn on Wittgenstein’s 
work in a way that, to my knowledge, no other Wittgensteinian ethicist has and developed and 
defended a teleological account of the possibility of non-accidentally true belief that, again, appears 
to be unprecedented. Finally, I have outlined a deflationary form of realism that is inspired by and 
extends Amie Thomasson’s so-called “normativist” approach to modality. 
Even so, there is considerable room for further development. For one thing, a fuller 
treatment would develop simple realism in a number of respects. The analogy between ethical 
reflection and complex skills like playing music deserves more elaboration, as does the story about 
the social aspects of moral cognition at which I hinted in §4.4 above. Moreover, there is room to 
worry, as Setiya does about some of the views he discusses, that the form of simple realism I have 
outlined predicts more convergence in ethical views than we actually see or precludes the possibility 
that entire communities might go astray. A fuller treatment would need to reckon with these 
concerns. Finally, there are other general challenges to realism requiring a response. These include 
the so-called supervenience challenge, which asks why it should be the case that ethical facts 
supervene on non-ethical ones;2 challenges to cognitivism stemming from worries about how 
                                                 
2 For discussion, see Bader, “The Grounding Argument.” 
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knowledge could be practical, or how ethical knowledge could engage our motives in the way it 
characteristically does; worries about how moral expressions refer;3 and disagreement-related 
challenges to cognitivism of the sort that have recently been pressed by Richard Rowland.4 
Finally, there is a deep problem about the very possibility of epistemic agency that this 
discussion has so far left untouched. The dissertation takes up challenges to the possibility of 
knowledge or justified belief stemming from facts about the influences on the content of our belief 
or our moral reasoning faculties, contending in effect that these arguments fail to take sufficiently 
seriously the possibility that our beliefs may be shaped, in addition, through the exercise of epistemic 
agency. In reality, I’ve suggested, we needn’t be the hapless victims of our circumstances these 
arguments take us to be—the epistemic equivalents, I said, of a boat whose captain has absconded; 
instead, we can take the helm, thinking carefully about whether or not to indulge our various 
inclinations with a view to ensuring that our beliefs match the facts. Yet there is a deep problem, 
different from but related to those I have discussed, about how this could be so much as possible, a 
problem that parallels worries about free will and moral responsibility. Given a broadly naturalistic 
viewpoint, we can ask, how is it even possible to be epistemically responsible for our beliefs? 
Moreover, how can we make room for the possibility of holding each other epistemically 
responsible without embracing an implausible form of doxastic voluntarism that, besides involving 
dubious metaphysical commitments, seems likely to preclude the possibility that we are sometimes 
less open to criticism for holding mistaken or reprehensible beliefs when those beliefs are at least 
partly explained by our circumstances? 
The issues here are difficult and complicated, and answers are unlikely to come easily. 
Fortunately, these are problems for another day. For now, it is enough to have explained why the 
                                                 
3 For discussion, see McPherson, “Semantic Challenges to Normative Realism.” 




mere fact that our thinking about how to live is subject to irrelevant influences needn’t entail that 
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